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This thesis investigated the prospects of the transformation of civil and political rights through 
the courts in Zimbabwe. The arguments made were based on the concepts of transformative 
adjudication and transformative constitutionalism as contemplated by Karl Klare. The adoption 
of a new Constitution in 2013 and the subsequent establishment of the Constitutional Court as 
the highest court in Zimbabwe made this study necessary. It is argued that the Constitution 
adopted in 2013 is transformative and the courts must ensure that the hopes and aspirations of 
the people embodied in the Constitution are realised. This argument is based on the 
understanding that there is a lack of political will to drive transformation through political or 
other legislative processes. Zimbabwe’s constitutional history was explored to make a case for 
transformation. Therefore, the views of scholars on constitutional transformation and 
transformative adjudication were considered. It was observed that court-led transformation 
would be an ambitious project given the volatile political situation in Zimbabwe where the 
denial of civil and political rights is used as a tool for silencing opposition and maintaining 
power by the political elite. It may be ambitious, but not impossible, for the Zimbabwean 
judges to take the lead on the transformation of civil and political rights. Lessons were drawn 
from the discussions of the South African Constitutional Court, and the Kenyan Supreme Court 
to carve a path for judiciary-led transformation. The study recommended a change of attitude 
and interpretative methods by Zimbabwean judges. The thesis also recommended that whilst 
engaging in judiciary-led transformation, judges should consider other adjudication methods 
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1.1 Introduction   
 
For two decades, Zimbabwe has been in socio-economic and political distress. Its post-colonial 
history is characterised by several legal and political challenges. Before 2013, the main legal 
challenge was how to deal with a Constitution1 that had lost its relevance in the face of a new 
generation calling for a people-driven constitutional making process. As such, a new 
Constitution2 was adopted and a new Constitutional Court was established in 2013.3 Under the 
new Constitution, the challenge is how to fulfil its constitutional values and principles in the 
face of political rigidity. It is believed that constitutional courts entrusted with the interpretation 
of the supreme laws of democratic states play a crucial role in legal and social transformation 
processes.4 The adoption of a new Constitution, together with the establishment of a new court 
as a custodian of the supreme law, represents the will and power to do away with the old order 
and usher in a new one based on respect for the rule of law and democracy. This custodianship 
places the courts at the centre of transformation and the democratisation process. However, this 
can only be carried out if the courts are well equipped in respect of their legal culture and 
interpretation of constitutional texts.5  This would require a change of judicial mindset and 
methodology as ‘they must be examined and revised so as to promote equality, a culture of 
democracy and transparent governance.’6 The same holds for the new Constitutional Court of 
Zimbabwe. The Court has a dual role; to transform and to legitimise its work to avoid 
confrontation with the political arms in its adjudication of civil and political rights. 
 
1 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980. 
2 The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Zimbabwe Constitution, 2013). 
3 Ibid. Section 166(1) states that the ‘Constitutional Court is a superior court of record and consists of- a.) The 
Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice; and b.), five other judges of the Constitutional Court.’ 
4 R Maruste “The role of the Constitutional Court in democratic society.” (2007) 13 Juridica International. 8 -13. 
5 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism.” (1998) 14 (1) South African Journal on Human 
Rights,146-188. 




It is posited that the 2013 Constitution is transformative and the Constitutional Court, as the 
custodian of this document, needs to read and interpret it in a manner that gives life to its 
transformative vision. Unless the Court adopts this sort of interpretation, the Constitution will 
be a missed opportunity at bringing about real change in the country in respect of rights to 
assembly and freedom of expression.  
The work of Karl Klare is used to guide the conceptualisation of what transformative 
constitutionalism and transformative adjudication mean. It is conceded that delivering 
transformation is a duty placed on all arms of the state. In the absence of the political will to 
drive such transformation however, the judiciary must play a leading role in ensuring that the 
transformative object of the Constitution is realised. This study, therefore, focuses on the 
adjudicative role of the courts, particularly the Constitutional Court in the transformation 
process.  
An exploration of Zimbabwe’s constitutional history shows that the adoption of a new 
Constitution in 2013 was long overdue. Several attempts had been made to write a new 
constitution. These were, however, always blocked by deadlocks in respect of both substance 
and the procedure for the drafting of an acceptable document to all parties.7 Historically, new 
constitutions are often preceded by a period of conflict. Zimbabwe is no exception to this.8  
 In 1979, Zimbabwe’s (known as Rhodesia then) political parties agreed on a Constitution that 
would see the holding of free and fair elections and usher in a new era of universal suffrage.9 
The Constitution was adopted and became known as the Lancaster House Constitution.10 The 
 
7See for example K Vollan “The Constitutional History and the 2013 Referendum of Zimbabwe.” (2013). A 
NORDEM Special Report. 
8 Zimbabwe’s political conflict, from land reform to 2008 electoral violence. See for example B Raftopoulos “The 
2013 elections in Zimbabwe: The end of an era.” (2013) 39 (4) Journal of Southern African Studies 971-988. 
9 Elections had been held in April 1979 which saw Bishop Abel Muzorewa becoming the Prime Minister of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, a country which was largely not recognised internationally.  
10 See Lancaster House Agreement, 21 December 1979. Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Held at 
Lancaster House, London September - December 1979 Report in paragraph 1 says ‘Following the Meeting of 
Commonwealth Heads of Government held in Lusaka from 1 to 7 August, Her Majesty's Government issued 
invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to participate in a Constitutional Conference 
at Lancaster House. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an 
Independence Constitution, and that elections should be supervised under British authority to enable Rhodesia to 




Lancaster House Constitution survived from 1980 to 2013 after going through a total of twenty 
Amendments.11 The 20th Amendment became the new Constitution as it was a complete 
overhaul of the Lancaster House Constitution. The Constitution adopted in 2013 was to see a 
new era of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.12 Following this adoption, 
a Constitutional Court was established as a guardian of the Constitution.13 
It is against this background that this study sought to explore and analyse the disjuncture 
between the transformative object of the Constitution and the interpretative methods adopted 
by the Zimbabwean judiciary. The idea of transformation in Zimbabwe is contemplated within 
the constitutional framework. The values of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe reflect a fresh 
system of democratic governance, openness, accountability, the rule of law and guarantees 
fundamental rights and freedoms.14 The new Constitution has provisions that highlight its 
transformative objective.15 However, there are laws, previously introduced to complement the 
Lancaster House Constitution, whose compatibility with the new Constitution is no longer 
viable and hence require realignment, and in some cases a complete overhaul.16 The new legal 
order raised the hope for a nation founded on the principles of the rule of law, good governance, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and all legislation and state conduct must 
 
11 Some of the most notable amendments were: Amendment No. 7 (Act 23 of 1987) which abolished the position 
of a Prime Minister and created an Executive President, Amendment No. 9 (Act 31 of 1989) abolished the bi-
cameral legislature. Amendment No. 11 (Act 30 of 1990) allowed for corporal punishment and also that capital 
punishment in the form of hanging by the neck did not constitute inhuman and degrading punishment. Amendment 
No. 13 (Act 9 of 1993) made delays in the enforcement of capital punishment constitutional. Amendment No. 16 
ousted the court’s jurisdiction in matters involving compensation on land. Amendment No. 17 restricted freedom 
of movement.  
12Section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 states that the Constitution is founded on respect values and 
principles which include the rule of law, supremacy of the Constitution, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
good governance among others.  
13The Constitution was adopted in 2013 after a constitutional making process led by Parliamentary Constitution 
Select Committee co-chaired by members of the two main political parties and a national referendum in 2013.  
14Section 3 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.   
15 The inclusion of a Declaration of Rights in the Constitution is a clear indication of its transformative nature.  
16According to SADC Lawyers Association, 2014 ‘In Zimbabwe, the government announced a programme to 
align more than 450 pieces of legislation with the country’s 2013 Constitution. However, despite the public 
pronouncements about the programme, there is scepticism over the government’s willingness to ensure that the 
laws are indeed aligned with the Constitution.’ See also M Makonese “Developments in the SADC region: A 




reflect this. At present, the Constitution is still to usher in the much-needed change. The country 
is still suffering violations of the rule of law and human rights, particularly civil and political 
rights. Ideally, the new Constitutional Court should be playing a crucial role to make the 
envisioned transformation a reality through its processes of giving meaning to the wording 
contained in the new Constitution.  
It is acknowledged that undue judicial activism can lead to backlashes from the political arms 
against the judiciary. It is my supposition, however, that in as much as excessive judicial 
activism may lead to threats against the institutional security of the judiciary, excessive judicial 
timidity can be equally damaging.17 This study, therefore, draws lessons from the record of the 
South African Constitutional Court and the Kenyan Supreme Court on how they have managed 
to balance between transformative adjudication and maintaining institutional security.  
The thesis argues that the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court has the potential to be the force 
behind the transformation of the country. This can be achieved if the Court adopts a consistent 
approach to its interpretation of the Constitution. It is imperative that the approach adopted be 
one that breathes life into the transformative elements of the Constitution especially in the area 
of civil and political rights. Although other constitutional interpretation approaches are tenable, 
the Constitutional Court needs to adopt one that finds resonance with the South African 
Constitutional Court and Kenyan Supreme Court’s discourses to bring about a desirable 
change.18 
1.2 Background and problem statement  
 
It is a fact that ‘the new [C]onstitution, which [P]arliament approved in May 2013, enshrines 
respect for the rule of law, and commits the government to fully implement and realize the right 
to freedom of association, assembly, expression, and information.’19 It is the enforcement and 
application of these rights by the courts that this study places into perspective. The 
 
17 This raises the issue of separation of powers; however, it is submitted that the judiciary review powers held by 
the courts should be used as an incident of the checks and balances that exist between the arms of state.  
18 Kenya and South Africa are used because, like Zimbabwe, they both adopted new constitutions after political 
conflict with the aim of ushering peaceful transformation and the constitutions themselves draw heavily from the 
South African constitutional design.  
19Human Rights Watch “World Report 2015: Zimbabwe Events of 2014.” Available at 




Constitutional Court and other high courts have so far tentatively shown a move towards this 
transformation, albeit unconvincingly.20  
The existence of security legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA)21 and 
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)22 pose a threat to 
democratisation and transformation in respect of civil and political rights. The failure to amend 
or repeal this legislation constraints the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, 
assembly and association as guaranteed in both the Constitution and international instruments.  
The High Court of Zimbabwe has made some inroads in the protection and promotion of human 
rights through its reading of the new Constitution.23  For example in the case of Democratic 
Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment and Others v The Police Commissioner and 
Others (DARE),24 the Court was asked to rule on the validity of a ban on all demonstrations in 
the Harare Central Business District and surrounding areas by the police acting through 
Statutory Instrument 101A as empowered by Section 26 of the POSA.25 Section 26 of POSA 
has traditionally drawn criticism for empowering the police to ban demonstrations through 
statutory instruments and public notices.26 This provision has been used by the State to repress 
opposition through the banning of gatherings. The banning of demonstrations and the 
accompanied heavy-handedness that it comes with have no place in the current constitutional 
dispensation. Fortunately, in DARE, the Court firmly adopted this position. Part of the 
 
20 Klare (n 5 above). 
21Public Order and Security Act [Chapter 11:17]. 
22 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27]. 
23 The High Court has, however, not been free of controversy as it has recently become a political battlefield. It 
will be shown that, in the process, the High Court has also made a few decisions that are against progressive 
constitutionalism during the period between 2013 up to date.  
24 Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment and Others v The Police Commissioner and Others 
(DARE) HC8940/2016; See also Demo Ban provisionally suspended. 2016 The Herald September 08, available 
at http://www.herald.co.zw/breaking-news-demo-ban-lifted/  [Accessed 09 Sept 2018]. 
25 See (n 21 above). 
26 In terms of  section 26 of Public Order and Security Act ‘(1) without derogation from subsection 25, if a 
regulating authority believes on reasonable grounds that a public gathering will occasion public disorder, he may 
by notice in terms of subsection 3 prohibit the gathering… (3) A notice given under subsection (1) shall have 
effect immediately it is issued and shall be published – (a) in a newspaper circulating in the area to which the 
direction applies; or (b) by notices distributed among the public or affixed upon public buildings in the area to 




judgment reads ‘it is ordered and declared that Statutory Instrument 101A of 2016 is invalid to 
the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution as provided by s175(6) (a) and s2 of the 
[C]onstitution.’27 Further, ‘[R]espondents... shall be and are hereby interdicted from unlawfully 
interfering with the rights of the citizens’ right (sic) to exercise their right defined by s59 of the 
Constitution read together with s12 of Public Order and Security Act.’28 Interestingly, the 
police purportedly corrected the defect in the ban and issued another Statutory Instrument29 
which effectively became a second ban. A different judge sitting in the High Court ruled that 
the second ban was constitutional.30  
 It should be noted that the second judgment came hardly a week after the then President, 
Robert Mugabe had publicly expressed his displeasure at the judgments passed by ‘some’ High 
Court Judges who granted the right to demonstrate to anti-government protestors.31 The 
President’s sentiments against the judges were criticized by various quarters of the legal 
profession who regarded it as an interference with the independence of the judiciary and were 
of the view that there was a likelihood of it being a source of a crackdown against the judiciary 
soon.32 One would also argue that the President’s sentiments had a bearing on the outcome. 
This, therefore, calls for the need to analyse the role that the courts must play in the 
transformation of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe cognisant of the potential backlash and 
threats against the newly established Constitutional Court.  
 
27 See (n 24 above). 
28 Ibid.  
29 Extraordinary General Notice No. 239A of 2016.  
30 Zimbabwe Divine Destiny v Newbert Saunyama N.O. and Ors HH-589-16. 
31International Business Times reports that ‘On Wednesday (7 September) judges of Zimbabwe's High Court lifted 
an “unconstitutional"” ban by police on political demonstrations carried out by opposition parties and pro-
democracy groups in the country. The decision came just days after President Robert Mugabe accused the 
judiciary of “recklessness” for allowing the demonstrations that turned violent at times.’ available at 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/zimbabwe-tajamuka-activists-welcome-court-decision-overturn-police-ban-demos-
1580334 [Accessed 12 September 2016]  See also Robert Mugabe calls Zimbabwe judges reckless for permitting 
protests against him : ‘I hope they learnt their lesson’.  2016 The Independent. 5 September. available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/robert-mugabe-calls-zimbabwe-judges-reckless-for-
permitting-protests-against-him-i-hope-they-have-a7227036.html  [Accessed 5 September 2018]. 
32 See Mugabe goes after judiciary again. 2016 Daily News. 29 August. Available at 





Laws such as POSA have over the years been used to limit the people’s right to freedom of 
movement. The Human Rights Watch report states that; 
‘Police frequently misused provisions of POSA to ban lawful public meetings and gatherings. 
Opposition and civil society activists were wrongly prosecuted and charged under these laws. 
For instance, when hundreds of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) members marched to 
petition Parliament over the national economic situation on February 13, police violently broke 
up the march and dispersed the demonstrators.’33 
 POSA stifles open debates that strengthen good governance, the rule of law and democracy. It 
oppresses diverse views of the people. ‘In terms of the Zimbabwe Declaration of Rights, most 
sections of POSA are unconstitutional in that they deny the guaranteed rights of assembly and 
freedom of expression.’34 The values and principles of the new Constitution have therefore 
failed to bring about any meaningful change to the lives of the people because of the operation 
of POSA and AIPPA and the courts have also not done much towards this. One would have 
expected to see a significant shift from the old order after the adoption of the 2013 Constitution. 
Murisa and Chikweshe point out that ‘Zimbabwe is coming out of a period of what one would 
call supercharged politics characterised by interventionist international community [with] 
entrenched and deep divisions between political parties and the closing down of public 
sphere…’35 Hence, the adoption of a new Constitution was to establish a new nation founded 
on the principles of democracy and the rule of law and to do away with a culture of polarised 
politics.  
The Constitutional Court, although still in its infancy, has so far received several cases on the 
constitutional validity of some State conduct.36 The judiciary, has in these cases, declared some 
pieces of the legislation invalid, following failure by the legislature to timeously align the laws 
 
33Human Rights Watch (n 19 above). 
34 Controversial POSA Invoked against MRT Member. Zimbabwe Situation. 16 December 2016. Available at  
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-controversial-posa-invoked-against-mrt-member/  Accessed 
[15 August 2018]. 
35 T Murisa and T Chikweshe. Beyond the Crises; Zimbabwe’s Prospects for Transformation. (2015) 25. 
36For example Mutumwa Dziva Mawere v Registrar     General  CCZ 4/15; Madzimbamuto v Registrar General 
CCZ  5/14; Madanhire & Another v Attorney General (Const. Application No CCZ 78/12) [2015] ZWCC 02 (19 
February 2015); and Mudzuru & Another v Ministry of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs (N.O.) & Others 




with the new Constitution. For example, in Madanhire and Another v the Attorney General,37 
criminal defamation as contemplated in the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act38 was 
declared invalid.39 It remains to be seen however whether this is a trajectory that the courts are 
going to pursue in future. It is important to stress that the decision to outlaw criminal 
defamation was also followed by worrisome political sentiments from the State.40 The courts’ 
involvement in the transformation process raises several questions around fundamental issues 
such as the judicialisation of politics, separation of powers and judicial activism. Fombad 
submits that ‘if constitutionalism is to survive in Africa, then judges must be ready to play a 
more proactive role than they have played so far, they must be ready to use their powers to 
negate the continuous authoritarian impulses of elected politicians.’41 This can be achieved if 
judges adopt a ‘rights-sensitive approach.’ Roux cautions, however, that where a court’s 
decisions are not favourable to the state, in politically sensitive cases, institutional security of 
the court becomes threatened.42  
This study, therefore, shows that the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe must adjudicate in a 
manner that gives effect to the constitutional rights to freedom of expression, freedom of 
assembly and related civil liberties especially in the wake of stringent security legislation.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
Despite the adoption of a Constitution with a codified bill of rights, the human rights situation 
in Zimbabwe remains unchanged.43 There is, therefore, a need for substantive research on this 
contemporary situation and what it means to 21st-century constitutionalism in Africa. There 
have been attempts to undermine the judiciary by some political actors.  In this regard, the key 
 
37 Madanhire & Another v Attorney General (Const. Application No CCZ 78/12) [2015] ZWCC. 
38 Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9: 23]. 
39 See (n 37 above). 
40 VP Mnangagwa defends criminal defamation. (2015) The Herald 16 April.  
41 CM Fombad “Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on Some Current Challenges 
and Future Prospects New Constitutionalism.” (2011) 75 Buffalo Law Review 1020. 
42 T Roux “Tactical adjudication: How the Constitutional Court of South Africa survived its first decade”  
http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/2007/Tactical%20Adjudication.pdf   [Accessed 14 March 2017]. 
43 See for example Human Rights Watch. World Report 2014: Zimbabwe events of 2013 available at 




question would be: What are the implications of reliance on courts as means of addressing key 
political questions? 
This research has four broad objectives; 
1. To locate the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court’s role in the transformation of politically 
and legally sensitive civil and political rights. 
2.  To examine how constitutional courts elsewhere have so far been used as a means of 
addressing democratic values and political questions in pursuit of a transformative 
agenda. 
3.  To investigate whether the adjudicative approaches adopted by the Zimbabwe 
Constitutional Court are sustainable considering Zimbabwe’s socio-political situation.  
4. To recommend a new adjudication approach for the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court 
to ensure that it avoids political backlashes and transform civil and political rights 
through transformative adjudication.  
In so doing, several core questions are necessary;  
i) How does the jurisprudence of the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court compare to other 
constitutional democracies with relatively new courts such as the South African 
Constitutional Court and the Kenyan Supreme Court? 
ii) As a newly established Court, what likelihood is there that the Court’s institutional 
security would be threatened? If so, how can the Court secure institutional 
autonomy? 
iii) If the court declares the unaligned laws as invalid on a case by case basis, would 
that not be unacceptable judicial law making, judicial activism or judicialisation of 
politics or be viewed as a displacement of political actors? 
iv) How best can the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe adjudicate to ensure its 
continued existence and independence and transform civil and political rights at the 
same time?  
A key focus is placed on the role that can be played by the new Constitutional Court of 




rights of the citizens. This study also makes some recommendations and speculative remarks 
on the future trajectory of the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court as at the 16th of November 2017.  
1.4 Literature review 
 
This section serves as a conspectus of existing literature on transformative constitutionalism, 
the role of the judiciary in the transformation process, and the concept of transformative 
adjudication. There is a substantial literature on transformative constitutionalism and 
transformative adjudication. However, very few studies have been conducted on the subject 
about Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean jurisprudence from 1980 to date is also silent on the 
concept of transformation. The concepts of transformation, transformative adjudication and 
transformative constitutionalism have not been explored within a Zimbabwean post-colonial 
discourse, and this study aimed to stimulate discussions around the subject matter.   
Attaining constitutionalism is one of the most important objectives of modern democracies. 
However, its achievement is not always easy. According to Fombad, ‘[f]or Africa, after more 
than four decades of mostly authoritarian, corrupt and incompetent rule, the 1990s began with 
a slow and painful move towards what many optimistically hoped will usher in a new era of 
democratic governance and constitutionalism.’44 Efforts have been made in almost every part 
of Africa to design reforms that lead to constitutionalism and democratic governance. 
However, attaining this has proved to be a challenge. As studies show, even though many 
governments in Africa have constitutions, they ‘were quickly transformed into instruments of 
oppression under the pretext of pursuing coveted but elusive goals of national unity and 
economic development.’45 They have led to “constitutions without constitutionalism.”46 
Constitutionalism entails that the government power is sufficiently limited in a manner that 
protects the citizens from such vices as an arbitrary rule. This means that the government should 
only exercise power within its constitutional limitations.47 According to Fombad;  
 ‘modern constitutionalism has six elements; i) the recognition and protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms; ii) the separation of powers; iii) an independent judiciary; iv) the review of 
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the constitutionality of laws; v) the control of the amendment of the constitution, and vi) 
institutions that support democracy.’48  
It should be noted, however, that constitutionalism is not static, the presence of these 
institutions does not guarantee constitutionalism and it is ‘the cumulative effect of these 
elements that enhance the chances for constitutionalism.’49 This shows that the extent to which 
a state promotes and protects human rights determines the level to which it will achieve 
constitutionalism.  
At independence, most African countries inherited constitutions that were crafted by their 
erstwhile colonial masters. These were predominantly Westminister and Gaulist models for 
Anglophone and Francophone states respectively. Most have since been revised to include 
elements of constitutionalism.50 Surprisingly, this has not led to much change on the continent 
including in Zimbabwe. 
Many African countries have undergone periods of political turmoil characterised by lack or 
absence of the rule of law and total disregard of democratic practices. This has led to serious 
calls for constitutionalism, in some instances, preceded by the adoption of new constitutions.51  
For example, in Zimbabwe, the new Constitution was primarily adopted to promote a new 
human rights culture, democracy and good governance. Political arms are less likely to take 
the charge of transformation especially where they have implications on their traditional 
powers. Therefore, the judiciary is best placed to ensure that constitutionalism is realised. As 
Fombad observes ‘attaining these goals requires a judiciary that is willing to reflect the new 
spirit of constitutionalism when interpreting these constitutions.’52  
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, particularly because of the urgent need to usher in 
a new era of constitutionalism, and this was significant in informing this study.53 Just like in 
Zimbabwe, the adoption of a new Constitution in Kenya ‘…marks a crucial step in Kenya’s 
struggle for a new constitutional dispensation that would help transform Kenyan society 
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fundamentally.’54 The Kenyan Constitution is commended for having opened avenues for 
litigation on matters of national importance and engaging in the new phenomenon of 
transformation through courts. In Speaker of the Senate and Another v Attorney General and 
Another and 3 others55 the Supreme Court held that;  
‘Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 is a transformative charter. Unlike the conventional ‘liberal’ 
Constitutions of the earlier decades which essentially sought the control and legitimisation of 
public power, the avowed goal of today’s Constitution is to institute social change and reform, 
through values such as social justice, equality, devolution, human rights, the rule of law, 
freedom and democracy…’56 
Githuru points out that ‘the transformative constitution of Kenya is one that requires the 
judiciary to come up with a jurisprudence that resonates with that transformative vision.’57 The 
role of the court in the transformation process has been previously highlighted by the Chief 
Justice of Kenya;  
‘Some have spoken of the new constitution as representing a second independence. This is 
when our institutions, and the people, are to come into their own, when the legislature will truly 
act as the representatives of the people and the supervisors of the executive, when the executive 
will put the interests of the nation first… this will only happen if we all, including the judiciary, 
play our part for the forces of resistance are strong.’58  
The above statement echoes a generally accepted view that a new constitution should represent 
a new order, better than its predecessors. According to Githuru, the record of the Court under 
the new constitution shows ‘a new attitude, innovation and bravery’ alien to the old order.59  
This is accompanied by a progressive new jurisprudence that includes human rights cases, 
election petition cases, as well as public interest cases. The Court has, however, also been 
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blamed for exercising ‘restraint and timidity’ in some cases.60 Recent developments have 
shown a new direction with the Court becoming bold enough to nullify national presidential 
election results in the case of Raila Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission61 in September 2017. This move has been widely regarded as a victory 
for democracy and human rights in the region setting an important precedent for African 
constitutionalism.  Even though the transformative jurisprudence in Kenya is still developing, 
the courts have adopted a values-based approach to the interpretation of the Constitution.62 
Rapatsa discusses transformative constitutionalism in South Africa’s 20 years of democracy.63 
He argues that South Africa’s history of colonialism, unjust legal system and other 
discriminatory practices ‘bred a society of imbalances and socio-economic inequalities.’64 He 
adds on that transformative constitutionalism was indeed a necessity to redress these injustices. 
This author, however, argues that the success of transformative constitutionalism largely 
depends on political will.65  
According to Langa ‘transformative constitutionalism involves entrenching civil and political 
rights, socio-economic and other pragmatic rights and ensuring that there exist institutions that 
safeguard a comprehensive realisation of these rights.’66  Christiansen explores transformative 
constitutionalism in the context of South Africa. This author notes that ‘the Court was uniquely 
empowered by its role to ensure the initial democratic transition and as ultimate interpreter of 
the new constitution through judicial review.’67 
With reference to South Africa, Liebenberg notes that the ‘notion of “transformative 
constitutionalism” has formed a deep resonance in academic literature, the jurisprudence of the 
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courts.’68 In addition, she submits that  like any new constitution adopted during the periods of 
political transitions, the Constitution69 is ‘simultaneously backwards and forward-looking.’70 
This is because ‘it provides a legal framework within which to redress the injustices of the past 
as well as to facilitate the creation of a just society in the future.’71 Therefore, this gives rise to 
the need to examine this concept in the Zimbabwean context and have a broad discussion on 
the role the Constitutional Court can play to achieve it. 
In addition to the four constitutional principles that govern the South African institutions, the 
Constitution also define their structures, functions and composition in a manner that ensures 
that none of the three organs of government can interfere with their operations.72 ‘Three main 
issues are critical to this: i) the strengthening of judicial independence and judicial competence, 
ii) the expansion of the scope for judicial intervention, and iii) the judiciary acting as agents of 
constitutional change and development.’73 
Davis contends that the Constitution should represent a move from the old order. He argues, it 
is ‘about the constituting of a new society, one that lasts.’74 He uses Pitkin’s view of such a 
constitution, ‘which in human affairs, inevitably means something that will enlist and be carried 
forward by others.’75 This is done within a framework of constitutional interpretation aimed at 
the creation of a new legal and political order.76 This is what may be referred to as 
transformative adjudication. According to Karl Klare, transformative adjudication is a long-
term project of constitutional presentation, interpretation, and enforcement dedicated to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction.77 In addition, transformative 
 
68 S Liebenberg. Socio Economic Rights; Adjudication Under A Transformative Constitution. (2010), at 25. 
69 The Constitution of South Africa, 1996.  
70 Liebenberg (n 8 above) at 25. 
71 Ibid. 
72 PM Mojapelo “The doctrine of separation of powers; A South African perspective.”  Paper delivered at the 
Middle Temple South Africa Conference, September 2012 available at http://www.sabar.co.za/law-
journals/2013/april/2013-april-vol026-no1-pp37-46.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2018]  
73 Fombad (n 41 above) at 1009. 
74 D Davis “Democracy and Integrity; Making Sense of the Constitution.” (1998)14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 127-145, at 143. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid.  




constitutionalism suggests an enterprise prompting significant social change through peaceful 
political processes founded in law;   
 ‘I have in mind, a transformation, vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase 
‘reform’ but something short of or different from ‘revolution’ in any traditional sense of the 
word. In the background is an idea of a highly egalitarian, caring, multicultural community 
governed through participatory democratic processes in both the polity and large portions of 
what we now call the private sphere.’78 
According to Hirschl  ‘the concept of constitutional supremacy - one that has long been a major 
pillar of the American political order - is now shared, in one form or another, by over a hundred 
countries across the globe.’79  This scholar adds that newspapers everyday carry headlines on 
‘constitutionalisation’ processes in the world as well as landmark constitutional court rulings.80 
He, however, notes that this has come with judicialisation of politics, which he refers to as 
‘accelerating reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, 
public policy questions and political controversies.’81 It is inevitable that in pursuit of a 
transformation agenda, courts usually find themselves entangled in national politics.  
Fombad expresses similar sentiments arguing that armed with newly acquired judicial review 
procedures, national high courts worldwide have been frequently asked to resolve a range of 
issues, from the ‘scope of expression and religious liberties, equality rights, privacy, and 
reproductive freedoms, to public policies on criminal justice, property, trade and commerce, 
education, immigration, labour, and environmental protection.’82 These issues are intrinsically 
linked to politics, and when courts adjudicate on them, they are accused of interfering in 
politics.  
Schor explores the emergence of constitutional courts and their role as political actors.  He 
argues that constitutional transformation resulted in the courts (in Mexico and Colombia 
especially) displacing political actors ‘in the task of constitutional construction and 
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maintenance.’83 This scholar further explores the ‘more ambitious agenda’ that has been 
pursued by the Colombian Court and concludes that ‘although judicial activism has become a 
normative and political bone of contention in the United States…. Activist courts, such as the 
Columbian Constitutional Court, can play a key role in ushering needed democratic 
transformation…’84 
Roux is of the view that in new democracies, judicial activism by judges would play a greater 
role ‘where the judicial branch is by definition still in the process of building the legitimacy 
required to play a meaningful role in politics.’85 In his other writings, Roux acknowledges the 
risks that come with this role especially for newly established courts in new democracies.86 He 
argues, drawing from the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, that these 
courts make their decisions in a way that protects their institutional security by avoiding direct 
conflict with the political arms of the state. It is the dangers that come with decisions in 
controversial cases that Roux discusses in depth.87 It is thus important that the role played by 
the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court be assessed cognisant of these factors.  
Botha et al. contend that the general limitation clause in the South African Constitution itself 
raises the question of among others, ‘style of adjudication, separation of powers and the degree 
of judicial activism or restraint that is proper in fundamental rights cases.’88 They argue that 
the judges play an important role in the transformative process, however, this needs 
commitment.89 Acknowledging that the Constitution of Zimbabwe is in many ways similar to 
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that of South Africa, the extent of the commitment to constitutional interpretation by 
Zimbabwean judges is critically examined in Chapter 5. 
Beyond the African continent, Sieder et al discuss judicial activism in Latin America. They 
argue that courts have been significant actors in the politics of Latin American countries. They 
provide an example of how the Argentinian Court expanded labour rights. In addition, they 
argue that the judicialisation of politics raises fundamental issues of balance of powers and ‘the 
responsibilities between the representative and elected bodies and appointed members of the 
judiciary.’90 
Hirschl charts the contours of what he calls ‘judicialization of mega or pure politics.’ Firstly, 
there is ‘the spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules and procedures into the political sphere and 
policy-making forums and processes,’91 and secondly, there is the ‘judicialization of public 
policy-making through “ordinary” administrative and judicial review.’ Lastly, the 
judicialization of “pure politics”- the transfer to the courts of matters of an outright political 
nature and significance including core regime legitimacy and collective identity questions that 
define (and often divide) whole polities.92 This reinforces the fear that the more the 
Zimbabwean judiciary get involved in cases of a political nature, the more likely its 
independence become compromised.  
Still, on that, Roux argues that to be transformative, ‘rights discourse and legal reasoning need 
to be more candid and self-conscious about the politics of adjudication...’93 This essentially 
means that Roux accepts that courts have a role to play in rights-based transformation and 
should be wary of the politics of such postures. This argument essentially brings to the fore the 
theories of transformative adjudication and transformative constitutionalism. 
Zimbabwe’s human rights history is an essential part of this study. Ncube has set out this in his 
2013 work.94 He explores the post-2000 human rights developments in Zimbabwe. He argues 
that post-2000 Zimbabwe has been characterised by two polarising rights claims; 
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 ‘[the first claim] is associated with Zanu PF, and that is rooted in anti-imperialist movements 
of the twentieth century that challenged colonial powers and demands the right to national self-
determination, which should be realised when a country is sovereign enough to exploit its 
natural resources such as land and minerals without external influence.’95  
To achieve self-determination, the ZANU PF government violated the civil and political rights 
of the opposition. The second claim - associated with the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), the main opposition party in Zimbabwe, is rooted in the liberal political philosophy 
and democratisation of the 1990s. It demands fair elections along with civil, political and 
private property rights. The MDC championed these rights to challenge ZANU PF’s hegemony 
in a way that, from a ZANU PF standpoint served “western hegemony.” 96 
Ncube also gives a brief preview of Zimbabwe’s constitutional history. He submits that in the 
year 2000 Zimbabwe civil society and the MDC campaigned for the rejection of a government-
sponsored constitutional draft, arguing that it ignored citizens’ demand for reduced presidential 
powers, among other pertinent issues, and that it entrenched ZANU PF’s hold on power. 
Violence was unleashed on the White commercial farming community, including farm 
workers, civil society and the MDC and its supporters. According to Ncube, this worsened until 
the tipping point in 2008, which saw the establishment of a Government of National Unity 
(GNU) and the eventual adoption of a new constitution in 2013.97 
The constitutional history of Zimbabwe shows that several amendments were made during the 
life of the Lancaster House Constitution. Mupuva and Muyengwa submit that; 
‘sought to legitimise controversial actions, notably the expropriation of land in terms of the 
Land Acquisition Act 1985, which violated property rights, private and Voluntary Organisation 
Act of 1996, Broadcasting Services Act of 2000, Public Order and Security Act and the Access 
to Information Protection Act. 2002 among others.’98  
However, there is a dearth of literature on the jurisprudence of the new Constitutional Court. 
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be noted that the transformative nature of the Constitutional Court processes finds foundation 
in the Constitution itself.  The African Union has commended the Zimbabwe Constitutional 
Court’s decision in MISA Zimbabwe and others v Minister of justice and another.99 In a 
statement to Zimbabwe, the AU said it 
‘call[s] on your government to support the decision of the Constitutional Court in light of the 
potential of this ruling to promote and protect the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and as elaborated in the 
Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa.’100 
With reference to the new Constitution of Zimbabwe, Ndhlovu submits that ‘judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights is a powerful indication that the Constitution goes 
beyond merely guaranteeing abstract equality.’101 Ndhlovu, however, acknowledges that even 
though the Constitution should be seen as transformative ‘[it] does not provide [a] 
comprehensive blueprint for a transformed society nor stipulate the precise process for 
achieving it.’102 According to Ndhlovu, the very presence of institutions with a transformative 
agenda in the constitution clarifies this argument. Even though Ndhlovu’s work focuses more 
on socio-economic rights, the interpretations contained therein can be extended to civil and 
political rights as contemplated in this study. The Constitution itself provides for institutions 
such as the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights Commission with full and quasi-judicial 
powers respectively.  It is, therefore, a prerogative of these institutions to develop and transform 
civil and political rights as well.  In addition, the founding values in section 3 of the 
Constitution, the objectives set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, are clear indication of its 
transformative nature.103  
Ngang acknowledges the role that courts can play in bringing about social change. This scholar 
categorically states that ‘[she does] not advocate for courts to become crusaders of democracy, 
but as arbitrators of fair play in the political game between the government and the governed 
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the role of courts cannot be ignored.’104 It is the proposition of this study that the Zimbabwe 
courts should adopt this role if the tenets of the 2013 Constitution are to be realised. 
The Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe has also made some landmark judgments, albeit amid 
the realignment of the laws with the Constitution. The decisions made by the Constitutional 
Court thus far have reaching consequences and it needs to be cautious. In the case of Madanhire 
and Another v Attorney General, the Constitutional Court passed a judgment declaring the 
criminal defamation law as unconstitutional.105 Criminal defamation laws are commonly used 
to suppress criticism of public officials. In democratic societies, the actions of public officials 
must be open to public inspection. Criminal defamation laws deter individuals from exposing 
the misconduct of public officials, and such laws are therefore irreconcilable with freedom of 
expression.106 
Judgments with significant bearing on the constitutional trajectory have been handed down by 
the South African Constitutional Court in the cases of S v Makwanyane,107 Glenister v 
President of South Africa,108 and many other cases.  
Hirschl is of the view that; 
 ‘the growing political significance of courts has become not only more widespread but also 
expanded in scope to become a manifold, multifaceted phenomenon that extends well beyond 
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the now “standard” concept of judge-made policy making, through ordinary rights 
jurisprudence and judicial redrawing of legislative boundaries between state organs.’109 
Having explored the existing literature for this study, it is necessary to now turn to the research 
methodology that is used to both gather and analyse the data. 
1.5 Methodology  
 
This study assumes a socio-legal approach. This allows for a departure from pure legal analysis 
to one that allows for a consideration that may help with insight into how political actors make 
their decisions which ultimately have legal and political consequences.  This work relies on the 
background of the literature on the law of Zimbabwe, South African and Kenyan jurisprudence 
which were used as key comparators.  A detailed review and analysis of the civil and political 
rights treaties, conventions, protocols and other instruments and documents to which is 
Zimbabwe is a party was made. This is meant to paint a picture on the application of these 
rights in Zimbabwe.  Civil organisations’ reports on Zimbabwe human rights situation are also 
considered.  
This work takes a critical approach to the analysis of the relevant sources. Value judgments are 
made, basing on both my understanding of the law and that of other legal commentators.  Where 
no legal materials are available, various other sources such as newspapers and relevant websites 
are used. 
1. 6 Delimitation  
 
This work is limited to legal and political developments preceding the 17 November 2017 
Coup.110 This is because the post-2017 coup regime has declared what it calls the Second 
Republic which warrants an independent study of its own.  This study avoids being drawn into 
the political debates surrounding the legitimacy of the current government led by President 
Emmerson Mnangagwa.   
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1.7 Overview of the Chapters 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter serves as an introduction to the entire thesis. It provides an overview 
of constitutional transformation in Zimbabwe and also highlights the objectives of the study 
and its literary intervention.   
Chapter 2: This chapter explores the historical development of constitutionalism or its absence 
in Zimbabwe, from the Lancaster House Agreement to the Constitution of 2013.111 It explores 
Zimbabwe’s constitutions to date in terms of both form and substance and the processes leading 
to its adoption. It argues that the processes leading to the adoption of a constitution are just as 
important as the constitution itself. It also serves to provide a background for the need for 
transformation in Zimbabwe.  
Chapter 3: This chapter explores the application of civil and political rights from an 
international perspective. It shows that civil and political rights are first-generation rights 
guaranteed at the international level through various instruments to which Zimbabwe is a party. 
It is argued that this places an obligation on Zimbabwe to ensure that these rights are fully 
realised by the citizens, and an abdication from such duty is a violation of international law. 
The extent of the application of selected civil and political rights, and permissible limitations, 
thereof are discussed.  
Chapter 4: This chapter examines the record of the South African Constitutional Court and the 
Kenyan Courts. Special attention is given to how these Courts have adopted a value-based 
approach of interpretation of the constitutionalism. Transformation, as an aspect of 
constitutionalism, is put into perspective. The Chapter demonstrates that the South Africa and 
Kenyan courts have developed some significant transformative jurisprudence, from which the 
Zimbabwean courts can draw lessons. It is argued that even though South African 
jurisprudence is predominantly socio-economic rights, the same interpretative methods are 
directly applicable to civil and political rights cases in Zimbabwe.  
Chapter 5: This chapter interrogates the record of the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe with 
special attention on the interpretative methods adopted in civil and political rights cases. The 
purpose is to examine whether there are any prospects for transformative adjudication in the 
 




country given the existing volatile legal and political situation that existed and continues to 
exist. 
Chapter 6: This chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis and makes some 
recommendations. The recommendations are based on both policy and legal interventions.  
Having outlined this, it is necessary to turn to an exploration of Zimbabwe’s constitutional 





THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Zimbabwe’s constitutional history hinges upon a critical discussion of not only the substance 
but also the processes leading to any significant constitutional developments. A chronological 
discussion of the history of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe forms the core of this study.   It 
reflects an ever-increasing digression from the fundamentals of human rights protection, which 
is one of the tenets of modern-day constitutionalism. The roots of constitutionalism in 
Zimbabwe must be explored from early days of colonialism to the most recent constitutional 
development.  
 Zimbabwe, like many other African countries, is a former British colony whose democracy 
and sovereignty were gained through a combination of war and political negotiations.1 This 
followed close to a century of white minority rule, characterized by oppression and subjugation 
of the Black majority. As is usually the case, new constitutions are often preceded by a period 
of instability and political bickering; Zimbabwe went to war in the 1970s.  After the armed 
struggle against colonial rule, Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution in 1980.2 The 
Constitution was in force for a total of 33years and survived 19 Amendments, with the 20th 
Amendment becoming the 2013 Constitution. Even though it was an Amendment, the 2013 
provisions were a complete overhaul of the Lancaster House Constitution (1980 Constitution). 
This alone demonstrates that there was something amiss regarding the 1980 Constitution and 
the many amendments were attempts to address that. It is argued, in this study, that the 1980 
Constitution was not transformative enough to capture the ideals of the revolutionary war that 
resulted in its birth. Many scholars, therefore, argue that the 1980 Constitution was merely a 
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compromise and was not supposed to have lasted that long.3 However, after 1980 there were 
several failed attempts to write a new constitution.4 
 It should be noted that the lack of the essential transformative elements in the 1980 
Constitution resulted in serious human rights violations, emanating from abuse of power by the 
authorities, and a general lack of the rule of law or simply a deliberate disregard thereof. These 
violations included denial of civil and political rights, and socio-economic rights, as well as 
some acts that have arguably been regarded as genocide.5  
This chapter, therefore, explores the history of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe, from the 
Lancaster House Conference to November 2017 when the “Second Republic” was declared. 
The view taken here is that the current constitutional dispensation is informed by the path that 
the country has taken over the years in terms of both constitutionalism and human rights. The 
role of the courts, in particular the Constitutional Court, to contribute to constitutional order in 
the country is also noted. In this regard, it is observed that most decisions that had a bearing on 
the constitutionality of the State’s actions were followed by amendments that were essentially 
meant to nullify the court’s decisions. This significantly affected the role of the courts in the 
transformation of human rights in Zimbabwe. Thus, it is necessary to investigate the role that 
the Constitutional Court can play to see through the transformation processes.  
However, before discussing the Lancaster House Constitution, it is necessary to discuss its 
predecessors. From the time Zimbabwe was colonized until its independence in 1980, there 
were several colonial constitutions. Most of these constitutions did not survive for long. They 
 
3 See for example, C Ncube and U Okeke-Uzodike “Constituting Power and Democracy: Zimbabwe’s 2013 
Constitution-Making and Prospects for Democracy.” (2015) 12 (3&4) Africa Renaissance 129-157; L Sachikonye 
(2011) “Zimbabwe’s Constitution-Making and Electoral Reform Processes: Challenges and Opportunities,” Draft 
paper prepared for the Conference on ‘Legitimacy of power-possibilities of opposition’ organised by the 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, 1-20 and; S Marumahoko 
“Constitutional making in Zimbabwe: Assessing Institutions and Process.” (2016) Doctor of Philosophy Thesis. 
University of the Western Cape. (Unpublished). 
4 The most prominent of these were the year 2000 Constitutional Commission constitutional Draft, the 2001 
National Constitutional Assembly draft and the 2007 Kariba Draft.  
5 As will be shown below, Zimbabwe went through what was referred to as a period of ‘madness’ in which all 
those opposed to the incumbent in the 1980s were labelled dissidents and had a specially trained army unleashed 




were in stark contrast in terms of both substance and process, to the 1980 Constitution, hence, 
it is necessary to discuss them as well.  
2.2 Pre-independence constitutional developments  
 
When the British South Africa Company (BSAC) through Cecil John Rhodes annexed 
Zimbabwe, it became part of the British sphere of influence.6 The first constitutional 
arrangement was known as the Royal Charter.7 The Queen of England would confer the 
document to the British South Africa Company through Cecil John Rhodes to exercise all rights 
as to form a government for administrative purposes.8 The Royal Charter, 
 ‘granted the BSACo the right to obtain powers necessary for the preservation of public order 
in territories that fall under its concessions. More specifically, it granted the BSACo the right 
to maintain public order by establishing and maintaining a police force … In addition, the 
Charter enjoined the BSACo to respect existing African laws and all religions. Importantly, the 
Charter provided for a legislative body called the Legislative Council whose main function was 
to assist the Company to run the country by enacting laws.’9 
According to Marumahoko, the Charter had a lifespan of 25 years.10 The British South Africa 
Company, however, had the option of extending its validity or enacting a new constitution. 
Following the expiry of the Charter, the British government gave Southern Rhodesia the power 
to set up its own Legislative Assembly. The Royal Charter’s validity was subsequently 
extended to 1922. This Royal Charter is regarded as the first written Constitution of Zimbabwe 
although this is debatable. The Charter’s main characteristic was its supremacy. Marumahoko 
 
6 The British South Africa Company was a company formed by the colonialists as a vehicle through which 
acquisition of territory in Southern Africa was to be done. Cecil John Rhodes under a Royal Charter formed the 
company in 1889. The British South Africa Company was given the power to establish a political entity, explore 
minerals and establish a paramilitary police. In acquiring territory from local rulers, the BSAC employed tactics 
such as misrepresentation, fraud or outright military conquest.  
7 The Charter of the British South Africa Company, (London Gazette), 20 December 1889. 
8 The Royal Charter, technically speaking, was not a constitution; however, it provided the legal foundations upon 
which the colonial legal order in the Southern Rhodesia was built. It is for this reason that it is often regarded as 
the first constitution.  





argues that the Charter can be regarded as a constitution because it provided the legal basis on 
which the new country of Southern Rhodesia was established.11  
When the Royal Charter expired in 1922, Britain did not extend its duration. This was after a 
“Whites-only” referendum that sought the people’s views on whether or not to join the Union 
of South Africa as its 6th province failed.12 This resulted in the integration of Southern Rhodesia 
into the British Empire in 1923 as a self-governing territory. The British government, through 
the Office of Colonial Affairs, adopted a Constitution of the colony. The Constitution was 
enacted as an Act of the British Parliament.  The Constitution of 1923 established a Legislative 
Assembly. Members of the Legislative Assembly were elected through an election in which 
only White members of the population could participate. The threshold for voting was 
generally prohibitive.13  The 1923 Constitution pronounced Rhodesia as a self-governing 
territory, which was welcomed by the Whites.14 It lasted for thirty-eight years. 
The year 1953 saw the adoption of a Constitution that led to the creation of a Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland.15 The federation was to bring together Nyasaland, Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia. This Federation was to be ‘based on the territorial distribution of power 
and the principle of shared sovereignty.’16 The three territories collectively became known as 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. According to Marumahoko; 
 ‘it was envisaged that the alliance would bring together cheap labour from Nyasaland for the 
expansion of the agricultural and industrial sector in Southern Rhodesia, minerals from 
Northern Rhodesia and capital and technical expertise from Southern Rhodesia to grow the 
integrated economy.’17  
A Constitutional Commission drafted the Federal Constitution. Of the thirteen delegates from 
Southern Rhodesia, only two were Black. Therefore, the resultant constitution was an 
 
11 Ibid, at 14. 
12 The British, for Southern Rhodesia to join the Union of South Africa comprised of Afrikaner and British States 
of Transvaal, Natal, Orange Free State and Cape in modern day South Africa had made suggestions.  
13 Only British male subjects above the age of 21 could vote. 
14 C Palley. Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888- 1965. (1966). 
15 The Federation was an amalgamation of three British colonial states namely; modern day Zimbabwe, Malawi 
and Zambia respectively.  
16 Marumahoko (n 3 above) at 18. 




entrenchment of White interests. The Federation lasted until 1963 after independence was 
granted to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.18  
Consequently, following the collapse of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia had to draft a new 
constitution. A Constitutional Conference was established in 1961, it was tasked with 
negotiating and drafting a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia.  The Constitutional 
Conference’s delegates were drawn from political parties in Southern Rhodesia. The Prime 
Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, chaired it. According to the Prime Minister, the conference 
aimed at the ‘creation of a constitution that would be satisfactory for Blacks, Whites, and the 
colonial power, Britain.’19 During the drafting of this constitution, five contentious issues 
arose. These were, whether it was necessary to have a declaration of rights or bill of rights 
entrenched in the constitution, what to do with legislation that was discriminatory of blacks, 
the composition of the legislature, franchise of Black people and procedure for the amendment 
of the constitution. After these issues were resolved, the Constitution was adopted through a 
referendum in 1961.20  
The 1961 Constitution did not last long. In the 1960s, Ian Smith led a campaign calling for the 
independence of Rhodesia from Britain. This saw his political rise to become the Prime 
Minister in 1964. Marumahoko notes, ‘this development was significant as it changed the 
trajectory on the narrative of constitutional development in Southern Rhodesia.’21 This was 
because Prime Minister, Ian Smith, paved way for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI)22 and adoption of a constitution that entrenched White minority rule. Ian Smith made it 
clear that he could not accept ‘the principle of unimpeded progress towards majority rule 
enshrined in [No Independence Before Majority Rule] NIBMAR principles.’23 The UDI was 
declared after a referendum in which Whites were asked whether they supported the idea of 
divorcing Southern Rhodesia from the colonial power. The Rhodesians voted ‘yes’ and a 
declaration of independence was issued on 11 November 1965. In the same year the Smith 
 
18 Palley (n 14 above). 
19 Marumahoko (n 3 above) at 24. 
20 It was consequently enacted by the British House of Assembly as Southern Rhodesia Constitution Act 1961 
21 Marumahoko (n 3 above) at 29. 
22 The UDI was Rhodesia’s declaration of Independence from the British. The British did not recognize it and as 
a response, it imposed sanctions.  




government, having unilaterally declared independence, started drafting a constitution.24 The 
constitution, generally, was a counter to NIBMAR.25 It represented everything against 
NIBMAR.26 The drafting of this Constitution was criticized on the basis that Ian Smith had 
directed it. All the constitutional guarantees that had been extended to blacks were reversed in 
the 1965 Constitution.27  The British government objected to the Constitution on the basis that 
the declaration on independence was illegal. Despite this objection, the constitution was 
promulgated on 13 November 1965.28  
In 1967, Smith noticed that the Constitution had faced resistance on almost all fronts and had 
to act. A Constitutional Commission was appointed in 1967 to draft a new Constitution. The 
Commission was made up of five members.  The Constitutional Commission embarked on a 
civic education mission encouraging people to participate in the constitution-making process.29 
The draft constitution increased the number of Black legislators.30 The Constitutional 
Commission’s draft was rejected on various grounds. However, the most notable reason for its 
objection was that it did not represent the interests of the Whites. Marumahoko submits, ‘the 
 
24 The Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965. 
25 G Williams and B Hackland. The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of Southern Africa (2015)  
26 According to Williams and Hackland, Ibid.  ‘There were five NIBMAR principles: unimpeded progress towards 
majority rule; guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution that would retard African 
advancement; an increase in African political representation; the progressive end of racial discrimination; British 
satisfaction that proposals for independence were acceptable to Zimbabwe as a whole.’ 
27 Some of the provisions that were amended were related to ‘the rights of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, the protection of the constitution from amendment if any one racial group did not agree, the 
constitutional safeguards for blacks, and the Declaration of Rights.’ Marumahoko (n 3 above) at 31.  
28 The consequences of this were that the government was regarded as a rebellious one; both the United Nations 
and the Commonwealth rejected the Constitution. It should also be noted that the constitution itself was a subject 
of litigation in Southern Rhodesia. In the case of Stella Madzimbamuto v Desmond William Lardner-Burke and 
Frederick Phillip George, (High Court case number GD/CIV/23/66.) the Applicant challenged the incarceration 
of her husband based on violation of an “illegal” constitution. The local courts rejected the Applicant’s argument 
leading to the appeal in the Privy Council of Britain. The Privy Council ruled that the constitution was illegal.  
29 The commission interviewed 250 people and received more than 650 memoranda.  
30 ‘According to the [constitutional] report [1968], some representatives of members of the black community in 
the legislature were to be selected through direct elections while others were to be selected through electoral 
colleges formed mainly by chiefs and headmen. Of the Lower House’s 80 seats, 40 seats were to be reserved for 
White voters. The Senate was to consist of 31 members of whom 12 were blacks, another 12 were Whites and 7 




fact that racial bigotry influenced the rejection of the draft suggests that the authorities were 
hostile to the idea of a constitution that was acceptable across the racial divide.’31 
In 1969 the ruling party embarked on a new journey to transform the 1961 Constitution. 
Consultative meetings with supporters of the party were held in six provinces. The executive 
committee responsible for the drafting of the constitution agreed that there was to be a 
declaration of rights, but it was not to be enforceable in court but only ‘safe guarded by the 
State.’ This essentially means that the rights contained in the Declaration of Rights would only 
be enforced by the State, but there would be no judicial recourse available.  The land issue was 
at the core of the Constitution. The drafters saw to it that the White property interests were 
protected by the Constitution itself.  The drafted constitution was put up for a Whites’ only 
referendum. The results of the referendum showed that 72% of the voters accepted the proposed 
constitution and 28% rejected it. The Constitution was soon enacted in Parliament as 
Constitution Amendment (No. 2) Act of 1969.  
The constitutions discussed above were, from a constitutionalism perspective, both 
substantially and procedurally irregular. They were not acceptable to all races and were drafted 
to protect the interests of the Whites. Constitutionally speaking, none of them would have 
passed modern-day constitutional muster informed by principles of non-discrimination, 
equality and tolerance.32 This means that the constitutions were especially not acceptable to the 
blacks who formed the majority of the population, therefore, the liberation armed struggle 
continued. Black people continued to seek a constitution that would see the franchise extended 
to all regardless of the race with everyone exercising their right to vote freely and without fear 
and prejudice. On the contrary, whereas blacks were yearning for a more inclusive constitution, 
the White minority government continued to entrench racial segregation. The White minority 
government continued to face pressure from the adverse economic effects of war, as well as 
persistent calls for majority rule from the international community. As a result, the government 
agreed to form a government of national unity. The agreement was concluded on 3 March 
1978.33 Having acknowledged that the unjust 1969 Constitution was the main cause of the 
ongoing-armed struggle, the first task of the government was to write a new constitution. A 
 
31 Marumahoko (n 3 above) at 39.  
32 Ibid, at 42, ‘a constitution can hardly be deemed to be legitimate if the methods by which it comes into operation 
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constitution drafting Committee was appointed and tasked with coming up with a constitution 
and the deadline for this was set for 31 December 1978. Both White and Black political parties 
were represented in the constitution drafting committee. It should be noted that the drafting 
Committee made it clear from the onset that it was not a commission therefore it was not going 
to seek views outside of the Committee. Because the drafting committee could not agree on 
certain issues, completion of the drafting process was delayed. The political parties endorsed a 
draft produced on 11 January 1979, and the Legislature approved the Constitution. A 
referendum on the adoption of the Constitution was held on 30 January 1979. The Constitution 
was approved by 85% of the White voters. The parties entered into a government of national 
unity.34  
Regardless of these developments, the armed struggle continued. This time, the calls for 
majority rule were getting even louder. As noted by Marumahoko ‘with the insurgency growing 
in strength daily and the ability of the defence forces to contain them reaching a breaking point, 
negotiating a new constitution started to emerge as the only way out.’35 Britain, as the colonial 
power, saw the need to break the political impasse in Southern Rhodesia through peaceful 
means. The only means was by supporting a constitution that reflected the views of a much 
broader political spectrum regardless of race or ideology. Therefore, at the Commonwealth 
Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Lusaka Zambia,36 the international 
community tasked Britain to negotiate a constitution and supervise an election to ensure the 
independence of Rhodesia. The British government invited all political parties to attend a 
constitutional conference at Lancaster House in 1979.  
2.3 Post-colonial constitutional developments  
 
The post-colonial history of Zimbabwe starts with the negotiated settlement in the form of 
Lancaster House constitutional agreement to the adoption of the new Constitution in 2013. The 
decade after 1998 which was characterised by a ‘cacophony of voices from every nook and 
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corner of Zimbabwe’s body politic’ resulted in the current dispensation.37 This period enjoyed 
its fair share of rigorous debates around several draft constitutions and constitutional discourses 
in Zimbabwe. At the centre of these debates was the question of how to draft a document that 
would be acceptable to the people in terms of both substance and process. The question of what 
an acceptable document would be was very clear - people wanted a new constitutional 
dispensation characterised with respect for human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Given 
Zimbabwe’s history of polarisation, civil and political rights were critical to this 
transformation.  
2.3.1 The Zimbabwe Constitution of 1980 
 
The Zimbabwe Constitution of 1980 was adopted following negotiations between the warring 
parties in 1979. The Constitution contained several provisions that were meant to bring peace 
and usher in a new era of constitutional rule.38 The 1980 Constitution contained provisions that 
would see a move from minority to majority rule, put an end to colonialism, and bring about 
equality and the rule of the law. As Sachikonye notes; 
 ‘… the Lancaster House Constitution was premised upon a recognition of liberal notions of 
constitutionalism. Hence its incorporation of the concepts of separation of powers, 
independence of the judiciary, supremacy of the legislature over the executive, public service 
neutrality and governmental accountability.’39 (sic)   
Given the history of colonialism, ‘the Constitution, therefore, sought to place extensive 
limitations on powers of government vis-à-vis individual rights and sought to check the powers 
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38 Magaisa notes that ‘The new constitution was clearly a product of compromise as evidenced by its weaknesses 
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of the executive arm of the state.’40 Perhaps the most notable features of the Lancaster House 
Constitution were the moratorium clauses that were placed on several key provisions. Some 
argue that the clauses were necessary for providing for a smooth transition and avoid possible 
post-war retributions. As a result, the Constitution contained moratorium clauses related to 
changes on issues on the bill of rights, the rules for changing the Constitution and sections 
relating to emergencies and detentions. These moratoriums were for ten years.41 In addition, 
there was a seven-year moratorium on the composition of the two chambers of the Parliament, 
including the White voters roll. However, at the expiry of the moratoriums, Zimbabwe 
government began to make changes detrimental to White interests.42 This is one fact that 
indicates that the Constitution as it was in 1980, was only accepted as a ceasefire document 
meant to allow for a smooth transition in the country.  
The key question that emanates from the adoption of the Lancaster House Constitution is 
whether it was transformative enough as a post-conflict document. The answer to this lies in 
how the constitution failed to change the lives of many ordinary black people. As a result, 
several amendments were made to the Constitution, most of them flawed. To an extent, the 
weaknesses of the Lancaster House Constitution can also be blamed for the misrule, including 
human rights violations, that characterized Zimbabwe’s political scene from 1980.  As one 
would correctly observe, ‘… while the Constitution served an important purpose in transferring 
power from a minority to a majority government, it was not necessarily a foundation for good 
governance.’43 Furthermore, the process that led to the adoption of the 1980 Constitution was 
flawed as it was only led an elite few.44 It has been described as ‘an outdated, imposed and 
 
40 Ibid at 143. 
41 ‘This was designed to ensure that the transition to independence would not entail a substantial shift in social 
and property relations.’ Sachikonye Ibid.  
42N Chitty et al.  Routledge Handbook of Soft Power. (2016). See also Magaisa (n 38 above) who reflects ‘The 
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transitional instrument … which does not represent the aspirations of the people for good 
governance and development’45  
In addition to these weaknesses, the government itself was keen on preserving certain 
provisions. ‘Although the provisions which restricted changes to the Lancaster House 
Constitution expired in 1990, the government was somehow not keen to change it to improve 
conditions for democratization.’46 As a result, the Constitution itself could not be trusted as a 
means for transformation. The government resisted attempts to amend the constitution in such 
a way that would make the country more democratic. The discussion below shows that the 
constitutional changes since 1980 were mainly aimed at entrenching the State’s power and not 
necessarily for transformational reasons as would be expected.  
2.3.1.1 Constitutional changes of 1987-89 
 
The expiry of the first moratorium in 1987 saw the birth of significant constitutional changes. 
Amendment No 6 of 1987 abolished the system of the White roll in both houses.47  This 
essentially changed the system from a parliamentary system to a presidential system.48 This 
 
as follows; “United Kingdom Delegation; Lord Carrington (Chairman), Sir I Gilmour, Sir M Havers, Lord 
Harlech, Mr R Luce, Sir M Palliser, Sir A Duff, Mr D M Day, Mr R A C Byatt, Mr R W Renwick, Mr P R N 
Fifoot, Mr N M Fenn, Mr G G H Walden, Mr C D Powell, Mr P J Barlow, Mr R D Wilkinson, Mr A M Layden, 
Mr R M J Lyne, Mr M J Richardson, Mr C R L de Chassiron, Mrs A J Phillips, Mr M C Wood.” The Mugabe and 
Nkomo delegation; Mr J M Nkomo, Mr J M Chinamano, Mr E Z Tekere, Gen J M Tongogara, Mr E R Kadungure, 
Dr H Ushewokunze, Mr D Mutumbuka, Mr J Tungamirai, Mr E Zvobgo, Mr S Mubako, Mr W Kamba, Mr J W 
Msika, Mr T G Silundika, Mr A M Chambati, Mr John Nkomo, Mr L Baron, Mr S K Sibanda, Mr E Mlambo, Mr 
C Ndlovu,  and Miss E Siziba” and the Muzorewa delegation “Bishop A T Muzorewa, Dr S C Mundawarara, Mr 
E L Bulle, Mr F Zindoga, Mr D C Mukome, Mr G B Nyandoro, Rev N Sithole, Mr L Nyemba, Chief K Ndiweni, 
Mr Z M Bafanah, Mr I D Smith, Mr D C Smith, Mr R Cronje, Mr C Andersen, Dr J Kamusikiri, Mr G Pincus, Mr 
L G Smith, Air Vice Marshal H Hawkins, Mr D Zamchiya, Mr S V Mutambanengwe, Mr M A Adam and Mr P 
Claypole.” Lancaster House Agreement, 21 December 1979. Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Held 
at Lancaster House, London September - December 1979 Report.  
45 Sachikonye (n 39 above) at 143. 
46 Ibid.   
47 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 6) Act 15 of 1987. 
48 According to Szylagyi ‘The office of President characterises the presidential system. The President is both the 
chief executive and the head of state. The President is elected independently of the legislature.’ And ‘In 




Amendment also resulted in the abolition of the post of prime minister with the Executive 
powers shifting to the President. The original Lancaster House Constitution provided for a 
largely ceremonial President, with most of the Executive political powers concentrated in the 
office of the Prime Minister.  The 1987 move was a signal for the significant doubts on the 
acceptability of the 1980 Constitution. ‘This, in itself, is very telling of the acceptability of this 
document in our society.’49 In 1989, Amendment No 9 abolished the bicameral system of 
parliament and replaced it with a unicameral one.50 Real political power shifted from the 
Parliament to the President.51 The 1989 Amendments also provided for the Attorney General 
becoming a member of cabinet thus bringing the Judiciary under Executive influence. As will 
be shown later, most of these changes served more political purposes than legal ones.  
As noted above, these changes were mere attempts to rewrite the Constitution to one that would 
be acceptable to the black majority and are considered to have laid the foundation for the 
current constitutional dispensation. However, some had other more sinister motives.  ‘Most of 
the Amendments have sought to reverse judicial rulings which have set standards for 
constitutional conduct by the State.’52 In addition, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 
placed the acceptability of the Constitution into perspective;  
‘The Constitution of Zimbabwe was a ceasefire document conceived during peace talks to 
protect selected interests. It therefore remains flawed and unable to substantively promote and 
protect the human rights of all the people of Zimbabwe today. Further, virtually all amendments 
made to this ceasefire document have been in favour of entrenchment of state power, and have 
compounded the attack on, rather than the protection of, civil rights and liberties as confirmed 
by the courts and otherwise.’53 
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Amendment No. 9 of 198954 abolished bi-cameral legislature and introduced a single House of 
Parliament. Considering the ceasefire notion carried in the previous legislation where some 
parliamentary seats were ‘transitionally’ reserved for the White minority, the State failed to 
open all parliamentary seats to the vote and instead used them to continue to allow the President 
to exercise extreme powers over the legislature by appointing a large proportion of this 
erstwhile ‘independent’ institution, essentially to promote political party interests. This was a 
direct violation of the people’s right to elect their leaders.   
A rather more interesting move by the State was its enactment of the Amendment No. 1155 
which came as a response to a human rights-related Court ruling in S v A Juvenile.56 The 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held in S v A Juvenile that corporal punishment amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment which was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society.57 In response, the Legislature in Amendment No. 11 changed the Constitution to add 
a provision expressly allowing such corporal punishment. It added that hanging by the neck 
‘did not amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.’58 
This directly reversed the ruling of the Supreme Court and negatively affected the 
independence of the judiciary and the principle of separation of powers. In a further assault on 
the judiciary, when the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held in Catholic Commission for Justice 
and Peace v Attorney- General and Others59 that a delay in the enforcement of capital 
punishment amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, the Legislature in Amendment No. 
1360 again reversed the decision by inserting a provision that such conduct would be considered 
acceptable. The impact of these and other decisions on constitutionalism will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5.  
2.3.2 Constitutional developments of the early 2000s 
 
The beginning of the 21st Century was a turning point in Zimbabwe’s constitutional history. 
There were two unsuccessful attempts, within two years, to write a new constitution for 
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Zimbabwe. After these attempts, the constitutional debate became even more relevant during 
a decade-long period of political instability and economic meltdown. The constitutional 
developments in the 2000s started with the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly, 
followed by the constitutional draft of 2000 followed by the constitutional Amendment of 2000 
and with the 2001 draft.  
2.3.2.1 The National Constitutional Assembly 
 
Perhaps the most important period in Zimbabwe’s constitutional history was the late 1990s. 
This period saw growing calls for a new constitution in Zimbabwe. Commenting on the many 
amendments made to the Zimbabwe constitution, Marumahoko said ‘this led civil society to 
argue that the piece-meal constitutional changes have transformed the Lancaster House 
Constitution such that it no longer bore resemblance to the original constitution.’61 This 
eventually led to the formation of a new civil society organisation with its main focus placed 
on constitutionalism. The organisation formed in 1998 came to be known as the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) led by academics, students and activists. Describing the NCA, 
Sithole said;  
 ‘The NCA is an effective pro-democracy network that strives to keep democratization as a 
priority issue on the national agenda and consistently acts as an advocate for good governance. 
Its membership comprised both institutional and individual members. The former include 
scores of civil society organizations like the influential and well-respected Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace; religious organizations like the Zimbabwe Council of 
Churches; human rights advocacy groups such as Zimrights; women’s groups like the Women’s 
Coalition; student organizations such as the Zimbabwe National Students Union; and, most 
important of all, the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which is also the 
backbone of the MDC [Movement for Democratic Change].’62 
The NCA has been credited for pushing the constitutional agenda. Hatchard notes that,  
‘The debate on a new constitution for Zimbabwe to replace the 1979 independence document 
commenced in earnest in 1997 when a grouping of various civic organizations that included 
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churches, political parties (although crucially not the ruling party, ZANU(PF)) and human 
rights groups formed the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).’63  
To illustrate the role of the NCA, as Sachikonye  notes, ‘[t]he first salvo was fired by a broad 
alliance of civil society organisations that founded the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) in 1998.’64  The objectives of the NCA were spelt out as: i) to identify shortcomings of 
the current Constitution and to organize a debate on possible constitutional reform; ii) to 
organize the constitutional debate in a way that allows broad-based participation, and iii) to 
subject the constitution-making process in Zimbabwe to popular scrutiny per the principle that 
constitutions are made by and for the people.65 Although these objectives resonated with the 
State’s objective of writing a new constitution, there were fundamental differences that later 
proved to be irreconcilable. The main differences were centred around the process and the 
substance of the constitution. Substantially, ‘the NCA singled out several clauses in the 
Constitution which, it argued, were not justifiable in a democratic society.’66 It was observed, 
for example, that the protections in the Bill of Rights were not as wide as is desirable in a 
democratic society. Concerning the procedure, Sachikonye notes that ‘while there was basic 
agreement on the case for a new Constitution, there was a polarisation of positions over the 
process to follow in crafting one.’67 This essentially led to a stalemate that resulted in ‘an 
unprecedented constitution-making exercise dominated by ZANU-PF and involving a 
government-appointed Constitutional Commission consisting of 400 members, of whom 150 
were parliamentarians.’68 The NCA, however, found resonance with the newly formed 
opposition political party the Movement for Democratic Change that was also calling for 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and a new constitutional order that would 
bring back the rule of law.69 As a result, the NCA enjoyed significant support across the 
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country. The NCA thus went on a massive national campaign. ‘The NCA exercise involved an 
extensive civic education campaign to explain why it had begun to write a new Constitution. It 
identified the limitations of the Lancaster House Constitution and solicited suggestions and 
proposals about what a new Constitution should contain.’70 This was the greatest strength that 
the NCA had in the constitution-making process.  
2.3.2.2 The Constitutional Commission Draft and Referendum  
 
The Constitutional Commission was constituted through Statutory Instrument71 by the 
President in 1999. The Constitutional Commission was tasked with initiating the process of 
constitutional review and to write a new constitution. The rationale was to ‘afford the people 
of Zimbabwe the opportunity to author and found their constitution enshrining freedom, 
democracy, transparency and good governance.’72 In the words of the then  President Robert 
Mugabe, the Commission was mandated to ‘review the Lancaster House Constitution, as 
amended, and to appreciate the functions and powers of the three principal pillars of State (that 
is, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary) and the extent and scope of the Bill of 
Rights…..’73 According to Sachikonye, the Commission constituted of 500 members drawn 
largely from the ruling party and a few from the private sector and a cross-section of State 
friendly civil society organizations.74 The Commission was chaired by the late Justice 
Chidyausiku, who was, at the time, the Judge President of the High Court, who was to later 
become the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court then the Constitutional Court.75 Marumahoko 
argues that the Commission was given unfettered powers in terms of setting its own rules and 
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74 According to Marumahoko ‘of the 500 commissioners, 150 were elected Members of Parliament and 350 were 
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procedures for constitutional making.76 The Commission started its work in August 1999 and 
by the end of September 1999, it had completed its consultations. It was divided into nine 
distinct thematic committees responsible for ‘(a) executive organs of state; (b) citizenship, 
fundamental and directive rights; (c) separation of levels of government; (d) public finance and 
management; (e) customary law; (f) independent commissions; (g) separation of powers among 
the three branches of government; (h) transitional arrangements; and (i) legal matters.’77  
During its work, the Commission received written and oral submissions. According to records, 
it held 5 000 meetings and consulted 700 000 people.78 These consultative meetings were done 
by 10 consultation groups made of 43 commissioners each.79 Their duty was to collect and 
record what people wanted to see in the new constitution. However, the challenge came in the 
compilation of its findings and the drafting of the constitution. After the consultations, the 
Commission held a plenary session with all the consultation teams to submit their findings.80  
This was followed by the drafting stage.81  
According to Raftopoulos and Savage ‘in producing the draft constitution the Constitutional 
Commission did not faithfully record the views that it had gathered in the interviews recorded 
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in the CRC reports.’82 It is also on record that once the Constitutional Commission adopted the 
draft, the President also made his alterations and sent it to Parliament for adoption on 
November 19 1999.83 Highlighting the shadowy manner in which the drafting process was 
undertaken, Marumahoko puts it as follows;  
‘On 19 January 2000, under the heading ‘Corrections and Clarifications’, the government again 
published in the Government Gazette, the final draft constitution. In total, forty amendments 
were made to the draft constitution adopted by the Constitutional Commission under the guise 
of ‘corrections and clarifications’. The executive justified the amendment of the document 
through a statement published in the national media; It is common cause that any draft is by 
definition subject to improvement by way of grammatical and factual corrections as well as 
linguistic clarifications in order to avoid any doubt about the meaning of what is in the draft. 
The corrections and clarifications below were done on the basis of the records of the 
Commission’s Committee minutes and published in the Commission’s 1437-page Social 
Report. It’s all there for the asking and there is nothing new because the record is public and 
therefore speaks for itself. Only people with literacy problems or hidden political agendas will 
find it difficult to tell the otherwise clear difference between corrections and clarifications on 
the (sic) one hand and amendments on the other. Don’t be misled.’84 
The Draft Constitution was becoming more contentious. It has been reported that even some 
members of the Commission approached the Court seeking a declaratory order for invalidity 
of the Draft Constitution. The grounds for the applications to High Court were, inter alia, the 
constitutionality of the President’s unilateral amendments to the draft as well as the clear 
disparity between the submissions and the final draft.85   As a result, the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) rejected the Constitutional Commission processes. The NCA, ‘like the 
Constitutional Commission (CC), also conducted an extensive outreach programme in different 
parts of the country on what should form the content of the new Constitution.’86 In its outreach 
and campaigns, the NCA pointed out the shortfalls of the Constitutional Commission and as 
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Sachikonye puts it, ‘eventually, the credibility of the CC exercise was thrown into serious doubt 
when its draft omitted and misrepresented some of the citizens’ views on what the new 
Constitution should contain.’87 The NCA went on a rigorous campaign calling for the rejection 
of the Commission’s draft in a referendum that was to follow in February 2000. ‘The CC’s 
draft was decisively rejected in the referendum in February 2000. The NCA had contributed to 
that rejection through its ‘no’ campaign, which resonated with the electorate. What followed 
was a stalemate on the future direction of the reform process.’88 The rejection of the 
Constitutional Commission draft was viewed as a victory for the opposition and civil society. 
However, it also marked a turning point in Zimbabwe’s political history, as this was largely 
seen as the ruling party’s first-ever defeat. As Marumahoko puts it;  
‘The results of the referendum represented the first significant national snubbing of a major 
political programme institutionalised by ZANU PF, the ruling party … The ‘no’ vote also 
signified the opposition to the awkward manner in which the government-appointed 
Constitutional Commission had organised and managed the process of constitution-making. 
The State President was, however, gracious enough to publicly accept the results of the 
referendum as binding, noting that ‘the people had spoken.’89 
What followed thereafter was a politically charged decade characterised by State-sponsored 
human rights violations. There was also a further contraction of civil and political rights 
through the introduction of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA)90 and the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)91 in 2002. The legislation restricted 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression respectively. Their operation was beyond the 
limitations of the permissible rights in terms of the international law and was therefore 
unacceptable in a democratic society. The introduction of this legislation even further polarized 
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Zimbabwe’s political space. More people belonging to the opposition were arrested on 
allegations of violating the provisions of POSA and journalists belonging to the private media 
were also not spared through the operation of AIPPA.  
After the referendum, the constitutional debate was temporarily shelved with attention shifting 
to the impending 2002 presidential election. Most of the amendments that followed were in 
one way or the other meant to guard against the growing criticism of the State and many arrests 
were made under POSA and AIPPA. The 1980 Constitution could not sufficiently protect civil 
and political rights as it had been manipulated through several amendments.  
2.3.2.3 Key features of the Constitution Commission’s 2000 draft.  
 
Some key provisions of the Constitutional Commission Draft must be discussed. This is 
because it is one of the few publicized draft constitutions for Zimbabwe before the adoption of 
the 2013 Constitution. It would also be interesting to see if the Constitutional Commission draft 
had any transformative elements that could inform the trajectory of the Zimbabwe courts’ 
jurisprudence.  
The Commission’s Draft committed to the constitution as the supreme and fundamental law of 
the land. This was indeed a key feature as it guarantees the supremacy of the law which in turn 
is important in ensuring the rule of law, something which had for long been absent in 
Zimbabwe. The Draft further stated that the organs and agencies of the State were not exempt 
from the supremacy of the Constitution. Executive authority was vested in the President, Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. The Constitution placed the presidential two terms limit. However, this 
was not to apply to the incumbent. Arguably, these were the most progressive features of the 
Commission’s Draft. However, the President’s powers were even entrenched further.92 And 
this was retrogressive.  
In addition, the power to make peace or war was vested in the President. The President also 
had the power to deploy military forces outside the country’s borders. The Draft Constitution 
established the office of the Prime Minister.93 It is important to note that the office of the Prime 
Minister had been abolished in the 1987 Amendments to the Constitution.94 The Parliament 
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was to be comprised of two houses, the Senate, and the National Assembly. This was one of 
the contentious provisions of the Draft.95 Further, the Draft vested the judicial authority in the 
courts that is the Constitutional Court (which was to be established), Supreme Court, High 
Court, Magistrate’s Court, Customary Law Courts as well as any other courts established 
through acts of Parliament. The Constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. The 
extent of this independence was however debatable. The Constitution made a provision that 
judges, other than the Chief Justice were to be appointed by the President from a list of names 
drawn by the Judicial Services Commission. The President, however, was responsible for the 
appointment of the Chief Justice and was to only consult with the Judicial Services 
Commission. One may argue that this document was a reformed version of the Lancaster House 
Constitution, however, the process that led to its drafting was not acceptable to the masses 
which led to its rejection at the referendum.  
2.3.2.4 Constitutional changes of 2000 
 
The year 2000 saw a significant constitutional change that has often been blamed for the socio-
economic challenges that Zimbabwe is currently facing. Through the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment No. 16,96 the Government purportedly transferred the responsibility of 
compensation for land belonging to dispossessed commercial farmers from the Government of 
Zimbabwe to the British Government. Amendment 16A read;   
(1) In regard to the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for the resettlement of people 
in accordance with a programme of land reform, the following factors shall be regarded as of 
ultimate and overriding importance (a) Under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe 
were unjustifiably dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation; (b) The 
people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land and political sovereignty, and 
this ultimately resulted in the Independence of Zimbabwe in 1980; (c) The people of Zimbabwe 
must be enabled to reassert their rights and regain ownership of their land; and accordingly (i) 
The former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land 
compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established for the purpose; 
and (ii) If the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the 
 
95 This was seen by the opposition as a ploy by the ruling party to increase its chances of control the parliament 
since a substantial number of members of the uppers were to be appointed by the President and some to come 
from the traditional chiefs’ body.  




Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land 
compulsorily acquired for resettlement.97 
Consequently, this provision resulted in the farm invasions of the early 2000s that were later 
legalised via another Amendment in 2005.98 It is important to note that the land invasions of 
the year 2000 were a direct response to the emergence of a new political party, the MDC, 
formed by students, academics, trade unionists and the civil society. The political debates 
surrounding the issue of land resulted in a ruling party led a crackdown on the opposition, 
White commercial farmers and the civil society.99 It is the crackdown on the opposition and 
civil society that led to new calls for a new dispensation based on the rule of law, democracy 
and respect for human rights.  
2.3.2.5 The 2001 National Constitutional Assembly Draft  
 
The rejection of the Constitutional Commission draft led to an ‘ambitious’ constitution-making 
process by the civil society led by the NCA. This project was undertaken by civil society with 
the belief that the Government was not sincere in its commitment to a new constitutional order. 
They also accused the government of not treating the constitutional issue with the urgency it 
deserved. Many civil organisations came together intending to write a new constitution. To 
achieve this, the NCA convened an extraordinary summit on 31 March 2001.100 The objective 
of the summit was for the affiliated members to chart a way forward in a quest for a new 
constitution. An all Stakeholder’s Constitutional Conference was consequently held in Harare 
for the NCA to get a formal mandate to write a new constitution for Zimbabwe.101  More than 
7 000 delegates attended the Conference. The delegates included civil society, women 
organisations, students, and youths. The NCA was unanimously elected to drive the 
constitution-making process. Having received the mandate, the NCA embarked on a civic 
education campaign to produce a draft by 30 September 2001. Its civic education was primarily 
focused on acquainting the masses with the process, structure and how input was to be sourced. 
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This was done through various billboards, radio and television advertisements as well as 
through newspapers. Rallies and marches were also conducted.  
During consultations, the NCA sought to gather the input of the people on what they wanted to 
see in the constitution. The consultations took the form of community outreach programmes. 
The First Draft of the NCA Constitution was published on 28 September 2001.  Following 
various debates, comments, and suggestions, the draft was updated and endorsed by 85% of 
the delegates at the All Stakeholder Conference on 1 December 2001. The Draft was then 
presented to the Government for adoption. Marumahoko cites the Draft Constitution of 2001; 
‘This is now the Final Draft, which from the evidence available to the NCA, has been endorsed 
by a broad section of the people of Zimbabwe. It is being presented to the government of 
Zimbabwe with a DEMAND that it be enacted into law. The Government must among other 
things, facilitate the holding of a referendum on any future Constitution of Zimbabwe. The 
NCA will be leading a process of ensuring that Zimbabwe eventually has a new, democratic 
and people-driven constitution. This Final Draft represents such a constitution and the NCA 
will advocate for its enactment into law.’102 
The Government did not accept the proposed constitution on various grounds. Firstly, the 
government argued, ‘the actions of the NCA did not carry moral and legal authority. The NCA, 
it was argued, could not act as the representative of the people.’103 Secondly, the constitution 
was objected on the basis that its land and property clause was too generous and that the 
changes were broad. 
Even though the NCA constitution did not come to fruition, it provided the basis for 
constitution-making in Zimbabwe. The elements of inclusivity and national participation were 
to be commended, and these became the guidelines for the 2013 constitution to be discussed 
later.  
2.3.2.6 Constitutional changes of 2005 
 
In 2005, the Constitution Amendment (No. 17)104 was enacted. This Amendment had three 
main characteristics. The first is that it revived a bicameral Parliament through the 
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reintroduction of the Senate, a house that had been previously abolished.105 The Senate became 
the Upper House of Parliament.106 The second feature is that the Amendment provided for the 
compulsory acquisition of land from white commercial farmers. The Act, through section 16B 
‘introduced a new provision to confirm the acquisition of land for resettlement purposes which 
took place according to the Land Reform Programme beginning in 2000, and provide for 
acquisition in the future of agricultural land for (sic) and other purposes.’107 The provision also 
had the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts in matters involving land and reduced 
individuals’ right to access to courts in similar matters.108 ‘This Amendment was to be the 
subject of the long and fierce legal battle between Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd109 (a Zimbabwean 
farming company) and the Government of Zimbabwe.’110 This Amendment also had far-
reaching consequences. As a result, several cases were heard in both Zimbabwean and regional 
courts.111 
The third main feature of the 2005 Amendment was its effect of reducing the extent of the right 
to freedom of expression.  This Amendment also altered Section 22 of the Constitution by 
extending the grounds on which the right to freedom of movement could be limited.112 Legal 
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commentators viewed this as a strategy to circumvent the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Chirwa v Registrar General113 in which the Court ruled it unlawful to restrict a citizen’s right 
to travel in terms of section 22 of the Constitution.114 As will be shown in the following 
Chapters, constitutional amendments had become a tool by which the state could reverse the 
court’s rulings on constitutional matters. This effectively led to increased calls for a new 
constitution.  
2.3.2.7 Constitutional changes of 2007 and Kariba Draft 
 
Perhaps the most controversial development in Zimbabwe’s constitutional history was the 
drafting of a constitution that became known as the Kariba Draft. The Kariba Draft derives its 
name from the name of the town in which it was drafted.115 There is not much legal information 
about the drafting of this document as it was done secretly by political parties around 2007.116 
The Draft, however, suffered a premature death and the only time in which it found legal 
meaning is when it was referenced in Article 6 of the Global Political Agreement.117 The Kariba 
Draft has often been criticized for its flaws in terms of both substance and process. The Kariba 
drafting process overlooked the role that could be played by other stakeholders including the 
ordinary citizens. It essentially denied people the right to self-determination through a people-
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driven constitutional making process.118 A few people representing political parties drafted the 
Kariba document and it is often suggested that not more than six people were primarily 
responsible for the drafting.119 This was contrary to the values and principles set in the 
Zimbabwe People’s Charter,120 which calls for a “people-driven, participatory” process of 
constitutional reform spearheaded by an inclusive All Stakeholders Commission.’121 21st-
century constitutionalism requires that the views of the people be taken into account when 
drafting constitutions that would be acceptable to the people. Commenting on the Kariba Draft, 
one author pointed out: 
‘It is regrettable that the attempt at constitutional reform was tied to the whims and caprices of 
the political elite. The fact that the process of constitution-making was concocted by a collection 
of politicians and reflected executive preferences suggests that the final document could not 
claim to be democratic, legitimate and reflective of the popular will of the people.’122 
Substantially, the Kariba Draft was flawed. It was simply a merger of the Lancaster House 
Constitution and the 2000 Constitutional Commission draft which both sought to entrench 
Executive powers as opposed to expanding the scope and protection of fundamental human 
rights. Therefore, the Draft could not meet the minimum expectations of a constitutionally 
drafted document.  
2.4 The Global Political Agreement and 2009 Amendments 
 
Arguably, the most important stage in Zimbabwe’s post-colonial history is the formation of the 
Inclusive Government in 2009. Following a disputed election in June 2008: 
 ‘on the 15th of September 2008, Zimbabwe entered into a historic Global Political Agreement 
(GPA) which gave birth to the Government of National Unity (GNU) to end the political and 
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economic impasse in the country as well as a foundation towards a new constitutional 
dispensation, founded on the protection of human rights.’123  
The Global Political Agreement is often credited for setting the base on which the new 
Constitution was founded.124 As Arat notes ‘democracy depends largely on the extent to which 
it recognizes and enforces civil and political rights.’125 Some of the provisions that can be 
singled out include Article 6 which informed the constitutional-making process.126 In terms of 
the substance, Articles 11, 12, 18 and 19 provided for civil and political rights.127 From its 
inception, the mandate of the new Government was clear. Firstly, it was to carve a path to 
economic recovery, and secondly to restore democracy and the rule of law. Morgan Tsvangirai, 
one of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) principals was once quoted saying that the 
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Government of National Unity (GNU) was not about power-sharing but a return to democracy 
and the rule of law.128  
Most importantly, the parties in the GNU agreed to set up a committee that would spearhead 
the drafting of a new Constitution. Soon after the formation of the GNU, some key 
constitutional Amendments were made. These amendments came through Constitution 
Amendment No. 19,129 which was the last amendment on the old Constitution. The Amendment 
was engineered to activate and operationalize the Government of National Unity.130  This 
Amendment dealt with issues to do with citizenship, citizens’ duty to respect the Constitution, 
duty to uphold the rule of law, granted political rights as well as guaranteed the independence 
of several commissions.131 Concerning the issue of citizenship, the Constitution was amended 
in several ways. It repealed the old Chapter on citizenship and replaced it with a new chapter.132 
This new Chapter set out the grounds for citizenship by birth, descent and registration. People 
married to Zimbabwean citizens could also now obtain citizenship by registration. In addition 
to this, the Constitution imposed a duty on every citizen to ‘observe and respect the 
Constitution, to respect the national flag, and the national anthem and to the best of his/her 
ability, to defend Zimbabwe in time of need.’133 Notably, Amendment 19 also provided that 
every citizen be entitled to the protection of the State. Furthermore, a new section titled 
‘political rights’ was inserted into the Constitution.134 This section obliged the State to 
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guarantee every citizen the right to a ‘free, fair and regular elections for local and national 
political offices’135 The right to vote included the right to vote freely in both elections and 
referendums, and the right to stand for public office. It should be noted that these Amendments 
were meant to address the ills of the 2008 elections.  
To strengthen democracy, Amendment 19 established various independent commissions. It 
provided that these commissions are independent and not subject to any form of control by 
political organs. In addition, it required commissioners to exercise their authority without fear, 
favour or prejudice. The two main changes in this regard were the changes in the composition 
of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)136 and the establishment of the Zimbabwe Anti-
Corruption Commission (ZACC). The former’s composition was highly contested on the basis 
that it was not independent and that Commissioners were ZANU PF loyalists, so the latter had 
to be introduced to combat corruption, misappropriation and abuse of power.  
2.5 Constitution-making: Background 
 
The preceding sections painted a picture of the constitutional crisis that Zimbabwe was in 
before 2013. The only solution for Zimbabwe was to adopt a new Constitution- one that would 
usher in a new era of democracy and respect for human rights. Following the disputed Election 
in 2008, a new inclusive Government was established. This new Government was to be 
popularly known as the Government of National Unity as it was made up of the three main 
political parties in the country. The new Government was formed under the mediation and 
brokerage of regional and sub-regional bodies such as the Africa Union (AU) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). The GNU came to power on the 13th of February 
2009 following negotiations on a power-sharing deal and several agreements on constitutional 
issues. 
The guidelines for the drafting of the new Constitution were contained in the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA). In terms of Article 6,137 the Constitution Parliamentary Committee 
 
 (a) to vote in referendums and elections for any legislative body established under this Constitution, 
and to do so in secret; and 
 (b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office 
135 Ibid. 
136 The Amendment increased the number of commissioners from 7 to 9 (including the Chairperson) nominated 
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(COPAC)138 was to call for a constitutional conference to seek guidance on the themes and 
structure of the Constitution. As outlined in the GPA, the new government’s mandate was to 
drive a new constitution-making process in Zimbabwe. This duty was placed in the hands of 
Parliament, through a Select Committee. This was needed to promote human rights and 
democracy.139 
‘In the quest to promote and protect human rights, the GPA principals pledged to create 
conditions for Zimbabweans to write a constitution that deepens democratic values and 
principles. In principle, parties in Article 4 agreed to draft a people-driven “constitution that 
provides for some basic political and economic rights as guaranteed by international law.”140 
Despite this need for a people-driven constitution, in practice it was dominated by political 
parties, through a Parliament-led process under the direction of the Constitution Parliamentary 
Affairs (Select) Committee (COPAC), which defeated the voices of the people by making the 
whole process determined by inter-party negotiations.141 
The COPAC was constituted of 25 legislators drawn from all the political parties represented 
in the Government of National Unity.142 As a result, the constitutional-making process was 
riddled with contestations. Different political parties had different political views. Critics have 
argued that the very composition of COPAC was not representative.143 Notably, they expressed 
concern over the fact that Parliamentarians led the process. Reynolds cited by Marumahoko 
also ‘questioned the suitability of Parliament on the basis that it did not represent all the 
political parties.’144 In response to this argument, the Speaker of Parliament (the Hon. L Moyo) 
said that a Parliament-led process would ensure that the process was transparent and credible. 
Marumahoko is of the view that ‘putting a Parliament in charge of the Constitution-making 
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process puts the ruling politicians of the day in an ideal position to dominate the process of 
constitution-making under the guise of being representatives of the people.’145  
This argument is premised on the notion that the incumbent always has control of all arms of 
the State as well as the State media which provides room for electioneering. Another criticism 
of the constitutional making process in Zimbabwe was that ‘Parliament is necessarily a product 
of temporary electoral choices that depend on the political winds, interests and prejudices of 
the moment.’146 In addition to this, Moyo submits that ‘unsuitability of parliamentarians as 
constitutional makers stems  from the fact that they are chosen to represent the people who vote 
them into Parliament and those who subscribe to political values that are in conflict with those 
they purport to embody.’147 The other argument made against the involvement of 
Parliamentarians is that as elected representatives of the people, Parliamentarians only serve 
for a limited period, therefore they are not best suited to be the authors of a document that 
would endure well beyond their parliamentary terms.148 As valid as the arguments against the 
composition of COPAC may sound, the constitutional-making process in Zimbabwe was 
widely regarded as democratic, and certainly better than the previous attempts.  
2.6 The COPAC-led process. 
 
The Constitution-making process started in earnest with the calling of the Constitutional 
Conference. This was known as the First All Stakeholder Conference.149 It was held from the 
12th to the 13th of July 2009. The participants of the Conference were drawn from the political 
parties, civil society, and non-governmental organizations.  The objective of the Conference 
was to discuss and determine the methodology of the collection of people’s views, input and 
to constitute thematic committees of COPAC.150 This was a participatory process meant to 
ensure that citizens were involved in the process from the beginning.151  Records show that the 
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this, the Conference managed to record some degree of success, sufficient to start the 
process.152  
In terms of Article 6 .1 (a) of the GPA, COPAC had the mandate to solicit the views of the 
ordinary people.153 The views of ordinary people were collected through outreach consultation 
meetings led by COPAC. 54 teams of 16 members each were tasked with the duty of consulting 
the ordinary citizens on issues surrounding the themes that were agreed on at the First 
Stakeholders Conference. The outreach teams consisted of members of the civil society, 
political parties and traditional leaders. It is on record that they held a total of 4 943 meetings 
and an estimated total of 1 118 760 people participated in the meetings.154 Further, views were 
also submitted via email and other electronic platforms. This was meant to cater to those 
citizens who were not physically available to attend meetings especially those in the 
diaspora.155  
Even though these meetings were participatory, they were not as perfect as they should have 
been. There were reports of coercion by the police and the military.156 The meetings were 
criticized for not reflecting the views of the people but those of political parties, as there was 
evidence of coaching. After the data was collected and collated, a committee drafted the 
constitution.  
COPAC released the first Constitution Draft on 18 July 2012. It was reported that MDC 
accepted the Draft as it was whilst ZANU PF proposed several amendments. Ncube and Okeke-
Uzodike note that ‘ZANU PF proposed several amendments and declared them non-
negotiable.’157 The Opposition rejected the Amendments in the strongest of terms, the 
Welshman Ncube led Movement for Democratic Change described the Amendments as 
‘preposterous, a mockery of the people, and flaunting gross disrespect, contempt insult and 
audacity by ZANU PF hawks to block transition.’158 The Draft Constitution was presented at 
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the Second All Stakeholders Conference that was held in October 2012. The Conference was 
aimed at giving feedback to the stakeholders and to review the Draft Constitution. After the 
review, the MDC accepted the document and ZANU PF rejected provisions relating to 
devolution of powers of which they favoured decentralization, legalization of same-sex 
relationships, dual citizenship, the idea of presidential running mates, and establishment of a 
Constitutional Court and the idea of an independent prosecution authority. 159 These demands 
resulted in an impasse. The impasse was subsequently resolved leading to a referendum and 
the adoption of the Constitution. At the referendum, Zimbabweans voted overwhelmingly in 
support of the new constitution. The Constitution was enacted as the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment No. 20.160  This Constitution saw overwhelming support at the referendum 
because of its transformative object. This was a commonly shared vision amongst the citizenry.  
2.7 Salient features of the 2013 Constitution  
 
The 2013 Constitution presented Zimbabwe with a chance to respect democracy, the rule of 
law and human rights. As noted in the earlier Chapters, the new Zimbabwe Constitution was 
negotiated and adopted by the people, and unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, there was 
no external influence. The main feature of the Constitution in so far as human rights is 
concerned is its broad Declaration of Rights.161 The other main feature is that it is founded on 
principles of separation of powers, democracy, accountability, good governance and the rule 
of law among others. There is therefore hope that this new Constitution may represent a new 
system of governance. This was also further entrenched by the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court.  However, according to Justice Chinhengo, a former judge of the High 
Courts of Zimbabwe and Botswana, ‘[o]n its own, the adoption of the new Constitution does 
not in any way guarantee this departure as envisaged under the new Constitution.’162 This 
simply indicates that even though the Constitution is transformative, there is a need for the 
judges to ensure that the transformation envisaged is realised.  
2.7.1 Separation of Powers 
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Separation of powers in the Constitution of Zimbabwe is found in the distinct constitutional 
powers that are granted to the three arms of the state. Section 88 (2) vests executive authority 
in the President and Cabinet, section 162 vests judicial authority in the courts and section 116 
vests legislative powers in the Parliament.163 Even though there is no strict separation of 
powers, for example between the Legislature and the Cabinet, separation of powers allows for 
the smooth operation of government.164 This is because of the existence of a system of checks 
and balances which promotes transparency and accountability. Without a system of checks and 
balances, there is a likelihood of abuse of powers by the different arms of the state.165  
2.7.2 The Rule of Law  
 
The Preamble of the 2013 Constitution refers to the need to ‘entrench democracy, good, 
transparent and accountable governance and the rule of law.’166 This makes the rule of law a 
salient feature of the new dispensation founded on constitutionalism in Zimbabwe. 
Theoretically, the rule of law ‘is a doctrine which requires that all citizens and their government 
be bound by the same laws and be protected by the same standards or rules; which are 
interpreted by the same principles at all times and as fairly as possible.’167 The rule of law is 
therefore an essential feature of constitutional democracy. It has also been noted by scholars 
that the rule of law plays a dual role of protecting normative values of a constitutional 
democracy against manipulation, and also functions as a vehicle for the enforcement of those 
normative values. However, the rule of law should not only be the absence of manipulation or 
equal treatment but substantially, it should be about having laws that are acceptable to 
humanity.  
In Commissioner of Police v Commercial Farmers Union, the High Court of Zimbabwe (per 
Chinhengo J) held that ‘the rule of law which is divorced from justice and just laws become a 
hollow concept.’168 It is imperative to make it clear that the rule of law contemplated in the 
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2013 Constitution, if holistically read with other provisions on human rights and accountability, 
is that which ensures both formalistic and material aspects of the rule of law.  According to 
Mavedzenge and Coltart, ‘the formalistic side of the rule of law ensures that government 
decisions conform with the law, while the material side ensures that the law itself is consistent 
with the entrenched constitutional democratic values and principles.’169  
The rule of law in the 2013 Constitution is further entrenched through various provisions such 
as section 3(1) (b) which lists the rule of law as a founding principle, section 2 (1) which binds 
the conduct of the State to the Constitution, and section 44 which places a duty on everyone 
including the State to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. More importantly, the 
Constitution places an obligation on all organs of the State to respect the decisions of the 
courts.170 As will be shown below the State has, on several occasions, abdicated these 
provisions.  
2.7.3 Judicial Review  
 
Like in many constitutional democracies, the 2013 Constitution provides for judicial review. 
Judicial review, as contemplated in the Constitution, refers to the Court’s power to test the 
constitutional validity of the decisions of the Legislature, the Executive and other agencies of 
the State.171 ‘[J]udicial review has become [a] necessary mechanism of ensuring governance is 
in accordance with the constitutionally entrenched normative values and principles of 
democracy.’172 The court, the Constitutional Court in particular, in terms of the 2013 
Constitution has the power to review the Constitutionality of laws as well as executive action 
in terms of section 167 (2).173 This work is therefore based on the argument that the courts in 
Zimbabwe should be bold enough to exercise these powers “without fear or favour” to bring 
about the much-needed change. Judicial review is an intrinsic feature of constitutionalism.  
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2.7.4 Constitutional democracy  
 
The Constitution provides for constitutional democracy. Under section 155(1) the government 
is obliged to ensure that elections are conducted regularly in a free, fair and peaceful manner. 
In addition to this, the same provision prescribes that elections will be conducted through a 
secret ballot, universal adult suffrage, equality of votes and be free from violence and other 
forms of electoral malpractices. The Constitution, under section 3(2) also creates a multiparty 
democracy.174  Multiparty politics has the potential to improve government scrutiny and 
accountability. Where the legislative arm is composed of various political parties, there is the 
likelihood of a vibrant oversight of executive action. Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees 
political rights to every citizen through the provisions of section (67), and these are the right to 
free, fair and regular elections, and the right to make political choices freely. More importantly, 
the Constitution gives every citizen the right to: 
‘form, join and to participate in the activities of a political party or organisation of their choice;  
to campaign freely and peacefully for a political or [other] cause; to participate in peaceful 
political activity; and to participate, individually or collectively, in gatherings or groups or in 
any other manner, in peaceful activities to influence, challenge or support the policies of the 
government or any political or whatever cause.’175 
Within the Zimbabwean context, this is an important provision as it is a corollary to various 
civil and political rights such as the right to demonstrate. This right has been a subject of 
extensive litigation in the Zimbabwean courts and will be discussed extensively in this Chapter.  
2.7.5 Independent Commissions  
 
To entrench democracy and the rule of law, the Constitution establishes several independent 
commissions. These institutions are primarily established to promote, respect, and protect 
human rights, and democratic values and principles. Central to the functionality and 
effectiveness of these institutions is their independence, and this is guaranteed by the 
Constitution itself. It is, therefore, crucial that the institutions carry out their duties without any 
hindrance or interference from the State or political parties.  
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The 2013 Constitution, in Chapter 12, establishes the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 
the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), the Zimbabwe Media Commission, the 
Zimbabwe Gender Commission, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission. The 
objectives, jurisdictions and scope of the operations of these commissions are in terms of 
section 233 of the Constitution. According to Mavedzenge and Coltart, ‘[i]ndependent 
constitutional institutions are therefore a necessary element of the constitutional infrastructure 
of a democracy.’176 It is even more important that the Constitution entrenches their 
independence and gives them sufficient powers to play their oversight role in the protection of 
democracy.177 
2.7.6 The Declaration of Rights  
 
One of the most progressive features of the 2013 Constitution is its inclusion of a Declaration 
of Rights in Chapter 4. Like most modern constitutions, the Declaration of Rights contains all 
the fundamental rights, civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. The purpose of the 
Declaration of Rights is to protect the citizens by spelling out the rights that cannot be 
derogated, especially by the State, and qualify others as not absolute. The rationale for the 
limitation of rights, essentially, is to allow the government to govern effectively. However, it 
should be stressed that in Zimbabwe, even though the Declaration of Rights protects several 
rights, including the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, notorious laws 
such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA)178 and the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)179 continue to operate despite being inconsistent with the 
declaration of rights. In addition to this, several executive actions continue to violate human 
rights. For example, police brutality, bans on demonstrations and persecution of media 
practitioners among others are still rampant in Zimbabwe.  
2.7.7 Independence of the judiciary 
 
The 2013 Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary. This is important in 
ensuring justice and effective judicial review. According to Chiduza, ‘[i]n a country founded 
on constitutional democracy, the independence of the courts is pivotal to the protection of 
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human rights.’180 Central to judicial independence are the issues to do with the appointment 
and removal of judges, jurisdiction, and the salaries payable to judges. Section 164(1) of the 
Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary and its judgements. The 
government is obliged to respect the independence of the judiciary and to respect the decisions 
of the court.181 Section 164 (2)(b) places a duty on the State to enact legislation that will 
supplement the constitutional provision of independence of the judiciary.  
2.7.8 The Constitutional Court  
 
The adoption of the new Constitution in 2013 led to the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court in terms of section 162 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.182  The ‘Constitutional Court’ 
provision in the Constitution was a subject of politically diverse views during the drafting 
process.183 It was, however, finally agreed that a Constitutional Court with a specific 
constitutional jurisdiction was necessary for the new dispensation.  
 2.7.8.1 Composition of the Constitutional Court 
 The Chief Justice heads the Constitutional Court, just like he/she does the Supreme Court.184 
In terms of section 166(1), the Constitutional Court bench also includes the Deputy Chief 
Justice and five other judges. It should be noted that, in terms of the Constitution, the Chief 
Justice also has the power to appoint an Acting Judge to the bench of the Constitutional 
Court.185 This appointment is, however, only for a limited period. The key values and principles 
that guide the operation of the Court are judicial independence, impartiality, and effectiveness 
of the Court. This means that the Court is expected to execute its duties expeditiously, without 
fear, favour or prejudice.186 In addition to this, the integrity of the Court is also maintained 
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through a provision that, ‘ members of the judiciary must not solicit or accept any gift, bequest, 
loan or favour that may influence their judicial conduct or give the appearance of judicial 
impropriety.’187 
2.7.8.2 Jurisdiction of the Court  
The jurisdiction of the Court is set out in section 167(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution where it 
says:  
‘(1) The constitutional court- 
(a) is the highest court in all constitutional matters, and its decisions on those matters bind all 
other courts; 
(b) decides only constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions on constitutional 
matters, in particular references and applications under section 131(8)(b) and paragraph 9(2) of 
the Fifth Schedule.’ 
In addition to this, the Court has the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of the actions 
of Parliament or the President, including powers to determine whether they failed to discharge 
a constitutional obligation.188 Should any other court make a pronouncement on the validity of 
the conduct of the President or Parliament, the Constitutional Court is obliged to confirm that 
decision.189  The Court also has exclusive jurisdiction in section 167(2) as it relates to decisions 
on the constitutionality of any proposed legislation; hear or determine disputes relating to the 
election of a President; hear and determine whether or not a person qualifies to hold the office 
of Vice President; or to determine whether Parliament or the President has failed to discharge 
constitutional duties.190  
The Constitution provides locus standi in the Court through the provision in section 167(5). In 
terms of this section, ‘the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in 
the interests of justice and, with or without leave of the Court, to bring a constitutional matter 
directly to the Constitutional Court; to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court from any 
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other court, or to appear as amicus curiae.’191 It can thus be argued that the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court is not inhibitive. In addition to this, the Constitution gives the Court the 
power to develop its own rules, the Common law or the Customary law in the interest of justice 
and the Constitution.192  
2.7.8.3 Appointment of judges and Constitutional Amendment (No.1) 
One of the most contentious issues during the drafting of the Constitution was on the 
appointment of judges, in particular, the appointment of the judges of the Constitutional Court 
and the Chief Justice. The appointment of judges is very significant and has a direct bearing on 
the balance of powers in a trias politica. According to Kika, ‘the very functioning of the courts 
is dependent on who sits on the bench.’193 As such, the Constitution, when it was adopted in 
2013, provided that the judges be appointment through a nomination process by the President 
as well as the public. The President, however, was the appointing authority. The 2013 
Constitution provided a cushion against manipulation of the appointment process by providing 
for public interviews for candidate judges.194 These interviews were to be conducted by the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC).195 From the qualifying candidates, interviewed publicly, 
the Judicial Service Commission would choose three candidates for each vacant post and 
submit the list to the President to appoint one.196 The significance of this is that the President 
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could no longer appoint judges outside of the submitted list. According to Chinhengo, ‘this 
provision vests the power of selecting and appointing the CJ and all judges not in one person 
but in two authorities, the JSC and the President with the former selecting and the latter 
appointing. It ensures that the person appointed to any of these high offices is not beholden to 
one person.’197  However, with the coming into existence of the 1st Amendment of the 2013 
Constitution, this position is now different.198  
Before turning to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1), it is necessary to lay 
down the political context around the Amendment. The ruling ZANU PF, during the drafting 
of the Constitution, had reservations on the issue of appointment of judges and the 
constitutional provision establishing the Constitutional Court. As such, it can be speculated 
that, when the main opposition divided into various formations following the election loss in 
2013, ZANU PF saw an opportunity to use its two-thirds majority in Parliament to amend the 
Constitution. The year 2016 was the perfect time to do this because the then Chief Justice’s 
(the late Chidyausiku CJ) term was ending, and he was reaching the constitutional retirement 
age of 70.199 Therefore, the Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs proposed 
amendments to section 180 seeking to empower the President to make the appointment of the 
new Chief Justice unilaterally.  
While the Parliamentary process for a constitutional amendment was ongoing, the Judicial 
Service Commission, in October 2016, called for nominations for the position of Chief Justice 
in terms of the Constitution.200 The JSC scheduled interviews for four nominated judges. 
However, a day before the interviews, an urgent chamber application was made to the High 
Court by one Romeo Zibani who sought to interdict the JSC from conducting interviews on the 
basis that there was an impending amendment to section 180 which provides for the 
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appointment of the Chief Justice.201  Hungwe J of the High Court granted the interdict.202  The 
JSC made an urgent appeal to the Supreme Court seeking reversal of the interdict and the JSC 
proceeded with the interviews after the appeal was upheld.203 What caught the attention of the 
people is how the Minister of Justice, cited as one of the respondents in the case, failed to give 
any meaningful opposition to the application and even supported the idea of stopping the 
interviews pending Amendment. This has raised the question of whether an impending 
Amendment has the power to stop the operation of an existing provision.  
The very nature and manner in which the Amendment was done have drawn criticism from 
scholars. Magaisa notes that ‘[t]he retrogressive character of Amendment No. 1 against the 
standards of constitutionalism is quite apparent. In addition, it was soiled by the controversy 
surrounding its introduction in December 2016.’204  It is interesting to note that one of the four 
nominated judges was absent from the interviews. The reasons for not attending the interview, 
according to Magaisa, were not made public. One can, however, speculate that this was a ploy 
to delay the process whilst the Parliamentary process proceeded and render the interviews 
useless.  
Following the litigation and interviews in terms of section 180, Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment Bill No 1 was passed into law by Parliament.205 The Amendment repealed section 
180 and replaced it with provisions that overturn the whole process of public interviews for the 
Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and the Judge President.206 This means that the processes 
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that apply to the appointment of other judges no longer apply to the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief 
Justice and the Judge President. The Amendment reads;  
‘(2) The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, and the Judge President of the High Court 
shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. 
(3) If the appointment of a Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, and the Judge President of the 
High Court is not consistent with any recommendation made by the Judicial Service 
Commission in terms of subsection (2) the Senate shall be informed as soon as possible: 
Provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that the decision of the President as to 
such appointment shall be final.’207 
This provision has drawn criticism from several legal scholars and civil rights groups. In a joint 
statement signed by more than 100 civil rights groups in Zimbabwe, the Amendment was 
labelled ‘a shameless action’.208 The Human Rights Watch organisation noted that the 
Amendment undermines the independence of the judiciary.209 It is argued, therefore that given 
how the Chief Justice is appointed, it would take some boldness on the part of the bench to 
transformatively decide on cases involving the most sensitive cases of civil and political rights.  
2.8 The state of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe  
 
Civil and political rights in Zimbabwe are guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. 
However, this remains one of the most sensitive areas in the Zimbabwean legal and political 
sphere. These rights, though constitutionally guaranteed, are not fully protected by the State. 
 
opaque and secretive. Fourth, whereas the old procedure provided room for public participation in the nomination 
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derives from the citizens, the new method completely excludes the public. Finally, whereas the old procedure had 
checks and balances on presidential powers, the new procedure leaves the President with excessive discretionary 
powers. All in all, the President now has more power to control the leadership of the judiciary without serious 
checks and balances than he did under the old procedure.’ 
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208Zimbabwe coalition says change in constitution ‘shameless’. (2017) Eyewitness News. available at  
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This is even though Zimbabwe has also acceded to international laws such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.210 As noted in Chapter 3, this international instrument 
requires the State to respect, protect and fulfil the rights contained therein. Regardless of this, 
the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, especially on the political front, remains dire. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe also obliges the State to respect international law.211 
The Constitution places an obligation on both natural and juristic persons to respect, promote 
and fulfil the rights and freedoms that are enshrined in the Declaration of Rights. The 
responsibility to respect and protect civil and political rights mainly lies with the State. 
‘Accordingly, the government and its organs at all levels, be it administrative organs, 
parastatals, law enforcement agencies… the Executive, Judiciary, and Parliament are 
constitutionally mandated to respect, promote and fulfil civil and political rights.’212 Thus, in 
terms of section 44, the State must desist from any conduct that may negatively interfere with 
the enjoyment and realisation of these rights.  
Several enacted pieces of legislation continue to hamper the enjoyment of these rights, 
especially the Public Order and Security Act213 and Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act.214 For this work, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are discussed 
and are used to discuss how the courts have handled cases involving civil and political rights 
and determine the attitudes of the courts towards the transformation of these rights.  
2.8.1 Freedom of expression  
 
The 2013 Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression. Despite this protection, 
the right to freedom of expression continues to be violated, against members of the public, by 
the State.215 ‘This clearly shows that the mere fact that civil and political rights are protected 
under the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 does not in itself guarantee the enjoyment of and/or 
respect for these rights in Zimbabwe.’216 Journalists remain at the receiving end of the media 
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and security laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.217 It should 
be noted that ‘journalists and other members of the media play a pivotal role in exposing civil, 
political and other human rights violations by the governments and other persons in many 
countries including Zimbabwe.’218 According to scholars, the rationale behind the enactment 
of this law was to control the flow of information and restrict the operations of journalists.219 
In addition, the Act prohibits journalists from carrying out their work in Zimbabwe without 
accreditation from the Zimbabwe Media Commission.220 The requirement of accreditation of 
journalists is not in itself a violation of the right to freedom of expression. However, the 
Zimbabwe Media Commission stands accused of denying accreditation to several journalists 
not aligned to the State media.221 According to Freedom House: 
 ‘[T]he 2002 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) requires all 
journalists and media companies to register and gives the information minister sweeping 
powers to decide which publications can operate legally and who is able to work as a journalist. 
Unlicensed journalists face criminal charges and a sentence of up to two years in prison.’222 
Another Act that has been previous used by the State to curtail freedom of expression is the 
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act223 (hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Code). 
Some of the provisions in this Act have since been found to be unconstitutional.224 In stark 
violation of the Constitution, sections 31(a)(i) and 33(a)(ii) criminalised the inciting or what 
would be perceived as the promotion of public disorder and made it a criminal offence ‘to cause 
hatred, contempt or ridicule of the President or Acting President, whether in person or respect 
of the President’s Office.’225  
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In addition to this, the Broadcasting Services Act226 has been previously used to violate 
freedom of expression by maintaining State media monopoly of the nation’s airwaves. The 
State-owned broadcasters have been accused of not covering opposition political parties, 
especially during election campaign periods. As a result, people have no alternative broadcast 
media, as they are forced to rely on State broadcasters for information. The Broadcasting 
Services Act also prohibits foreign funding and investment in the broadcasting services sector 
thereby making it difficult for private players to create alternative means of disseminating 
information.227 According to Jafari ‘[i]n a country where there is little internal capital 
investment, section 71 severely hampers the ability of new organisations to raise money.’228  
2.8.2 Freedom of Assembly  
 
Section 58 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees the right to peaceful assembly. 
Further, section 67 also guarantees the right to political participation. This means that everyone 
has a right to participate either in groups or as individuals in peaceful activities to ‘influence, 
challenge or support policies of the government of Zimbabwe.’229  However, the realisation of 
this right remains a challenge, especially because of the continuous existence of Public Order 
and Security Act230 whose various provisions limit several civil and political activities such as 
the right to demonstrate, picket or petition government, and the right to freedom of movement. 
The Act has traditionally been used for political reasons. According to Hellum et al ‘the brutal 
crackdown on opposition and dissent was legitimized through a series of repressive laws such 
as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA).’231 Non-Governmental Organisations and civic 
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education groups have also been affected by these laws by limiting their organisation and 
assembly.232  
According to Jafari ‘[s]ection 17 of POSA, which addresses public violence, has been expanded 
to apply to anyone who ‘forcibly disturbs the peace, security or order of the public… or invades 
the rights of other people.’233 On the surface, the objective of this provision seems to preserve 
the peace by punishing rioters. A closer examination, however, reveals that it can be applied to 
anyone who objects to the operation of the State.234 Section 25 of this Act gives wide 
discretionary powers to the police to either approve or disapprove or shutdown any public 
gathering.  The notification requirement in the Act is often abused or misconstrued by the police 
as a request for permission.235 This is best illustrated by how the police banned demonstrations 
against the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission on the 24th of July 2018.236 In response to a letter 
addressed to the police in terms of section 25 of POSA, the police said ‘you have already 
applied for a star rally scheduled for the 28th of July which we have sanctioned. Have held two 
similar demonstrations against ZEC on the 5th of June and on the 11th of July over the same 
issues.’(sic)237 This response points to two things, firstly, the police view the notification in 
terms of section 25 as an application, which is contrary to the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights’  Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa238  and 
secondly, the police abused their powers by placing a limit to the number of rallies or 
demonstration one can hold. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
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Zimbabwe’s constitutional history is a long and detailed one. In discussing the history of 
constitutions in Zimbabwe, the history of colonial constitutions cannot be ignored as they 
informed the processes and substance of their successors. However, a stark contrast exists in 
the constitutions before independence and those adopted after independence. Zimbabwe 
became a democracy in 1980 after adopting a new Constitution. Even though this Constitution 
lasted for a total of 33 years, it was amended a record 19 times. The Amendments did not do 
much to reflect the tenets of constitutionalism and democracy and instead they entrenched 
elements of authoritarianism from one-party state to one centre of power. There were also 
various failed attempts at writing a new constitution for the country. They all have their 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of both substance and procedure. The Constitution adopted 
in 2013 is widely accepted and has so far been amended once. The Constitution adopted in 
2013 contained civil and political rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and 
assembly. To understand how the courts in Zimbabwe have subsequently interpreted those 





CHAPTER 3  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In a quest to fully comprehend the application of civil and political rights, one has to understand 
the philosophical and conceptual underpinnings of these rights. This chapter, therefore, seeks 
to explore the various rights, looking first, at their foundation, rationale and development in 
recent years and then to discuss their application at both international and domestic levels. As 
stated previously, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to examine the role that the 
Constitutional Court can play in the transformation of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe. 
The discourse being advanced is that in the absence of political will to transform civil and 
political rights, constitutional litigation becomes necessary.1 Discussion of the fundamentals of 
human rights litigation requires a solid conceptual foundation. This foundation should set the 
basis for understanding meaning, application and interpretation of civil and political rights. 
This work argues that civil and political rights in Zimbabwe can be transformed through the 
national courts, in particular the newly established Constitutional Court. Simmons agrees with 
this notion and states that ‘litigation in national courts is one of the best strategies available for 
creating home-grown, pro-rights jurisprudence.’2 However, this is only possible if the judiciary 
is sufficiently independent. Even though the conceptualization of civil and political rights 
undertaken here presupposes a broad spectrum, it is conceded that the State bears the primary 
role to protect and promote civil and political rights of its citizens. The extent of the protection 
and implementation of these civil and political rights varies from one jurisdiction to another. 
This variation emanates, mostly, from political factors and the degree of the limitations placed 
on the enjoyment of these rights.  
 
1 In his dissenting judgement in Gilbert v Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920), Brandes. J said: ‘In frank 
expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression 
lies ordinarily the greatest peril.’  
2 B Simmons “Civil rights in international law: Compliance with aspects of the “International Bill of Rights.”  




To ensure a clear and definitive understanding of how the courts can be used as agents for 
transforming civil and political rights, it is important to first discuss the field in which the 
notion of civil and political rights finds itself.  Civil and political rights, primarily, are informed 
by international law. International law is founded on the understanding that states are 
autonomous and are equals, and consequently should be bound by their agreements.3 
International law has also been entrenched by the generally accepted principles of law that have 
been elevated to the status of international customary law.4 By becoming a party and ratifying 
a treaty, states choose to bind themselves. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have become the generally 
accepted standards and norms of human rights at the international level and have attained for 
themselves a ‘constitutional’ status in international law. It should be noted right from the outset 
that the drafters of these treaties were cognizant of the different political circumstances that 
exist in different jurisdictions. Therefore, they did not make the rights contained therein 
absolute but provided a room for limitations ‘when necessary to protect public interests.’5 
Human rights frameworks, in recent years, have developed to include various regional and sub-
regional treaties supported by their respective institutions.6 This Chapter, therefore, aims to 
clarify the concept of civil and political rights as contemplated in both jurisprudential writings 
and in international law. The object is to expose and elucidate the gaps between conceptual 
underpinnings of civil and political rights and their role in democracy and good governance 
which often gives rise to their breaches at a domestic level. The state of civil and political rights 
 
3 Steiner, Alston and Goodman submit that ‘the idea that the will of States is the basis of international law and 
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Goodman. International human rights in context: law, politics, morals: text and materials (2008). 
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that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation, the States that participated in such conduct and 
recognize the obligation created by it can reasonably be considered to have consented to the rule thus 
established….’ Ibid.  
5 See for example the limitations provision in Article 22 (2) of the ICCPR; ‘No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order….’  
6 Examples being the American Convention on Human Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 




in Zimbabwe makes this necessary. The adoption of legislation such as POSA and AIPPA as 
shown in Chapter 2 constitutes a systematic stifling of the people’s right to freedom of 
assembly and freedom of expression by the State. This makes it pertinent that a discussion of 
the application and permissible limitations of these rights be undertaken. The discussion 
undertaken in this Chapter contributes substantially to the development of the interpretation 
methods that can be used in civil and political rights provisions by the Constitutional Court of 
Zimbabwe.  
3.2 Fundamental and Basic Human Rights  
 
To explain and understand the applicability of human rights, scholars have made a distinction 
between rights by identifying them as either, absolute, relative and rights that may be limited 
by norms: 
‘1) Inherent or absolute rights, which may not be limited in any condition, including war and 
emergencies. These are the right to life, not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and humiliating 
treatment or punishment prohibition, prohibition of slavery, prohibition of retroactive 
punishment;  
2) Reduced or relative rights - government may allow some limitations only during war or 
emergency situations or existing definite circumstances, as a rule it is specified in the relevant 
article. It is not allowed to limit these rights with reference to the general public interest;  
3) Rights that may be limited by norms, such as, for example, public order, national security - 
and the public health and moral in peaceful time [sic]. These limited norms refer to the defined 
group and it does not require any special action to fulfill [sic] by the government.’7 
Another distinction is made based on generations, thereby creating first, second and third-
generation rights. According to Mubangizi, ‘classification (according to the generations) has 
proved to be a useful typology for conceptualizing human rights, and has helped to extend the 
idea of human rights beyond a narrow Western liberal construction.’8 The classification 
according to three tiers was formally introduced in the international human rights instruments 
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adopted since 1948.9 French Jurist, Karel Vasak was the first to use the three generations as a 
means of classifying human rights.10 According to Maclem ‘Vasak himself alluded to a 
conception of human rights that classifies them in terms of the interests they seek to protect by 
grandly suggesting that the three generations of human rights correspond, respectively, to the 
three ideals of the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity.’11 
3.2.1 The classification of rights 
 
First generation rights are those that relate to the liberty of persons, and these are mainly civil 
and political rights.12 These include ‘the rights of free speech, press, religion, and thought.’13 
According to Leonard, some scholars have referred to these as negative rights.14 They guard 
against the state’s encroachment on individuals. According to Walters, this is the reason why 
these rights were ‘initially conceived more in [the] negative (“freedoms from”) than positive 
terms (“rights to”).’15 
The second-generation rights are those that are related to equality, and these are mostly socio-
economic and cultural rights. Socio-economic rights are intrinsically linked to dignity and 
equality. According to de Vos and Freedman, the achievement of these requires ‘the state and 
other powerful institutions to take positive steps…’16 This essentially means that these rights 
are not immediately realisable and are only subject to availability of resources. This is one of 
the characteristics that has been largely attributed to the categorisation of human rights. 
Regardless of the categorisation, all human rights are of equal status.17 It has been opined by 
scholars that it is apparent, from the nature of the rights, that, regardless of the politics or 
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economic levels of a state, all states are capable of giving effect to first generation rights, 
because they are mainly negative.18 States cannot do the same with second generation rights 
that need the state’s ‘ability to provide the financial and technical resources for the realisation 
of affirmative oblations [sic] such as education and an adequate standard of living.’19  
Third-generation rights are related to group and collective rights such as the right to a clean 
safe environment, the right to peace, right to self-determination etc. These are the latest addition 
to the human rights regime and were recognized quite recently.20 Many of the rights contained 
in this category are controversial. Scholars and jurists alike do not exactly agree on the nature 
and meaning of each right. This includes normative expressions such as the right to peace and 
the right to a healthy environment. Some of the controversies surrounding them are that they 
require both positive and negative obligations from both states and individuals.21  
The classification of human rights according to generations is not free of weaknesses. It is not 
rigid. There have been debates surrounding the classification of these rights, in particular the 
distinction between the first and the second-generation rights. A prominent debate occurred 
during the Cold War when the first-generation rights were criticized for following Western 
tradition and liberal thinking, and the second-generation rights were criticized for reflecting 
Eastern socialist approach. According to Pocar;  
‘in reality there is no distinct conceptual or ideological approach behind the separation of the 
two categories of rights: both continue to constitute a single set of rights as in the Universal 
Declaration; however, they were separated based on the obligations surrounding their 
implementation.'22  
 Mubangizi argues that the three categories create the assumption that there is a hierarchical 
order of rights. He notes that; 
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 ‘denoting the generations of human rights as first, second and third can be seen as to imply a 
priority for civil and political rights, as if they somehow come first in any consideration of 
human rights, and that a hierarchy is therefore assumed which reinforces the tendency to 
marginalise other categories of human rights.’23  
In addition to this; 
‘it is often assumed that the first generation (civil and political) rights are individual rights, 
which can easily be enforced through domestic courts of law. Second and third-generation 
rights, on the other hand, are seen as collective rights based on notions of international solidarity 
and therefore not justiciable in domestic courts.’24 
States as well as litigants themselves must have an understanding of the nature of each right, 
including the extent of each justiciability. In authoritarian regimes, there seems to be no 
distinction given in the protection of derogable and none-derogable rights which has resulted 
in the closure of democratic spaces and contracted political participation.  
3.3 The evolution of civil and political rights 
 
The concept of human rights, as they are understood today, can be traced back to the Roman 
Empire, and during the creation of newly independent states after the fall of the Empire. In the 
Roman Empire, human rights came about as a result of the need to develop rules to deal with 
interactions among or between people in the diverse Roman Empire.25  
As independent states emerged from the Roman Empire, coupled with new conquests by states 
as well increased trade, the need for set standards or rules became necessary.  However, 
McInerny argues that human rights developed through the development of natural law theory.26 
Conceptions of natural law included theories of natural rights, with the emphasis on the duties 
of man. Natural law philosophy had strong religious underpinnings as natural law was 
perceived as being sourced from the law of God. It posited that ‘all human law derive (sic) 
 
23 Mubangizi (n 8 above) at 98. 
24 Ibid, at 100. 
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from and are subordinate to the law of God.’27 The linkage between human rights and natural 
law is conceptually apparent. What it means to be human and the values for that personhood is 
what informs the moral conception of human rights. Even though the law is derived from the 
law of God, there are some contradictions with modern-day human rights principles such as 
respect for freedom of movement, expression, equality and human dignity. For example, early 
laws legalized or recognized slavery and serfdom, which are considered as serious violations 
in modern-day human rights law.  
The idea that human rights are inalienable was also prominent. Hernandez-Truyol notes that 
‘[f]rom the early days, the view of these rights of “man” as inalienable was reflected in the 
language in which they were couched.’28 For example, Locke argued that ‘certain rights self-
evidently pertain to individuals as human beings ... that chief among them are the rights to life, 
liberty (freedom from arbitrary rule), and property.’29 If the state failed to guarantee these 
natural rights, the people would also have a right or responsibility to defy it through a 
revolution.  
In addition to this, positivist views on human rights also began to emerge. According to 
Hernandez-Truyol ‘[t]he value of the positivists’ contributions to the development of human 
rights law lies in their recognition of the importance of organizing rules by established 
processes of the states.’30 The challenge with positivism in the development of human rights 
law is that the law was only shaped by the perspectives of those with authority to do so. 
Hernandez-Truyol argues that ‘under a positivist model, human dignity is what a state makes 
it.’31 However, positivism can be acknowledged for its contribution to the development of 
human rights law according to the changing morals of the society.  
The notion of civil and political rights is a product of western liberal philosophies of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.32 These philosophical ideas have been credited for 
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influencing the wording of the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. In the 
declaration words such as ‘… all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ 
are used and have been influential in informing current human rights discourses. 
A similar notion was found in the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789. 
According to Joseph and Castan ‘[t]raditional civil and political rights, the subject matter of 
both the US Bill of Rights and the French Declaration, are largely concerned with the liberty 
to act following one’s own wishes.’33 Civil and political rights as contemplated  by the natural 
law theories ‘was not understood to require State assistance, so civil and political rights 
conform to the libertarian nature of early Western capitalist societies.’34 Stemming from this 
notion, human rights are now protected at both domestic and international level. Zimbabwe has 
largely ignored this protection of human rights as it should domestically, instead of promoting 
the protection of civil and political rights, the State has enacted legislation that limits these 
rights. This has resulted in a crackdown against the opposition and civil society leading to 
renewed calls for transformation with the hope of attaining the rule of law, democracy and 
respect for human rights.  
Modern human rights protection provides for the protection of human rights at the international 
level. It is conceded that the protection of human rights is the prerogative of the state. However, 
the norms and standards set at the international level should at all times be used as the minimum 
core. It is therefore necessary to turn to the international human rights framework.  
3.4 The international human rights framework  
 
The relevance of human rights in the relationship between states and states and individuals has 
become increasingly prominent. This has created a common culture of judging states based on 
their relationship with their citizens. For example, states that have a strained relationship with 
their subjects have been synonymous with authoritarianism. Those that enjoy a good 
relationship with their states are associated with democracy. Therefore, various international 
instruments were introduced to achieve common goals for states in the protection and 
promotion of human rights.  This is because there are several set standards and norms that states 
have to abide by in international law. There is consensus at the international level in respect of 
 





what these rights or norms are. They emanate from the acceptance that humans have inherent 
dignity that needs to be protected at all times.35 Therefore, human dignity elevates individual 
rights to a standard of universal acceptance. 
 ‘Consequently, there can be no challenge to the universal acceptance that, for example, 
genocide, race discrimination, and terrorism are wrong and universally condemned, regardless 
of whether the actors are states or private persons and regardless of the victims’ nationality.’36  
The importance of human rights is grounded in their definitive nature. According to human 
rights scholars ‘human rights are those rights vital to an individual’s existence; they are 
fundamental, inviolable, interdependent, indivisible, and inalienable.’37 It is important to note 
that the term “human rights” is broad and includes various dimensions of rights. For example, 
Hernandez-Truyol says, ‘human rights are moral, social, religious, and political rights that 
concern respect and dignity associated with personhood and [a] human being’s identity.’38 This 
means that there are various rights accorded to an individual that both fellow humans and the 
state need to respect and protect. 
 In standardizing this, the United Nations, in 1948, unanimously passed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. According to Shelton, ‘the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights constituted a landmark moment in human rights law. Its thirty articles cover 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.’39 National constitutions are heavily 
influenced by the provisions contained in the UDHR.40  Many of its provisions now form what 
is termed “customary international law”.  
 
35 C McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights.” (2008) 19 (4) European Journal 
of international Law, 655-724. 
36 Hernandez-Truyol (n 27 above) at 227. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, at 226. 
39 D Shelton The Oxford handbook of international human rights law. (2013); See also D Shelton, and PG 
Carozza, Regional protection of human rights (Vol. 1) (2013). 
40 Schwelb notes that, ‘It is not surprising that constitutions drafted in co-operation with the United Nations, such 
as those of Libya and Eritrea, show the marked in fluence of the Universal Declaration, although they fall short 
of its provisions in one important respect, viz., the right of women to vote. It can be seen from express references 
to the Declaration in many other constitutions and statutes from various regions of the world, and, in the absence 
of such express references, from extraneous evidence, that the in fluence of the Declaration is also reflected in 
many instruments not written under United Nations sponsorship.’  It is further noted that ‘The preamble to the 




Beginning with the United Nations Charter, the United Nations always had a human rights 
agenda.  The purpose of the United Nations Charter is to ‘promote and encourage respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religions.’41 This was the beginning of structural protection of human rights and all forms of 
injustice through international law. The international protection of human rights was essentially 
influenced by the events of the Second World War (WWII).42 The Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials 
followed WWII in the mid-1940s after the Nazis had committed atrocities against humanity 
during the war.  One scholar correctly captures the relevance of these trials in international 
human rights law as follows:  
‘Nuremberg clearly established that rules of international law applied to individuals. In a now 
famous and oft quoted phrase, the Tribunal provided that “[c]rimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’”43 
The War was followed by an unprecedented general agreement that individuals should be 
recognized along with states as key players in the international domain. This resulted in the 
inclusion of individual rights in the human rights instruments that were to follow.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a legal instrument binding all parties to the 
United Nations Charter.44 The UDHR was adopted following years of war that had left the 
world in total disarray. The early stages of the framing of the UDHR saw the philosophers’ 
committee crafting theoretical issues that the UDHR needed to cover.45 This was followed by 
 
Nations, the Republic of Guinea, proclaims that “the State of Guinea fully endorses the United Nations Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Title 10 of the Constitution of Guinea contains a catalogue of 
fundamental rights and duties of the citizen.’ E Schwelb “The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights on International and National Law.” (1959) 53 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 
at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) 217-229.  
41 The Charter of the United Nations, 1949. 
42 T Buergenthal, D Shelton and D P Stewart. International Human Rights in a Nutshell (2009) 34. 
43 Hernandez-Truyol (n 27 above) at 233. 
44 The Charter of the United Nations, 1949. 
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the drafting of the UDHR by the Human Rights Commission (HRC), consisting of 18 
Commissioners led by Chairperson Eleanor Roosevelt.46 The Commissioners came from 
various historical and cultural backgrounds. They decided to draft a declaration, instead of a 
treaty and they also agreed to include both civil and political rights and socio-economic rights.   
This adoption is largely regarded as symbolizing the awakening up to the unconscionable 
horrors of the Holocaust: ‘The framers of the declaration envisaged three parts to the postwar 
human rights enterprise; a set of general principles; the codification of those principles into law 
and a practical means [of] implementation.’47 In addition, ‘the nations of the world did issue a 
historic declaration of human rights- a pantheon that for the first time encompassed civil, 
political, social and economic rights.’48 The importance of civil and political rights in 
international law is demonstrated by their inclusion in the first 19 Articles. It is noted that even 
though this international instrument provides a framework for the protection of human rights, 
‘the laws and national constitutions of states, in most instances will be the first recourse to 
address any violation of human rights and should be regarded as the ordinary mode of the 
implementation.’49  
Article 29(2) of the UDHR; 
 ‘sets out the circumstances in which limitation on individual rights are permissible. The 
declaration as a whole document should be read as the assertion of a strong presumption in 
favor of human rights and articles should be read as placing the burden of proof on anyone who 
seeks to limit them.’50 
 This shows that even though there are permissible limitations to rights, any interpretation given 
to any provision should be one that favours affording more rights as opposed to contracting 
them. In Zimbabwe, the courts have at times failed to comprehend this requirement and instead 
have interpreted the law in a manner that further contracts human rights, civil and political 
 
46 Eleanor Roosevelt was the widow of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. ‘It also included René Cassin of France, 
who composed the first draft of the declaration; Commission Rapporteur Charles Malik of Lebanon; Vice-
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47 Ibid, at 1. 
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rights to freedom of assembly and association.51 As a result, there is a need for the Courts to 
transform civil and political rights, and this is done by changing how they interpret these rights. 
3.4.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
As mentioned earlier, civil and political rights form the core of human rights. As such, the 
international community, in 1966, adopted the ICCPR to standardize protection and respect 
that can be afforded to these rights. The ICCPR contains what may be termed “negative rights” 
which lays down what states and fellow humans should desist from doing against individuals. 
According to Macklem, ‘[t]he role that civil and political rights play in international law is to 
mitigate the harm that states can cause to rights-bearers in the exercise of sovereign power that 
international law vests in states.’52 Simmons has acknowledged that the signing and ratification 
of the ICCPR by states is likely to improve the civil rights situation in a country. The primary 
challenge to this is the question of the state’s right to exercise its sovereign power and how to 
frame these rights in particular contexts.  Simmons, however, stresses that this change does not 
come immediately after ratification. The ICCPR essentially creates relationships between 
states and individuals in international law.  
Various challenges are facing the international community in trying to ensure states compliance 
with the ICCPR. These challenges are mainly rooted in the absence of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the existence of human rights regimes at the international level is 
commendable: ‘States generally recognize that they are bound by the ICCPR obligations 
though they may disagree over their interpretation in concrete situations.’53 The Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) is responsible for the monitoring of the ICCPR. It has three different 
enforcement mechanisms available. The first is in terms of Article 40 which provides for states 
to submit reports on their implementation of the ICCPR to the HRC.54 The second is in terms 
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Legal Studies 64-65, at 57. 
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of Article 41 which calls on other states to submit complaints about violations of the ICCPR 
by another state.55 This only applies to state parties that made declarations accepting the 
 
those rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties 
concerned; 
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests. 
2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them 
to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting 
the implementation of the present Covenant. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may, after consultation with the Committee, transmit to 
the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the reports as may fall within their field of 
competence. 
4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It shall 
transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The 
Committee may also transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the copies 
of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present Covenant. 
5. The States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee observations on any 
comments that may be made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.’ 
55 ‘Article 41 
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party 
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. 
Communications under this article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party 
which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such 
a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
following procedure: 
(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the 
provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention 
of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall 
afford the State which sent the communication an explanation, or any other statement in writing 
clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic 
procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter; 
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six months 
after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to 
refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State; 
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has ascertained that all available 
domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally 
recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies 




competency of the HRC in that regard. The third is through the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
which allows individuals to petition or submit complaints to the HRC on alleged violations of 
the ICCPR by the states.56 These mechanisms have their inherent weaknesses. For example, 
the Article 41 mechanism is rarely used, states generally do not submit complaints against each 
other.57 The Optional Protocol mechanism is only available to citizens of those states that are 
party to it. It should be noted that the HRC is the ‘pre-eminent interpreter of the ICCPR, which 
is itself legally binding.’58 In as much as there is a lack of enforcement measures in the form 
of effective punitive measures or sanctions, the decisions of the HRC have ‘directly caused 
states to alter their laws and or practices so as to conform to the ICCPR.’59 
The ICCPR lists several rights that fall under this category. Even though this work is mainly 
concerned with freedom of movement and expression,  it is necessary that the meaning of most 
of the protected rights within the context of ICCPR is understood. The conceptual framework 
for civil and political rights as outlined below.  
 
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article; 
(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good offices to 
the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the present Covenant; 
(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in 
subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information; 
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented 
when the matter is being considered in the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in 
writing;…. 
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when ten States Parties to the present Covenant 
have made declarations under paragraph I of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the 
States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the 
other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. 
Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a 
communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall 
be received after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-
General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.’ 
56 Joseph (n 53 above) at 57. 
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before submitting applications to the UN Human Rights Commission.  
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3.5 Conceptual considerations for civil and political rights  
 
To grasp the international protection of civil and political rights, it is necessary to highlight the 
critical elements of these rights and that which makes them distinct from other rights. This will 
help understand the need for international protection as well as explain why these rights should 
not be unreasonably derogated. 
3.5.1 Civil rights  
 
The UDHR makes provision for the protection of civil rights.  These civil rights can be grouped 
into three categories namely; integrity rights, freedom of action, and rights relating to fairness 
or due process. According to Stoke and Tostensen ‘the integrity rights include the right to life, 
liberty and security of person. Torture and maltreatment are prohibited; so is slavery and forced 
labour, arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.’60 Freedom of action is ordinarily associated with 
freedom of movement, expression, religion, and other fundamental freedoms. Finally, rights 
relating to due process are rights such as the right to a fair trial, right to access to justice and 
right to an independent and impartial judge. It should be noted that the rights relating to 
integrity are absolute and cannot be derogated. Some provisions allow the other rights to be 
constrained where necessary, as will be shown in discussions on selected rights.  
3.5.2 Political rights  
 
Political rights are some of the most important rights in any state. Political rights allow people 
to engage in meaningful participation in all democratic processes within their country.  Article 
21 of the UDHR states that ‘the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the 
government.’ This provision forms the basis of the intrinsic relationship that exists between 
human rights and democracy. It is for this reason that human rights are used as a measure for 
democracy and good governance. Article 21 implies that the people shall have the right to 
participate in political processes through the expression of their will.61 In a modern democracy, 
this is done either directly, through referendums or indirectly, through chosen representatives. 
It should be noted that the exercise of this right also has its fundamentals such as the ability to 
do so freely, within the confines of the rule of law and free of manipulation. According to Eide, 
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‘the preamble of the declaration also underscores the close relationship between human rights 
and government, by pointing out that “it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have 
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny, that human rights should be protected by 
the rule of law.”’62  
However, unlike integrity rights, political rights can be limited. Article 29 provides that the 
exercise of political rights is subject to limitation as would be determined by law. In terms of 
this provision, the limitations are placed solely ‘for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic society.’63 In addition to this, 
the other international treaties such as the ICCPR have also recognized the necessity, in 
relevant instances, for limitations on the exercise of political rights. However, the ICCPR goes 
a step further by adopting a detailed regime for these limitations in Article 4. In terms of this 
provision, in case of a public emergency, “that threatens the life of the nation”, a state may 
officially proclaim a state of emergency and suspend or derogate from civil and political rights 
only to the extent necessary required by the demands of the situation.64 In addition to this, the 
ICCPR provides that the rights that are subject to suspension are only those that are not 
designated as non-derogable rights such as prohibitions against murder, slavery and torture.65 
Having said that, it is apparent that human rights are salient to the realization of democracy and 
good governance in any state.  
3.6 State compliance with ICCPR  
 
Having highlighted the importance of the ICCPR as the heart of civil and political rights, it is 
important to discuss state parties’ compliance. Compliance is the basis of international law. 
International laws are primarily anchored on states’ goodwill to live to their word in the form 
of desisting from violating their agreements with other states. Enforcement of international 
laws is problematic. Therefore, many treaties or international instruments’ respect and 
promotion largely depend on compliance by individual states. According to Simmons, ‘human 
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rights treaties are likely to be enforced, according to a dominant view, and for this reason, states 
are likely to ratify so that they may enjoy the expressive benefits of doing so without concern 
that their legal commitment will be enforced.’66 This means that the general obligation lies on 
the state to comply with the treaties that they ratify.  
Flowing from the above, the view taken here is that enforcement of international treaties 
depends principally, on domestic politics and laws of each state. As Simmons puts it,  
‘while it may be true that international actors and especially other states have little incentive to 
enforce their peers’ human rights commitments in any serious and systematic ways, domestic 
actors have a clear stake in their enforcement. For the locals, their rights and freedoms are at 
stake. Thus, we should expect that if international law with respect to human rights is to be 
enforced, the most consistent pressure to do so should emanate from the domestic politics.’67 
It is trite, that for this to work, the courts and other institutions promoting human rights and 
democracy in the countries to be sufficiently independent to execute their mandate without fear 
or favour. They should be independent of any political influence to improve the chances of 
constraining political actors. For this mechanism to be fully exploited, human rights defenders 
should be willing to engage in human rights litigation in domestic courts. Thus, domestic courts 
should play a critical role in the creation of homegrown rights enforcement jurisprudence.  
3.7 Freedom of expression and freedom of assembly  
 
Having discussed the importance of the civil and political rights in general, it is important to 
understand some selected civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression 
and right to assembly as these form the bulk of the cases that have so far been received by the 
Zimbabwe Constitutional Court as discussed in Chapter 5. It is worth mentioning that most of 
the judgements passed by the Zimbabwean courts, though progressive, have not made any 
significant contribution to the development of the transformative interpretation of human 
rights. This is because this is a task that requires a relative degree of boldness from the judges. 
In Zimbabwe, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are sensitive topics for the State.  
3.7.1 Freedom of expression  
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Freedom of expression is a right that has since acquired the status of an international customary 
norm. According to Mendel ‘it is the lynchpin of democracy, the key to the protection of all 
human rights, and fundamental to human dignity in its own right.’68 O’Flaherty quotes a 
Chinese Nobel laureate, Liu Xiaobo when he expresses the importance of freedom of 
expression: ‘Freedom of expression is the basis of human rights, the source of humanity and 
the mother of truth. To block freedom of speech is to trample on human rights, to strangle 
humanity and to suppress the truth.’69 
This right, at international law, was first recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights under Article 19. In terms of this provision, ‘everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.’70  
Freedom of expression is a right that finds much relevance and recognition in international law 
hence its inclusion in various other instruments such as the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The enjoyment of freedom of expression 
leads to the enjoyment of other rights. As O’Flaherty says, ‘it is sometimes described as a 
multiplier or meta right because of its role in enabling the enjoyment of so many other rights.’71 
Freedom of expression has both a personal and a social dimension. According to Howie, they 
are ‘indispensable conditions for the full development of the person, “essential for any society” 
a “foundation stone for every free and democratic society.”’72 Freedom of expression is a 
prerequisite for the functioning of a human being in a truly democratic society. As such the 
people of Zimbabwe have for years called for their rights to be respected and protected to fully 
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realize their potential in a democratic society. Under the ICCPR, freedom of expression 
includes ‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or print, in the form of art, or through any other media of a 
person’s choice.’73  
The scope of protection of this right includes ‘spoken, written and sign language and non-
verbal expression through artworks.’74 This essentially provides a wide enough scope to ensure 
adequate protection of this right. Together with the right to assembly or association, the 
importance of this right is that it is cardinal to the enjoyment of other civil and political rights 
such as the right to vote. The exercise of the right to vote without being able to freely air 
differing opinion or being able to freely mobilize through the assembly is an exercise in futility.  
According to Howie, the UN expert report75 says ‘individuals seeking to exercise their right to 
expression face all kinds of government-imposed limitations that are not legal, necessary or 
proportionate.’76 It is further noted that ‘targets of restrictions include journalists and bloggers, 
critics of government, dissenters from conventional life, provocateurs and minorities of all 
sorts.’77   
In recent years, many states have been found wanting regarding the violation of international 
laws on freedom of expression by limiting this right, especially, the right of people to express 
themselves through protests by enacting anti-protest laws. Howie cites the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which alleged that in 2017 alone, the United States of America responded to 
growing protests by civil rights movements such as the Black Lives Matter and those opposed 
to the Dakota Access Pipeline, by proposing new laws to limit people’s right to protest in at 
least 20 states.78  This is regardless of the fact that the Supreme Court in the US has previously 
held that ‘both the rights to freedom of speech and assembly encompass the right to peaceful 
social protest which in turn is critical to the preservation of “freedoms treasured in a democratic 
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society.”’79 In response to this, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
reported that; 
‘The bills, if enacted into law, would severely infringe upon the exercise of the rights to freedom 
of expression in international law and freedom of peaceful assembly, in ways that are 
incompatible with US obligations under international human rights law and with First 
Amendment protections. The trend also threatens to jeopardize one of the United States’ 
constitutional pillars: free speech.’80 
In Zimbabwe, this happened through the enactment of the AIPPA and that legislation is 
contrary to the values enshrined in the Constitution of 2013. AIPPA has no place in a 
democratic society such as the one contemplated within the new constitutional dispensation.  
3.7.1.1 Freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)  
 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the protection and 
promotion of the right to freedom of expression.81 According to Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick 
in interpreting Article 10, the Court examines whether there was an interference with freedom 
of expression as contemplated in the first paragraph of Article 10 and if so, the Court looks into 
whether the interference is justified under the second paragraph. In so doing, the Court weighs 
the conduct against the tripartite standards, i) whether an impugned measure is ‘prescribed by 
law’; ii) whether it pursues a legitimate aim(s), and iii) whether it is necessary for a democratic 
 
79 Ibid.  
80 OHCHR ‘UN rights experts urge lawmakers to stop “alarming” trend to curb freedom of assembly in the US’, 
Geneva 2017, United Nations. Accessed (13 August 2019 ) Available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21464&LangID  
81 Article 10:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
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frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or 
cinema enterprises. 
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prevention of disorders or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 




society.82  Zimbabwe has largely faltered on this standard as there are laws that are enacted by 
the State to specifically limit the enjoyment of these civil and political rights. These laws 
specifically target opposition political parties and civil society including human rights activists.  
It is apparent in the European system that the first standard, prescribed by law requires the state 
authorities to identify the basis in national law for restricting a person’s right under Article 10. 
The second requirement of legitimate aim has rarely generated substantive discussion in the 
case law. Overall, the Court’s analysis, when interpreting the right, focuses on the third 
standard, which is the most demanding test. Therefore, the normal interpretation given to the 
requirement of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is that it presupposes a ‘pressing social 
need’,  and this is done by striking ‘a proportionate balance between the means chosen to satisfy 
a legitimate end and the degree of injury inflicted on the expression of right.’83 This has helped 
in clarifying the interpretation hurdle on “sufficiency”, as the requirement is that states must 
adduce relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the interference with the right. Relevance is 
rarely contested.  
The interpretation of rights under the Convention is also guided by Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. In terms of this, ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose.’84 According to van Dijk, ‘in many cases, some 
deviation from fundamental freedoms guaranteed will be considered acceptable under the 
Convention, provided, inter alia, that the proportionality principle is observed.’85 The 
proportionality principle calls for the striking of a balance between the various competing 
interests.  
The importance of the right to freedom of expression was underscored by the European Court 
of Human Rights in Handyside v United Kingdom,86 ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of 
the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress 
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and the development of every man.’87 It is for this reason that this right is jealously guarded by 
the Court.  
3.7.1.2 Freedom of expression under the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR)  
 
The American Convention on Human rights, under Article 13, provides for the protection and 
promotion of freedom of expression.88 The content of this right is clear- it is the right to ‘seek, 
receive, and impart information…’  In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed: 
‘Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society 
rests. It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion. It is also a conditio sine qua non 
for the development of political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies and, in 
general, those who wish to influence the public. It represents, in short, the means that enable 
the community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. Consequently, it can 
be said that a society that is not well informed is not a society that is truly free.’89 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted this right to presuppose a dual 
character, in that it entails that individuals have a right to express themselves as well as to 
receive information and ideas.90 This also means that freedom of expression will be violated 
where the State has prevented one (individually or collectively) from receiving information or 
to have access to such information. In the case of Franscisco Martorell v Chile,91 the Inter 
American Commission of Human rights expressed that: 
‘Article 13 establishes a dual right: the right to express thoughts and ideas, and the right to 
receive them. Therefore, arbitrary interference that infringes this right affects not just the 
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individual right to express information and ideas but also the right of the community to receive 
information and ideas of all kinds.’92  
In the case of Oropeza v Mexico,93 the Court also expressed that freedom of expression is;  
‘universal and involves a legal concept that aids everyone, whether individually or collectively, 
to express, transmit, or disseminate thoughts, and, in parallel and correlative form, that freedom 
to inform oneself is universal and involves the collective right to receive information 
communicated by others without interference and distortion.’94  
Under the American Convention, the indivisibility of expression and dissemination has been 
made clear.  In an Advisory Opinion, the Court said, ‘expression and dissemination of ideas 
and information are indivisible concepts. This means that restrictions that are imposed on 
dissemination represent, in equal measure, a direct limitation on the right to express oneself 
freely.’95 In addition to this, freedom of expression under the American Convention does not 
restrict the dissemination of information to mainstream and usual forms of communication but 
applies to dissemination of ideas and information by any means. The American Convention 
protects all types of expression including silence.96  
3.7.1.3 Freedom of expression under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR).  
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has indicated in Article 9 that ‘this 
Article reflects the fact that freedom of expression is a basic right, vital to an individual’s 
personal development, his political development, his political consciousness, and participation 
in the conduct of public affairs of his country.’97  In terms of Article 9, every individual has a 
right to receive, express and disseminate his/her opinion. The Article further states that this 
should only be done within the law.  The inclusion of the phrase ‘within the law’ has a far-
reaching effect as it can be interpreted as a claw-back clause. Welch has expressed this more 
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precisely. ‘“Within the law” is a phrase that opens the door, at least theoretically, to any sort 
of raison d’etat. It is a clawback clause restricting rights from the start.’98 
If interpreted literally this means that freedom of expression can be enjoyed only within the 
confines of the domestic laws regardless of their effect or legitimacy.  Therefore, it provides 
room for the negation of the peoples’ rights by state parties to the Charter through the use of 
domestic laws or any other laws with that effect. However, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights has since clarified that as is required under international law, domestic 
laws should be consistent with state parties’ international obligations. This, therefore, means 
that States cannot limit freedom of expression in terms of domestic laws that are inconsistent 
with constitutional and international human rights standards, including international customary 
law.  
According to Salau, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has previously 
stated that ‘article 9 signifies that freedom of expression is a basic right vital to personal 
development and civic participation.’99 However, it should be noted that the protection of 
freedom of expression in the African Charter is very limited.100 According to Adjei: 
‘African political leaders continue to misapply and misinterpret Article 9 (2) of the ACHPR 
because of its vagueness and continue to rely on criminal defamation statutes and the like to 
suppress critical and dissenting views. These broadly phrased prohibitions encouraged by the 
poor drafting of Article 9 (2) of the Charter, criminalise the legitimate exercise of freedom of 
expression and have a real “chilling effect” on debate on matters of public interest.’101  
This has created several challenges regarding the protection of this right in an African context. 
The colonial states in Africa formed a historical basis for the restriction of the right to freedom 
of expression. The rise of nationalism in former colonies in Africa led to the enactment of 
various national security laws some of which placed a severe restriction on access to 
information as well as the dissemination thereof.  The roots, according to Welch, lie in 
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Howard’s words ‘[t]he idea that the African Press should not be critical of the established 
government is thus a direct legacy of the colonial period.’102 This has been worsened by a 
general lack of political will to interpret the provisions relating to freedom of expression in the 
African Charter broadly.   
The interpretation is given by the African Commission to Article 9 in the case of Media Rights 
Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project 
v Nigeria103 is that:  
‘According to Article 9(2) of the Charter, dissemination of opinions may be restricted by law. 
This does not mean that national law can set aside the right to express and disseminate one’s 
opinions; this would make the protection of the right to express one’s opinions ineffective. To 
allow national law to have precedent over international law of the Charter would defeat the 
purpose of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. International human rights 
standards must always prevail over contradictory national law. Any limitation on the rights of 
the Charter must be in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.’104 
As will be shown in Chapter 5, freedom of expression has been met with the imposition of laws 
on defamation, slander and hate speech that are often misconstrued by politicians in Zimbabwe. 
The imposition of these laws led to calls for constitutional transformation, which is yet to see 
fruition despite the adoption of a new constitution that seeks to promote and protect human 
rights and democracy in Zimbabwe.  Members of the opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe 
have over the years been obstructed from exercising their various civil and political rights as 
any criticism of the government or its official are deemed criminal defamation.  
The African Commission, in the case of Media Rights Agenda,105 noted that ‘in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, it should be assumed that criticism of government does not constitute 
an attack on the personal reputation of the head of state.’106 The Commission also added that ‘ 
[p]eople who assume highly visible roles must necessarily face a higher degree of criticism 
than private citizens; otherwise public debate may be stifled altogether.’107  In addition to this, 
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the Commission held that the test is whether the exercise of this right poses a real danger to 
national security.  
3.7.1.4 Permissible limitations to freedom of expression 
 
As noted earlier, freedom of expression is not an absolute right. There is a distinction between 
freedom of expression and freedom of opinion.108 In terms of the ICCPR, whereas freedom of 
opinion is absolute, freedom of expression can be limited in terms of various instruments.109 
According to Ahmed and Bulmer, 
‘some rights may have to be limited because of the potential adverse impact that the abuse of 
such rights could have on society at large or on the rights of others: for example, the right to 
freedom of speech may in many instances legitimately be restricted to prevent harassment of 
others.’  
For example, Article 29(2) of the UDHR, states that:  
‘In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.’110 
This general limitation clause of the UDHR is cognisant of the competing rights of people and 
that in the exercise of one’s right, an individual may infringe upon the rights of others. In 
addition, this limitation includes those limitations placed to counter competing interests of 
individuals and those of the public good, such as those meant for the maintenance of public 
order and peace.111 
In terms of Article 10(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: 
‘The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
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for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’112  
The ICCPR also sets the benchmark for the limitation of freedom of expression.  In terms of 
the ICCPR Article 19(3): 
‘The exercise of the rights provided in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be 
such as are provided by law and are necessary; 
 a) for respect of rights and reputations of others; 
 b) for the protection of national security or of public order or of public health or morals.’113 
Only limitations that meet the above requirements are considered to be legitimate or legal. The 
ICCPR Article 19(3) provides a test to determine whether the limitation is justifiable in the 
circumstances. The test is that the limitation should be provided by law, for a legitimate aim 
and it must be necessary.114 This is a complex test that has been interpreted differently by 
different courts. In some cases, the courts have even adopted a different approach altogether.  
For example, the European Court of Human Rights departed from the test in the case of Özgür 
Gündem v Turkey.115 In this case, the Court sought to determine whether the State had 
unlawfully restricted this right by determining the balance that could be struck between the 
general interests of the community and that of the individual. The Court, in this case also gave 
regard to ‘the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and the choices which must be 
made in terms of priorities and resources.’116  The heavy-handedness of the police in Zimbabwe 
when controlling demonstrations shows that the State has no regard to the balance that can be 
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struck between the need to permit peaceful protests and the cost of policing them, which in 
many cases has led to the loss of lives.117 
In addition to this, the Inter-American Court has also departed from the test in the case of 
Claude Reyes and Others v Chile.118 This departure was however justifiable for the reason that 
the Court dealt with an issue of the right of access to information as opposed to freedom of 
expression. Further, it should also be noted that restriction in cases of freedom of expression 
must be done by a public actor, not a private individual or private institution.  
Before applying the three-part test, one must determine whether someone’s right to freedom of 
expression has been restricted, if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the test is 
then applied. It is important to note that sometimes determining a prima facie restriction can 
be straightforward. For example, a prima facie case of restriction is made where a person was 
sanctioned for making a statement or prevented from making one.  
As noted earlier, the three-part test involves inquiring into whether the restrictions were 
provided by law and necessary.119 Law refers to different types of laws such as administrative 
laws, civil and criminal laws, as well as the constitution. In common law jurisdictions, this also 
includes decisions of the courts. In explaining this, the Inter-American Court, as cited by 
Mendel said:  
‘[T]he restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or 
exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance 
with laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which 
such restrictions have been established.’120  
The Court added further that ‘the word “laws,” used in Article 30, can have no other meaning 
than that of formal law, that is, a legal norm passed by the legislature and promulgated by the 
Executive Branch, under the procedure set out in the domestic law of each State.’121 
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It is also generally accepted that the law may delegate certain functions to various officials 
which may among others, including the discretion to make pronouncements limiting freedom 
of expression. In this regard the Ontario High Court in the Canadian case Ontario Film and 
Video Appreciation Society v Ontario Board of Censors,122 has cautioned against the use of 
excessive discretion: 
‘[I]t is accepted that law cannot be vague, undefined, and totally discretionary; it must be 
ascertainable and understandable. Any limits placed on freedom of expression cannot be left to 
the whim of an official; such limits must be articulated with some precision or they cannot be 
considered to be law.’123 
In addition to the requirement that the restriction or limitation must have been provided in law, 
the restriction must be for the protection of “a legitimate and overriding interest.”124 In 
determining this requirement, scholars have argued that the purpose and effect of the restriction 
would be taken into account.125 According to Mendel, the Supreme Court of Canada has had 
an opportunity to explain this point by saying that, 
‘where the original purpose was to achieve an aim other than one of those listed, the restriction 
cannot be upheld; “[B]oth purpose and effect are relevant in determining constitutionality; 
either an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect can invalidate legislation.”’126  
It would be imperative that Zimbabwean courts adopt a similar interpretation to afford more 
civil and political rights and restrict limitations. At present, the limiting mechanisms both 
legislative and policy-wise have the effect of stifling any prospects for democracy in the 
country.  
The test also requires a consideration of whether the restriction on freedom of expression 
protects the rights and reputations of others, as well as national security or public order or 
public health or morals. Scholars have noted these are general and at times may be difficult to 
define. For example, Mendel argues that ‘public morals are not only hard to define and change 
over time’127 Public order in Article 19(3) ‘does not refer simply to the maintenance of physical 
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order, but also includes the organization of society in a manner that strengthens the functioning 
of democratic institutions and preserves and promotes the full realization of the right of the 
individual.’128 
The final part of the test is that the limitations on freedom of expression should be necessary 
to protect the interests discussed above. An enquiry is made into whether the benefit of 
protecting the interests is greater than the harm caused by restricting freedom of expression. In 
any case, this simply is an interrogation of the substance of the limitation. Mendel notes that 
‘it has been held that the measures to protect the right must be rationally connected to the 
objective of protecting the interest.’129  Technically, this means that the authority or law 
restricting freedom of expression should be the least intrusive measure available. In respect of 
this, the Inter-American Court has previously held that ‘if there are various options to [protect 
the legitimate interest], that which restricts the right protected must be selected.’130 Mendel has 
also used the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that explained this point; ‘[f]irst, the 
measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must 
not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally 
connected to the objective.’131 
3.7.2 Freedom of assembly  
 
Freedom of assembly is a very important right, and it is cardinal to the exercise of various other 
civil and political rights. Delaney defines this right as the right that ‘protects the peoples’ ability 
to come together and work for the common good.’132 This right is the vehicle for the exercise 
of many other ‘civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.’133 Assembly was defined 
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as; 
 ‘an act of intentionally gathering, in private or public, for an expressive purpose and 
for an extended duration. The right to assembly may be exercised in a number of ways 
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including through demonstrations, protests, meetings, processions, rallies, sit-ins and 
funerals, through the use of online platforms or in any other way people choose.’134 
 Limitations on this right have been instrumental in furthering dictatorships and 
authoritarianism in various states. This right is essential for good governance and democracy. 
The exercise of freedom of assembly has been primarily related to political gatherings, 
demonstrations and other forms of mass gatherings as will be discussed in the following 
Chapters.  
This right is protected under international law. In international law, it refers to gather ‘publicly 
or privately to collectively express, promote, pursue and defend common interests.’135 
Consequently, this right is contained in international instruments such as the ICCPR,136 The 
African Charter,137 the UDHR,138 the African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child,139  
the European Convention on Human Rights,140 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights141. The right to freedom of assembly is a right that applies to everyone, that is, 
individuals and groups. This right requires that no one should be extra-judicially prohibited 
from assembling, and conversely, no one should be forced to participate in an assembly. It is 
important to note this right only applies to peaceful assembly, as contemplated in the ICCPR.142 
According to The Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa,143 
‘The right to freedom of assembly extends to peaceful assembly. An assembly should be 
deemed peaceful if its organizers have expressed peaceful intentions, and if the conduct of the 
assembly participants is generally peaceful.  
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a. ‘Peaceful’ shall be interpreted to include conduct that annoys or gives offence as well as 
conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties.  
b. Isolated acts of violence do not render an assembly as a whole non-peaceful.144  
Save for the African Charter, this right is referred to as a right to peaceful assembly. In the 
American Convention peacefulness is contemplated in the words “without arms.” This 
essentially means a gathering or assembly must be peaceful and that the peacefulness is 
guaranteed through an expression of intent to be peaceful.  According to the African 
Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Assembly in Africa, parties who intend to participate 
in an assembly are required to place a notification with relevant authorities for purposes of 
public order and safety. However, the lack of notification need not result in deeming an 
assembly illegal.145 It is also a general requirement that procedures set for notifications should 
not be burdensome. The time limit for notice should not be required too far in advance, but 
only far enough in advance to allow for any preparations and exchange of views that may be 
necessary.  
The European Convention, however, does not require a notice for assembly to be given in terms 
of Article 11. The Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly say that 
states may require that a prior notice for assembly be given so that preparations such as those 
designed to maintain public order may be made.146 In this regard, this Venice Commission 
Guideline has cautioned against regarding this notification as a request for permission. 
The European Court of Human Rights discussed the notification requirement in the case of Eva 
Molnar v Hungary: 
‘[A] prior notification requirement would not normally encroach upon the essence of that right. 
It is not contrary to the spirit of Article 11 [of the Convention] if, for reasons of public order 
and national security, a priori, a High Contracting Party requires that the holding of meetings 
be subject to authorisation.’147 
In the same vein, the European Court has reiterated the fact that lack of prior notification of 
assembly does not serve as a ground for sanction. It is however acknowledged that preliminary 
administrative procedures are common-place and should not be used as obstacles to assembly. 
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In the case of Bukta and Others v Hungary148 the European Court held that Hungary had 
violated article 11 of the European Convention after the police had dispersed a peaceful 
assembly held without prior notice.149 The European Court held further that even though the 
laws of Hungary required that the police be notified of any future gatherings, the dispersal was 
disproportionate to the peaceful assembly. 
3.7.2.1 Permissible limitations on freedom of assembly 
 
Limitations placed on freedom of assembly may only be those permissible at law.  These 
limitations are referred to as ‘limitation of the right imposed.’ It is trite, that states shall not 
place limitations on freedom of assembly depending on the nature of the expression involved. 
Gatherings for purposes of spreading hate speech and incitement of violence are not protected. 
In terms of paragraph 79 of the African Guidelines ‘speech addressing matters of public 
interest, or political or policy affairs, including criticism of the state or state officials, including 
as exercised in the context of an assembly, is given maximum protection under the right to 
freedom of expression.’150  
Blanket bans, where the state or authorities place a general ban on gatherings in certain places 
or certain times are a common practice in many states, are only permitted as a means of last 
resort. This is because freedom of assembly cannot be unreasonably limited.  
3.8 Chapter Summary  
 
The concept of civil and political rights has its roots in historical texts. Its primary foundation 
is in the international legal instruments of the mid-20th Century. There is general agreement at 
the international level regarding what civil and political rights are, as well as the substance 
thereof. The adoption of and consensus regarding the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, has made this general agreement and acceptance possible. This Chapter has 
paid special attention to civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, 
freedom of association/assembly and the right to citizenship as contemplated in various 
international instruments. It has been shown that civil and political rights are not absolute rights 
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and may be subject to limitations. These limitations, however, must be just and equitable in 
terms of international law guidelines and principles.  
Zimbabwe has had a terrible civil and political rights record. From the persecution of the 
opposition, forced disappearances to killings by the uniformed forces.151 These have been 
abated by the unconstitutional limitations on civil and political rights in the country. The laws 
such as POSA and AIPPA have been primarily relied on to clamp down on diverse views and 
public demonstrations. It is acknowledged that civil and political rights are not absolute and 
that they should be exercised within limits. It is argued that such limits should be ones that are 
acceptable in an open and democratic society. International law discussed in this Chapter has 
shown that courts should adopt standards and tests to construe the nature, extent and limitation 
of a right. The Zimbabwean courts have a lot to draw from the discussion made above to 
interpret civil and political rights in a manner that meets the generally accepted standards 
informed by human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Without this, transforming civil and 
political rights in Zimbabwe will remain a pipe-dream.  
This conceptual framework, therefore, sets the basis for a more detailed examination of how 
the courts have arrived at their decision in Zimbabwe and serve to provide a thesis of how these 
rights have been abused over the years.  The following chapter examines how the South African 
Constitutional Court and the Kenyan Supreme Court have used transformative adjudication in 
respect of these and other rights, for illustrative purposes. 
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This chapter explores the notion of transformative constitutionalism and how the courts have 
adjudicated in human rights cases in South Africa and Kenya. The significance of this Chapter 
is that it guides the analysis of the record of the Zimbabwe Courts in the following Chapter and 
help with mapping a trajectory for Zimbabwe. This chapter explores how the courts in more 
pronounced (South Africa) and emerging (Kenya) constitutional democracies have navigated 
the political sensitivity which human rights cases involve.  
Attention is paid to the methods of constitutional interpretation adopted in these jurisdictions. 
Both jurisdictions have passed landmark decisions using transformative interpretation methods 
to give life to the values and principles contained in their constitutions in ways that aim to 
achieve the aspirations of the people. It is acknowledged that the courts appreciate the role of 
political actors, and contrary to popular belief, adjudicating in such matters or exercising 
judicial activism as opposed to judicial restraint does not amount to a violation of the doctrine 
of separation of powers.   
The courts have to jealously guard the values and principles of the constitution. Transformative 
adjudication has been used in both jurisdictions to better the lives of the people and to achieve 
the constitutional goals and national aspirations. The first part of this chapter will explore the 
notion of transformative constitutionalism in the South African context, considering both the 
scholarly literature and the record of the Constitutional Court of South Africans. The second 
part explores Kenyan transformative jurisprudence. This chapter shows that the jurisprudence 
in these countries can be used to guide courts in countries with new constitutions such as 
Zimbabwe or other emerging democracies in shaping the trajectory of their transformations 
especially in matters involving civil and political rights. In Zimbabwe, rights adjudication has 
not been fully explored to transform and expand the ambit of the scope of protection of civil 







4.2 Transformative constitutionalism and adjudication in South Africa 
 
This section explores how South African courts have managed to transform society through 
various means. Emphasis is placed on the South African Constitutional Court’s transformative 
agenda, its appreciation of the court’s role, and the interpretative methods adopted to ensure 
that transformation in South Africa becomes a reality. To achieve this, this section provides a 
brief background to the socio-legal and political strata that transformed the Court’s agenda 
since its inception in 1994. The record of the Court in human rights cases is explored to show 
how the Court crafted its judgements in a manner that avoids confrontation with other branches 
of government. But for this craftsmanship, political arms would have accused the Court of 
judicial law-making or trampling on Executive authority in violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.  
4.2.1 Background  
 
At the demise of Apartheid, South Africa entered a new era of constitutional democracy 
founded on the values of equality, dignity, the rule of law, equality and respect for fundamental 
freedoms. This was a significant shift from the previous dispensation that was based on 
racialism, oppression, and discrimination. Just like any colonial territory in Africa, the African 
majority was mostly at the receiving end of the socio-economic and civil and political ills 
associated with colonialism.  The legislative and the justice system of the time did not help 
either.1 There was a need for real change to ensure that Africans were afforded the human rights 
they deserved. African people were previously deprived of their rights. Therefore, following 
years of conflict and negotiations, a new path in South African history was paved with the 
adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1994.2  The adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1994 
resulted in an agenda to transform social, economic and political life through respect for human 
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Unlocking the Creative Powers of Judges in Terms of Section 39(2) of Constitution” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal. 




rights and fundamental freedoms. As Rapatsa puts it, ‘the post 1994 regime embodied a vivid 
paradigm shift entrusted in law and social order thereby creating a new normative system, 
characterised mainly by respect for human life, dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’3 A constitutional duty was placed on the body politic to ensure that South Africa 
achieved true and meaningful democracy that would manifest itself not only through the 
holding of regular elections but also on the lives of the people themselves. 
The Constitution not only served to redress the injustices of the past but also sought to entrench 
the newly found principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.4 Pius Langa 
has viewed the constitution as a project aimed at healing the wounds inflicted in the past and 
guide the people into the future.5 South Africa needed to find a way of entrenching human 
rights and institutions promoting democracy. There were several lessons to be learnt from post-
colonial administrations from across Africa where the misery of most people was perpetuated 
by newly formed brutal regimes, sowing the seeds of endless coups and counter-coups as 
witnessed in the 1970s and 80s.6 ‘The elusiveness of constitutionalism in post-colonial Africa 
has attracted the attention of many scholars in Africa. Okoth-Ogendo, for instance, [described] 
Africa's post-colonial situation as one of “constitutions without constitutionalism”.’7 Thus, 
South Africa had to forge a realistically transformational path and avoid a return to or reverse-
Apartheid or even a revolution against the new democratic system. 
The history of South Africa has informed the need for a rights-based approach to transformative 
adjudication. During Apartheid, civil and political rights were alien to the majority of South 
Africa.  The final Constitution8 adopted in 1996, was based on the tenets of transformative 
constitutionalism, anchored primarily on socio-economic rights and civil and political rights as 
contemplated in Chapter 2 that contains the Bill of Rights. This was done as a way of bringing 
 
3 M Rapatsa “South Africa's Transformative Constitution: From Civil and Political Rights Doctrines to Socio-
Economic Rights Promises.” (2015) 5 (2) Juridical Tribune Journal 208, at 211. 
4 M Rapatsa “Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa: 20 Years of Democracy.” (2014) 5 (27) 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. 887- 895. 
5 P Langa “Transformative constitutionalism” (2006)17 Stellenbosch Law Review at 352.   
6 See, W R Jackman et al “Explaining African Coups D'Etat.” (1986) 80 (1) The American Political Science 
Review, 225.  
7 E Kibet and C Fombad “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Adjudication of Constitutional 
Rights in Africa” (2017) 17 African Human Rights Law Journal, 340 at 343. 




about much-needed social justice, peace, and reconciliation, after so many years of social and 
political conflict.  
What is of interest in respect of transformation, is the role that has been played by the South 
African Constitutional Court in championing this, and often setting itself on a collision course 
with the other branches of government. The Constitutional Court has since its inception taken 
a progressive human rights activist role by giving meaning to the form and substance of the 
Constitution, in pursuance to the values and principles of transformative constitutionalism.9 
The record of the South Africa Constitutional Court shows that it has intervened in many socio-
economic as well as civil and political rights disputes, by making progressive pronouncements 
or determinations ordering the State to act within the confines of, or in a manner prescribed by 
the Constitution. In instances where there is a clear absence of political will from the 
Legislature and the Executive, the Constitutional Court has been called upon to safeguard the 
rights of the people.10 This study shows in Chapter 5 that there exists a lack of political will to 
transform the state of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe, hence the call for a court-led 
transformation process.  
Regarding transformation, Chief Justice Pius Langa stated that ‘this project is a constitutional 
commitment to heal wounds of the past and guide us to a better future.’11 To elaborate on this 
point, Langa CJ notes that: 
‘Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that creates a space in 
which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly 
explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which change is unpredictable but the idea 
of change is constant.’12 
This chapter examines the record of the South African Constitutional Court in transformative 
adjudication. For illustrative purposes, the Court’s record in socio-economic rights is used to 
illustrate how the Court’s interpretative methods and adjudication techniques are used for 
transformative purposes. This is done for comparative purposes, to inform the next Chapter 
 
9 AC Diala “Judicial Activism in South Africa’s Constitutional Court: minority Protection or Judicial 
Illegitimacy?” (2007) LLM Dissertation University of Pretoria. 
10 The emergence of public interest litigation in South Africa is evidence on the fact that where politics or 
politicians have failed the people, the courts are used as an alternative to enforce the Constitution. 
11 Langa (n 5 above) at 352. 




where the record of the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court and its duty to transform the lives of 
the people in general and civil and political rights, in particular, will be discussed. 
4.2.2 The transformative nature of the South African Constitution  
 
The South African Constitution has been hailed as the embodiment of progressive democracy. 
South Africa’s Constitution has over the years resulted in a real change of both the social, 
economic and social spaces within the country. John Dugard notes that ‘the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa is not only ‘moral’,  but it is also inherently transformative.’13 
According to Rapatsa ‘this Constitution carried with it, a progressive agenda of transformation 
geared towards changing all spectrums of society with specific emphasis on altering social and 
economic conditions of ordinary South Africans.’14  Indeed, South Africa adopted a 
constitution whose core values are to create ‘a  society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights . . .’15 Besides,  the constitutional aspiration is to better 
the life of every individual and free their potential.16 The transformative nature of the South 
African Constitution is based on its founding pillars which were influenced by the events of 
the past struggle. Rapatsa explains that these founding values ‘represented a collective 
commitment geared towards ensuring that the conditions which led to conflict and suffering in 
society are eradicated and not given space to re-emerge.’17 The Constitution, therefore, 
presented South Africa with an opportunity to break with the past by introducing a new 
normative system. It can be said that the adoption of a new Constitution in Zimbabwe provides 
a similar opportunity for it to break with the past norms of polarization, human rights violations 
and the absence of the rule of law and democracy.  
The adoption of the values of constitutionalism in 1994 saw the issue of transformation coming 
to the fore of legal scholarship. In trying to understand the South African Constitution, post- 
1994 scholars have formulated various meanings for transformative constitutionalism. 
Prominently, Karl Klare defined transformative constitutionalism as a ‘long term constitutional 
enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed to transforming a country’s political, 
 
13 J Dugard “Judging the Judges: Towards an Appropriate Role for the Judiciary in South Africa's 
Transformation.” (2007) 20 (4) Leiden Journal of International Law 965 at 970. 
14 Rapatsa (n 3 above) at 209. 
15 See the Preamble, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16 Ibid. 




legal and social institutions, and power relations in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian 
direction.’18 This essentially means that the Constitution provided the opportunity to effect 
political change through legal processes. Karin Van Marle perceived it as ‘an approach to the 
Constitution and law in general that is committed to transforming political, social, socio-
economic and legal practices in a manner that it will radically alter existing assumptions about 
law, politics, economics and society in general.’19 Practically, this assertion is to be found in 
Christiansen’s description of transformative constitutionalism in South Africa: ‘South Africa 
has been attempting to transform itself through a constitution that zealously protects traditional 
civil and political rights and addresses the more fundamental elements of justice as well.’20 The 
transformative nature of the Constitution has been primarily viewed through socio-legal lenses.  
The Constitution has also been viewed as a transformative document, because it entrenched 
civil and political rights together and justiciability of socio-economic rights. This on its own is 
a sign that the drafters of the Constitution envisaged a document that would be used by the 
people as a tool for demanding what is owed to them by the State. These include the promotion 
and protection of various rights contained in the second chapter of the Constitution. Unlike 
many liberal constitutions, the South African Constitution does not only place a negative 
obligation on the State not to violate human rights but also places a positive obligation on the 
State to take all steps necessary to ensure that they are realised.21  
South Africa’s transformation, though ongoing, did not come through legislative means only. 
The courts have developed a rich jurisprudence in the furtherance of the transformation agenda. 
Christiansen notes that ‘indeed, South Africa has established a jurisprudence of expansive 
dignity and equality protections as well as the only relatively comprehensive, affirmative social 
rights jurisprudence of any nation a reflection of the transformative values of the 
 
18 K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism.” (1998) South African Journal on Human 
Rights’ at 150.   
19 K Van Marle “Transformative constitutionalism as/and critique.” (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review, 286 at 
288.   
20 EC Christiansen “Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa: Creative uses of Constitutional Court 
Authority to Advance Substantive Justice.” (2009) 13 Journal of Gender Race and Justice. 575. 576. 
21 See Pierre de Vos. The court keeping a check on the South African State. 2011 The Guardian 2 December 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/dec/02/south-africa-jacob-zuma-




Constitution.’22 This has been made especially possible by the courts’ justice-oriented 
ideology. This serves to illustrate the role that the court has to and can play in leading the 
transformation process and it is argued that this can be imported into the Zimbabwean 
constitutional adjudication design.  
4.2.3 Transformative adjudication in South Africa  
 
The courts in constitutional democracies or countries with a democracy of sorts must uphold 
the rule of law, fundamental rights and the promotion of constitutionalism. Constitutions 
generally place this duty on institutions of the State, by requiring the State to commit to 
respecting and upholding these values. However, this is only practical in ideal democracies, 
and those are rare.  More often states, acting through various agencies, are at the fore of 
violating these values. Many African courts, after independence, faced by despotic and 
repressive governments, struggled with carrying out their mandate to be the guardians of their 
constitutions and to promote and protect human rights. Even though this cannot be generalised, 
there exists a general pattern indicating that courts were either ‘impotent or complicit’ in the 
repressions.23 
The courts in Apartheid South Africa failed to play any meaningful role in the transformation 
of the human rights particularly due to the legal and legislative structures that were designed 
to support the system of Apartheid.24 Parliamentary sovereignty of the pre-1993 Constitutions25 
of  South Africa ensured that courts could do little detrimental to Executive or Legislative 
decision.26 For example, courts were not permitted to review the constitutionality of the acts of 
Parliament.27 This meant that decisions of the Cabinet or Parliament, no matter how 
 
22 Christiansen (n 20 above) at 577. 
23 Kibet & Fombad (n 7 above) 344. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Four Constitutions preceded the 1996 Constitution. The first three, that is 1910, 1960 and 1983 Constitutions 
served the interests of the White minority, and the 1993 one was adopted as inclusive and transitional document 
that paved way for the Final Constitution in 1996. 
26 See for example Dugard who notes that ‘[d]ecisions dealing with the "restriction" of individuals were also 
characterized by judicial abstention: the courts, led by the Appellate Division, refused to invoke the normal 
principles of administrative law in order to review arbitrary executive action.’ J Dugard “The Judiciary in a State 
of National Crisis- With Special Reference to the South African Experience.” (1987) 44 Wash. & Lee Law Review, 
477 at 492. 




outrageous, could not be questioned by the courts.28 The Apartheid government had numerous 
constraints on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of movement and 
these were cemented by bureaucratic controls meant to implement the laws.29 Unlike the 
current constitutional dispensation, the Apartheid legal order allowed very little room for 
judicial review, it was premised on an ‘explicitly racist constitution and parliamentary 
sovereignty, ostensibly “unencumbered by the British doctrine of the rule of law”.’30 John 
Dugard has laid criticism against the Apartheid Judges for their failure to find room for the 
‘judicial advancement of human rights in the interstices of the apartheid legal order.’31 
According to Wacks, South Africa’s legal order was  ‘quintessentially unjust.’32 In that respect, 
Chaskalson submits that judges who shared this view and were concerned about the moral 
dilemma of having to apply apartheid laws should have resigned.’33  John Dugard referred to 
the judges’ subordination to the executive and the legislature as ‘vulgar positivism.’34 Dugard 
elaborates that: 
‘Government strategy became more devious. First, it ruled that 2 judges, as against the 
customary five, had to preside in AD [Appellate Division] cases concerning constitutional 
matters. It then set about appointing to the AD more judges sympathetic to the NP [National 
 
28 See Moseneke who notes that ‘Parliament was supreme and entitled to override any rights that may be located 
in the common or prior statutes. The sovereignty of Parliament that courts could not invalidate any law passed by 
the unrepresentative parliament. Judicial review was virtually absent. In any event, the dominant judicial culture 
required courts to defer to law makers. Although, administrative law of the time permitted the review of 
subordinate legislation and administrative decisions, judges rarely set them aside.’ D Moseneke “Remarks: The 
32nd Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: A Journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness Towards a Just 
Society: Salient Features of the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa” (2013) 101 
Georgetown Law Journal, 749. 
29 A Chaskalson “From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South African Law.” (2003) 1(4) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 590. 
30 Dugard (n 13 above) at 967. 
31  J  Dugard “Should Judges Resign? – A Reply to Professor Wacks” (1984) 101 South African Law Journal 286, 
at 291. 
32 R Wacks “Judges and injustice.” 1984 South African Law Journal. 266 at 269. 
33 Chaskalson (n 29 above) at 592. 
34 J Dugard “Some Realism about the Judicial Process and Positivism - A Reply” (1981) 98 South African Law 




Party] outlook ... It also amended the Constitution to provide that “no court of law shall be 
competent to pronounce upon the validity of any law passed by Parliament”.’35 
Law schools and academics were not spared either: According to McQuoid-Mason:  
‘The few legal academics who did undertake criticism and analysis of the injustices of apartheid 
were themselves subjected to considerable criticism for becoming involved in politics from 
their peers, the legal profession and the bench. Sometimes they were prosecuted for what they 
wrote.’36 
John Dugard has written extensively on the idea that there were opportunities that the Apartheid 
judges could have explored to engage in judicial activism of some sort. He made unequivocal 
calls for the ‘judicial advancement of human rights through the use of common-law principles 
of equality and liberty.’37 The judiciary was encouraged to take a more activist posture to secure 
a more just society. An interesting point made by this scholar was that;   
‘[t]he South African judiciary has been relatively frank about its law-making function in the 
development of the common law… Why, then, is it that the myth of judicial sterility is 
preserved in the case of the interpretation of statutes? Why do we still adhere to the 
phonographic theory of judicial function in this sphere?’38 
The above does not serve to lay criticism on the Apartheid judges, but to highlight that scholars 
have always been clear about the role that the courts should play in ensuring transformation 
through interpretation of statutes in ways that afford rights to the marginalised groups. The 
decisions of the Apartheid courts such as in the case of Collins v Minister of Interior39 serves 
to illustrate how the judiciary was devoid of any craftsmanship to keep the Executive or 
Legislature in check. In Collins, it was held that ‘if the provisions of the law are clear, we, as 
a court, are not concerned with the propriety of the legislation or policy of the Legislature, our 
duty is to minister and interpret it as we find it.’40  
 
35 Ibid, at 966. 
36 DJ McQuoid-Mason “Access to justice and the role of law schools in developing countries: some lessons from 
South Africa: pre-1970 until 1990: Part I.” (2004) 29 (3) Journal for Juridical Science. 28 at 30. 
37 J Dugard “The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty” (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 181. 
38  Ibid, at 183. 





Post-apartheid South Africa can be said to have generally escaped the ills that characterised 
post-colonial Africa. This escape is owed to the transformative nature of its Constitution as 
well as the role played by the courts in giving meaning to the word and purport of the 
Constitution. Since 1994, the South African courts have been making crucial judgments, 
especially on issues to do with human rights, equality, the rule of law and general principles of 
democracy41. In Africa, comparatively, South African courts have been at the fore of upholding 
the rule of law, constitutionalism and fundamental rights.42 The notion that courts carry the 
ultimate power to make pronouncements on the meaning of law has, since  World War II, been 
embraced by most democracies world over. It is this notion that empowers the courts to act in 
a manner that may be seen to be bringing about change to the lives of ordinary citizens. This 
power, however, thrusts the courts in the centre of politics, with significant political 
implications. When courts carry out such duties, their independence is placed at risk. As a 
result, they have to find ways of executing their duty whilst maintaining their institutional 
security. As will be shown, in Zimbabwe, the courts have previously faced political backlash 
for passing decisions that are not favourable to the State.  
In South Africa, the courts’ power to act is inherent in the Constitution of South Africa which 
gives the power to review legislation, policies and administrative actions and other political 
decisions. These powers, when not exercised carefully, set the judiciary on a collision course 
with the Executive.43  The South African Constitution provides for several rights that are aimed 
 
41 The Inter-Parliamentary Union states that the basic principles of democracy are that “the people have a right 
to a controlling influence over public decisions and decision-makers, and that they should be treated with equal 
respect and as of equal worth in the context of such decisions.” Inter-Parliamentary Union . Democracy: its 
principles and achievement. 1998. Inter-Parliamentary Union. 
42 Kibet & Fombad (n 7 above) at 344. 
43 Siyo and Mubangizi illustrate this point using the Al Bashir case ‘what is more important are the attacks on the 
judiciary made by various government officials and government alliance partners, all of which seem to relate to 
or were instigated by the al-Bashir ruling. These attacks have included statements that the judiciary is biased 
against the state, that the judiciary is driven “to create chaos”, is “overreaching” and “contradicting the interest of 
the state” (according to ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe), and, importantly, that the judges were 
influenced to reach certain verdicts (according to Police Minister Nathi Nhleko). These attacks on the judiciary 
eventually led to an extraordinary judicial heads of court meeting, after which Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng 
announced that the judiciary would meet President Jacob Zuma to discuss matters, after “repeated and unfounded 
criticism” of the judiciary, given that the criticism “has the potential to delegitimise the court.” L Siyo and JC 
Mubangizi “The Independence of South African Judges: A Constitutional and Legislative Perspective.” (2015) 




at improving the lives of the people. The Constitutional Court, like the national government, 
has had a significant impact on the socio-economic and political justice.44 Critics argue 
however that a lot still needs to be done on the economic front. The establishment of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in 1994 signified a turning point in the country’s judicial 
history. The first task the Constitutional Court had was to scrutinise the 1994 Interim 
Constitution against the Principles45 that had been agreed to by the negotiating parties. Indeed, 
the Interim Constitution was repealed by the new Final Constitution in 1996. The Interim 
Constitution ended the Apartheid rule and brought in a new dispensation. What is also novel 
about the Interim Constitution was that it: 
‘ended the era of parliamentary supremacy in South Africa and invested very broad judicial 
review authority in the courts of South Africa—including the power to review proposed 
legislation, national and provincial statutes, provincial constitutions, acts of the executive 
branch and administrative bodies, and decisions of lower courts on all matters related to the 
Constitution.’46 
The South African courts have been able to freely adjudicate on matters that ordinarily would 
be dealt with by the Executive and Legislature. This is despite the existence of “separation of 
powers” as one of the guiding principles in the country. In terms of the Constitution, the power 
to declare any law or conduct of the State as unconstitutional is vested in the Constitutional 
Court.47 Further to this, the Constitution grants the courts the power to make any order that is 
just and equitable in a democratic society in any matter before it.48 These powers inevitably set 
the courts on a collision course with other arms of the state.  
Transformative adjudication requires that the courts embrace transition as was envisioned by 
the drafters of the Constitution. In South Africa, one of the ways that have been used by the 
courts to avoid confrontation with the State is by acknowledging that social transformation is 
a duty which primarily rests with the State.49 The courts have therefore stepped in, as provided 
for in the Constitution, to adjudicate in matters where the State’s legislative and administrative 
 
44 The Constitutional Court has managed to do this through the judicial review mechanisms whilst the national 
government has relied on executive action.  
45 Constitutional principles Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution. 
46 Christiansen (n 20 above) at 575. 
47 In terms of Section 172 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
48 Ibid, Section 172 (1) (b). 




conduct falls short of what is acceptable in a democratic society. For example, in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign50 the Court essentially acknowledged that it was the 
responsibility of the Government to formulate and implement policies.51 It argued, however, 
that in this case, the Government had failed to adopt reasonable measures to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to health care services under section 27 of the 
Constitution.52  
The Court demonstrated that it would make pronouncements in cases where the State had failed 
to discharge its constitutional mandate, to hold the Executive to account. This courage has 
primarily been absent in Zimbabwe, save for few instances, and has resulted in the judiciary 
being accused of timidity.53 As will be shown in Chapter 5, in Zimbabwe, even though the 
courts have made some progressive decisions, these have not substantially contributed to their 
interpretation methods or human rights jurisprudence in a way that would transform the society. 
Judiciary-led transformative process requires judges who are bold enough to adjudicate in 
politically sensitive matters regardless of popular political sentiments.  
Those who argue against transformative adjudication often invoke the separation of powers 
doctrine to prevent flexible interpretation of the law by the courts.  Liebenberg has argued that 
the separation of powers doctrine is likely to be applied rigidly in socio-economic rights case 
to avoid making decision likely to challenge the political arms of the state. She elaborates that 
‘this is particularly the case when the doctrine assumes an idealised form of separate terrains 
 
50 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC) 
51 Ibid, at para 99, ‘[w]here state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, courts have to consider 
whether in formulating and implementing such policy the state has given effect to its constitutional obligations. 
If it should hold in any given case that the state has failed to do so, it is obliged by the Constitution to say so. In 
so far as that constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the 
Constitution itself.’ 
52 Ibid, at para 135  ‘It is declared that:  a) Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the government to 
devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise 
progressively the rights of pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to health services to combat 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV.’ 




with the strict demarcation between the roles of each branch instead of a functional and 
pragmatic device to facilitate responsive, accountable governance.’54 
A rigid construct of separation of powers is contrary to ideal transformative constitutionalism 
as envisaged by the Constitution. 
4.2.4 Navigating around the separation of powers 
 
The South African courts have adopted an approach that some may see as violating the doctrine 
of separation of powers especially in matters that constitute political questions. This is contrary 
to the notion of positivism which is unwilling to accept the idea of transformative adjudication. 
The positivist view is that the primary objective of transformative adjudication is to invite 
judges to ‘accomplish political objectives.’55 This notion essentially confines legal 
interpretation to texts of rules of law and prevents any form of craftsmanship, use of subjective 
intellectual, ethical or moral views by the judges. However, the South African Constitutional 
Court appreciates its wide powers and scope of interpretation in determining all cases of a 
constitutional nature.56 As will be shown in Chapter 5, the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court 
has shown a move towards an appreciation of its wide powers, however, more work still needs 
to be done.  
The Court also has the power to hear disputes on the conduct of the President, as well as 
provincial, and national spheres of Government.57 In addition to this, the Court has the power 
to hear disputes between organs of the State concerning their constitutional status, powers and 
functions,58 the constitutional validity of Executive actions and the constitutional validity of 
parliamentary or provincial bills.59  
Given these powers, a conflict between the courts and these arms of the state is inevitable. 
South Africa’s courts-led transformation has been primarily visible in socio-economic rights 
cases. Chaskalson acknowledged that ‘enforcement of these rights represent (sic) hard cases. 
 
54 S Liebenberg “Towards a Transformative Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights” in Osode and Glover 
(eds.), Law and Transformative Justice in Post-apartheid South Africa (2010) at 51. 
55 D Moseneke “Transformative Adjudication.” South African Journal on Human Rights. (2002) 18 (3) 309-319. 
56 Section 167(3)(a), The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
57 Ibid Section 167 (5). 
58 Section 167(4)(a). 




Governments are elected to deal with these issues, and socio-economic rights are at the border 
of the separation of powers between the Judiciary and the Executive.’60 According to 
Moseneke:  
‘The essence… is that courts are duty bound to give full effect to the constitution in order to 
transform society. However, if their judgments are substantially at odds with the dominant 
political and social views of society they may lose the respectability they so need to function 
well.’61  
It has thus been suggested that there is a need for striking an ‘equilibrium between rigorous 
judicial review, on the one hand, and the historic need for effective executive government to 
pursue reconstruction and development of society.’62 
The judiciary has faced several criticisms on both its interpretation of the Constitution and the 
constitutional construct itself. Judges, judgements and the institution of the judiciary have been 
attacked by both disgruntled litigants as well as powerful political figures.63 ‘And, most 
concerning of all, senior political leaders have questioned the very idea of constitutional 
review.’64 Moseneke has pointed out that: 
‘Recently the state has announced an executive initiated review of our jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal amid political chants that the judiciary 
is untransformed or that it impedes transition to a socially just society. Sometimes the criticism 
veers towards blaming, not State inaction and ineffective economic policies, but the 
Constitution itself for deepening poverty and inequality.’65 
Despite these hurdles, the record of the South African Constitutional Court remains pro-
transformation. It is, therefore, necessary to turn to some of the cases in which the Court has 
exercised its authority to advance transformation.  
 
 
60  Chaskalson (n 29 above) 590. 
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4.2.5 The record of the Constitutional Court in transforming human rights. 
 
The record of the South African Constitutional Court shows that the Court has been industrious 
enough to navigate around political hurdles in its quest for a truly transformed society. 
According to Christensen, 
 ‘the South African Constitutional Court was the branch of government that was undeniably the 
first among equals. The Court was uniquely empowered by its role to ensure the initial 
democratic transition and as the ultimate interpreter of the new Constitution through judicial 
review due to its placement at the pinnacle of a court system newly empowered by a 
transformational value set.’66  
It should be noted that most of the cases recorded by the Constitutional Court involved socio-
economic rights. It is submitted that the interpretative methods used in these decisions are 
transferrable to other human rights, particularly, civil and political rights.  
The Constitutional Court, in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health,67 was faced with 
the question as to whether the Applicant was entitled to receive dialysis treatment as a 
manifestation of his right not to be denied emergency medical treatment as well as the right of 
access to health care. In brief, the facts were that the Applicant was a patient suffering from 
kidney failure and his life could only be sustained by ongoing dialysis treatment. He was 
informed by a hospital that it could not afford to give him dialysis because of limited resources 
and that his condition made him ineligible for a kidney transplant. Hence, he could not be 
allowed to access dialysis treatment. The Constitutional Court acknowledged that the 
realisation of several socio-economic rights was dependent on the availability of resources. The 
Court held that the State had not breached its constitutional obligations. ‘The Court promised 
that it would be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by authorities for 
such matters.’68  
However, in the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom69 the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to transforming the lives of the people through its interpretation of 
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67 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
68 A Govindjee “Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights by the Constitutional Court of South Africa: Walking 
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the law. This case involved a group of poor residents who had been made homeless as a result 
of their eviction from privately-owned land they had occupied. The group included children. 
Before the occupation of the private land they had lived in deplorable conditions. They had no 
access to basic services such as water, sewer and refuse collection. After their eviction, they 
applied to the High Court for an order requiring the government to provide them with adequate 
shelter. The High Court granted the order. The Government appealed to the Constitutional 
Court where the Court confirmed that in terms of Sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution, 
the State, though not express, has a negative obligation to refrain from violating the right to 
access to adequate housing.  In addition to this, subsection 2 was interpreted to mean that the 
State was obliged to take reasonable steps, including legislative measures within its available 
resources to ensure the realisation of this right.70 The Court specifically stated that the 
obligation to provide adequate housing was shared by all spheres of government and that the 
government needed to adopt clear measures, not only legislative but also to ensure appropriate 
finances and other human resources were made available. The Court had the opportunity to 
comment on the then-current government’s housing plan and pronounced that the plan was not 
flexible enough to cater for those who had no roofs over their heads or those living in 
intolerable conditions.71 
Another case in which the Court had to use its power to challenge government policies to realise 
the transformative agenda of the Constitution is that of Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign.72 In this case, the Treatment Action Campaign, a non-governmental organisation, 
made an application before the High Court for an order to compel the government to make an 
antiretroviral drug Nevirapine generally available and accessible and to develop a 
comprehensive program on HIV/AIDS. The Court held that ‘the government program to 
combat HIV/AIDS fell short of the constitutionally mandated standard…’73 The government 
appealed this decision to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court also held that the 
government’s policy was not flexible; ‘the government’s policy relating to the limited use of 
Nevirapine at research and training sites constituted a breach of constitutional rights. Implicit 
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in the Court’s finding was that the waiting period before deciding to make the drug generally 
available was not reasonable within the meaning of section 27(2) of the Constitution.’74 
Interestingly, the Court also alluded to the pertinent issue of separation of powers.75 The Court, 
in this case, confirmed that policy formulation and implementation remain the prerogative of 
the Executive. Therefore, the courts would not rush to make decisions that have the effect of 
forcing the Executive to pursue a particular policy. According to Govindjee, ‘… this doctrine 
did not restrain the courts completely from making orders that impacted on the policy.’76  In 
addition to this, ‘in so far as this constituted an intrusion into the Executive domain, the 
Constitutional Court held that such an intrusion was constitutionally mandated.’77 
In the landmark decision of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v 
Minister of Justice and Others,78 the Constitutional Court demonstrated its powers by declaring 
unconstitutional several laws that prohibited gay sex and declared the common law of sodomy 
as unconstitutional.  The Court did this by basing its argument on the rights to equality and 
dignity.79 This was an interpretation that the Constitutional Court would not have arrived at 
had it not been for the transformative nature of the Constitution.  Ackerman J, delivering the 
judgement, interpreted the right to equality in a manner that afforded rights to those unfairly 
discriminated based on their sexual orientation. Ackerman J said: 
‘We need, therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that 
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth 
and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in 
all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will require a careful and 
thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular people 
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concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal 
of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair 
in a different context.’80 
The transformative nature of this decision lies in the correction of the State and Legislative 
structures that caused a disadvantage and discrimination against same-sex couples. According 
to Langa CJ, the Court did this by ‘using new norm and rules which remedy and eradicate the 
disadvantage from its roots.’81 
 In Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another82 the Constitutional Court also 
made a bold decision by recognising same-sex marriages. The Court declared the common law 
definition83 of marriage in the Marriage Act84 unconstitutional.85 The Court said the Act was 
unconstitutional only to the extent that it excluded same-sex couples from the marriage status. 
The Court suspended the declaration for unconstitutionality for a year to allow the legislature 
to correct the defects. This was a sign of the recognition placed by the Court on the duty of the 
legislative arm to make and amend laws as they may see fit to comply with the Court’s decision. 
The Fourie decision is one of the many in which the Court exercised its counter-majoritarian 
authority which, if it was not for the appreciation of its role in the transformation agenda, would 
have set it on a collision course with the other arms of the state. This was a case where ‘it can 
be said that society’s “feelings” around a moral controversy are, as HLA Hart once called it, at 
“concert pitch”86 or as Dworkin would put it, meets with “passionate public disapproval”.’87 
This was indeed true in the aftermath of the Fourie judgement during the public participation 
proceedings facilitated by the legislature to comply with the decision of the Court to take 
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legislative steps to correct the defects in the Marriage Act.88 The members of the public openly 
voiced their opposition to same-sex marriages.89 
In S v Makwanyane and Another,90  the Constitutional Court, through Judge Ismail Mahomed 
said;  
‘The South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensible and 
represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of that part of the past which is 
disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, repressive and a vigorous identification of the 
commitment to a democratic universalistic caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly 
articulated in the Constitution.’91 
According to Dennis Davis, the Constitution of 1996, was ‘seen as the means by which a 
repressive, racially and sexually divided society could be transformed into a non-racial, non-
sexist and egalitarian community.’92 The Constitution was, therefore, a means to bridge the 
past and the future through engagement in a transformation process in which the Constitutional 
Court is a key stakeholder.  
The Court in Makwanyane demonstrated its courage by declaring the death penalty 
unconstitutional despite public opinion. The Attorney General even expressed the importance 
of public opinion and submitted that public opinion was important in determining the 
constitutional validity of the death penalty. The stance taken by the Court therefore shows that 
it was aware of its constitutional duty to review law and to promote and protect human rights.  
In another case, that would ordinarily have been met with resistance, Du Toit and Another v 
Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others93 the Court granted same-sex 
couples the right to adopt children. In this case, the Applicants had brought an application 
 
88 Barnad-Naude, Ibid, at 342 - 343, observes that ‘in the public participation proceedings before the legislature’s 
Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs (tasked with the responsibility to draft a legislative instrument that would 
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before the High Court challenging the constitutionality of section 17(a), 17(c) and 20(1) of the 
Child Care Act94 as well as section 1(2) of the Guardianship Act95. These provisions, the 
Applicants argued, limited their right to adopt as they referred to married couples only. It was 
submitted that these provisions, therefore, violated the right to equality as contemplated in 
section 9(3). The High Court found for the Applicants, and they subsequently applied to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation of judgment in terms of section 172 of the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court confirmed the decision of the High Court.96 This shows that, even 
though the Court was aware of the possible threats on institutional security, it was willing to 
go a stretch further in the protection and promotion of people’s rights as part of its 
transformation duty. 
The case of Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others97 
demonstrates that the State can no longer exercise powers arbitrarily and that the Constitutional 
Court has adopted a bold stance in its determination of constitutional and rights matters. In the 
opening paragraph of this case, Mogoeng CJ stressed the need to preserve the constitutional 
vision of guarding against the abuse of State power. He said, ‘[t]his is so because 
constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that 
stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck.’98 In this case, the Court 
also alluded to its recognition of the principle of separation of powers, and that it must be wary 
of instances wherein it may be called to take Legislative or Executive action.99 In the same 
case, the Chief Justice cited the Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others100 and said:  
‘[B]ut under constitutional democracy, the Constitution is the supreme law. It is binding on all 
branches of government and no less on Parliament. Parliament must act in accordance with, 
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within the limits of, the constitution,’ and the supremacy of the Constitution requires that ‘the 
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’101 
The judgements have also been widely used in some of the most persuasive arguments for the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights the world over. The approach adopted in these cases is 
indeed commendable if the Constitution is to meet the people’s expectations.  Of note, is the 
complex balancing act that was used by the courts in these cases. The inevitable effect of these 
judgments is that they create tensions between the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. 
The South African Constitutional Court has, however, so far, managed to discharge its duty 
without any real threats against its institutional independence and this is due to the bold and 
consistent approaches that the Court has adopted. There are therefore many lessons that other 
African jurisdictions can draw from the record of the South African Constitutional Court. 
Govindjee notes, ‘in the broader African context, for example, it has been argued that 
judiciaries must play the role of social reformers, often necessitating activism in order for such 
an endeavour to succeed.’102 More elaborately, he notes:  
‘Judges must use their judicial power in order to give social justice to the poor and economically 
and socially disadvantaged. South Africa is the best equipped to do this. Its bill of rights 
contains social and economic rights. In interpreting those provisions which protect social and 
economic rights, judges should remember that they cannot remain aloof from the social and 
economic needs of the disadvantaged. Through their activism, judges can nudge their 
governments so that they move forward and improve the social and economic conditions of the 
poor. In South Africa the bill of right is, without interpretation, activist on its own right. 
However, it requires activist judges to make its provisions living realities.’103  
The thesis here is that transformative adjudication, through judicial activism, if adopted 
elsewhere in Zimbabwe, has the potential to unlock people’s potential in both economic and 
political spheres for the improvement of democracy. It is argued that even though the jurisprudence 
discussed above relates primarily to socio-economic rights, its theoretical underpinnings accompanied 
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by the attitudes of the Court have potential to be used as a basis for the transformation of civil and 
political rights in Zimbabwe.  
The South African Constitutional Court has also made significant strides in transforming civil 
and political rights in the country. In the case of Mlungwana and others v The State and 
others104, the Court was faced with the question of the constitutional validity of section 12(1) 
(a) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act of 1993.105  This provision essentially criminalised a 
convener of a gathering’s failure to either give notice or sufficient notice to the local authorities. 
Mlungwana, who had convened such a gathering was convicted in the Magistrate’s Court. He 
appealed in the High Court where the Court held that section 12(1)(a) was unconstitutional on 
the basis that it limited the constitutional right to freedom of assembly as contemplated in 
section 17 of the Constitution. An application was then made to the Constitutional Court for an 
order confirming the invalidity of the contested provision.  
The Constitutional Court weighed the nature and extent of the right to freedom of expression 
against the limitation in section 12(1) (a) of the Act. Petse JA noted that; 
‘The possibility of a criminal sanction prevents, discourages, and inhibits freedom of assembly, 
even if only temporarily. In this case, an assembly of 16 like-minded people cannot just be 
convened in a public space. The convener is obliged to give prior notice to avoid criminal 
liability. This constitutes a limitation of the right to assemble freely, peacefully, and 
unarmed.’106 
In arriving at its confirmation of invalidity, the Court emphasised the importance of freedom assembly 
in a democracy. It was held that to take away a tool that allows people, especially the poor, to express 
themselves would undermine the constitution and the participatory democracy that it envisages.  
The Court has previously outlined that freedom assembly is a right that allows for the 
enjoyment of other civil and political rights. In South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence, it was held that freedom of expression is related to freedom of religion, 
right to dignity, freedom of association, and right to vote.107 
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Transformative constitutionalism in South Africa has not been without criticism. One of its 
main weaknesses in South Africa is that it has managed to bring about tangible change in as 
far as eradication of poverty is concerned. Sibanda questions the formulation of transformative 
constitutionalism in South Africa; ‘Is South Africa’s constitutional project, as currently 
conceived, formulated in such a way that it will withstand the pressures of seemingly deepening 
cycles of racialised, intergenerational poverty and social decay?’108  It is further submitted that 
South Africa’s transformative constitutionalism is imbedded in liberal democratic 
constitutionalism. Liberal democratic constitutionalism is not suitable for the achievement of 
poverty eradication. Sibanda submits that;  
‘the courts have sought to enforce its principles and aspirations in adjudication, however the 
prevalence of a liberal democratic constitutional paradigm in South African constitutional 
discourse – despite the best intentions of transformative constitutionalism – has had the effect 
of defining the goods of constitutionalism in narrower terms than is in fact necessary or 
desirable for purposes of pursuing a truly transformative project of poverty eradication.’109 
Sibanda posits that transformative constitutionalism, as currently formulated, has several 
weaknesses that impede the attainment of a truly egalitarian society. Transformative 
Constitutionalism should, instead, be conceptualised in a manner that is ‘alive to the possibility 
of delivering a substantively more egalitarian society committed to true social and economic 
emancipation in which poverty is not only alleviated so as [to] assuage the collective 
conscience of the haves…’110 It is argued that these criticisms, though not lacking in merit, 
ignore the fact that transformation is not an event but an ongoing project with many facets all 
aimed to achieve a truly egalitarian society. As a judiciary led project, transformative 
constitutionalism in South Africa has equipped the people with the right tools they need to 
claim, from the state, rights afforded in the constitution.  
It should be stressed, however, that not all decisions of the South African Constitutional Court 
are without criticism from a transformation perspective. The case of Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg111 is widely criticised for being retrogressive. The applicants in this case were 
residents of a poor community within the Johannesburg City. The city water authorities had 
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made a decision to supply six kilolitres of water free of charge every month to the residents of 
this community. In their application, the residents challenged the constitutionality of the City’s 
decision and avered that the Constitution provides that everyone has the right of access to 
sufficient water and the six kilolitres per month were not sufficient. It was further submitted 
that the installation of prepaid water meters was illegal. The main question before the court 
was whether the City, as an organ of the state, had an obligation to provide sufficient water. 
The Court held that the right of access to water does not confer an obligation to make the water 
immediately available but is subject to progressive realization within the available resources.  
The decision of the court had a direct impact on the poor. Mohlakoana and Dugard argue that 
providing water infrastructure or physical access to people who cannot afford it is 
meaningless.112 The state ought to have done more and the court ought to have placed a higher 
obligation on the state to provide adequate water to the poor.   
Roux has also proffered his criticism of transformative adjudication as posited by Klare from 
a conceptual perspective. Roux views transformative adjudication as a concept that blurs the 
distinction between law and politics. He submits that ‘[l]iberal legalists cannot do 
transformative adjudication thus understood, because it offends one of their central tenets, 
namely the strict law/politics distinction.’113 A fair elaboration made to this argument is that 
the distinction between law and politics prohibits the pursuit of ideological projects.114 As 
Venter notes, ‘[c]onstitutional interpretation for the purposes of creating a changed society is 
however far from an exact science. Its outcome is inevitably strongly flavoured by the premises 
of the interpreter.’115  
4.2.6 Legal culture and judicial craftsmanship   
 
The cases discussed above clearly show that by adopting an activist posture in pursuit of the 
transformation agenda, courts are likely to come into conflict with the political branches of the 
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state. Normally, when political branches are threatened by courts, they attack the court’s 
institutional integrity or even interfere with the judiciary’s independence. It is necessary to now 
look at what the South African Constitutional Court has done to ‘enable it to accomplish its 
most important task: staying in business long enough to give meaningful effect to constitutional 
rights.’116 According to Theunis Roux, the South African Constitutional Court has adopted 
tactics such as the use of ‘doctrinally redundant language’ to set the tone of a judgment, a 
preference for formulaic tests over substantive moral reasoning, conversion of conceptual tests 
into discretionary standards, interpreting the constitutional text to give pragmatic outcomes and 
framing certain issues as political questions to avoid deciding them.117 These do not however 
mean that the Constitutional Court does not use other techniques of legal reasoning.  
Firstly, Roux argues that the language and tone that is used in a judgment are just as important 
as the words themselves, the words referred to here is the strictly legal reasoning found in the 
Court’s judgments. The use of words and tone can shape how those affected by the judgment 
are going to understand it or receive it. Given the volatile political environment in Zimbabwe, 
judges need to pay more attention to word use and tine when crafting their judgments. It is 
acknowledged that the task of setting the tone and language right is time-consuming, however, 
due to the low caseload that the Constitutional Court has, it can invest enough time into this. 
In addition, within the South African context, this is said to reflect the current stage that the 
South African democracy, at the consolidation stage. It is argued that the Court knows it 
possesses the power to negate the majoritarian wishes. This role on its places the Court in a 
very delicate position. What the Court then does to counter this, is ‘rhetorically to align itself 
with the political branches’ transformation efforts.’118  
For example, in a decision that ultimately goes against the State, the Court starts by agreeing 
with the policy being pursued. For example, Roux quotes the Court in the Treatment Action 
Campaign judgment to illustrate this point: 
‘The HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa has been described as ‘an incomprehensible 
calamity’ and ‘the most important challenge facing South Africa since the birth of our new 
democracy’ and government’s fight against ‘this scourge’ as ‘top priority’. It has claimed 
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millions of lives, inflicting pain and grief, causing fear and uncertainty, and threatening the 
economy’. These are not words of alarmists but taken from a Department of Health publication 
in 2000 a ministerial foreword to an earlier publication.’119 
According to Roux, this passage is legally redundant. It has no contribution or justification for 
the findings made in this case. It is however masterfully crafted in such a way that it uses the 
government’s very own words indicating its commitment to providing treatment to those 
infected with HIV.  Roux captures this; ‘these are your own words, this is your own policy … 
how can there be any objection to our helping you to implement it properly?’ Roux calls all 
this rhetorical craftsmanship; ‘the careful packaging of a decision so as to make it more 
palatable to those who must obey it.’120  
The case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers121 has also been noted as one of 
the typical examples in which this type of adjudication was used. In this case, the first 47 
paragraphs are redundant, it is only in the 47th paragraph that the Court says, ‘[it] is necessary 
now to consider whether the application for leave to appeal should be granted.’122 This means 
that all the paragraphs preceding this are simply meant to set a foundation on which the real 
case will be decided but without quickly addressing the key questions in the case. These 
passages are also doctrinally redundant.  Interestingly, the case was a leave to appeal after all. 
A typical redundant paragraph, in this case, is paragraph 41 written by Sachs J;  
‘thus, those seeking eviction should be encouraged not to rely on concepts of faceless and 
anonymous squatters automatically to be expelled as obnoxious social nuisances. Such 
stereotypical approach has [no] place in the society envisaged by the constitution; justice and 
equity require that everyone is to be treated as an individual bearer of rights entitled to respect 
for his or her dignity. At the same time, those who find themselves compelled by poverty to 
live in shacks on the land of others, should be discouraged from regarding themselves as 
helpless victims, lacking possibilities of moral agency.123  
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Though redundant, the above paragraph and 46 others in the judgment, ‘are necessary, not in a 
strictly doctrinal sense, not because they constitute rigorous moral reasoning but because they 
express an attitude, an ethic of compassion if you like, that the CCSA is very seriously saying 
is part of the South African new Constitutional order.’124 
Secondly, the South African Constitutional Court, according to Roux, prefers to use formulaic 
tests over substantive moral reasoning in its judgements. Roux submits that ‘in case after case, 
faced with the duty to give meaning to a hitherto unelaborated constitutional right, to fit the 
right into the grand constitutional design, the CCSA has eschewed substantive moral reasoning 
in favour of casuistry or the articulation of formulaic tests.’125 An example of this is found in 
the Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others126 where the 
Court was faced with a task to interpret the meaning of the NCOP and provincial legislature’s 
duty to ‘facilitate public involvement in their processes.’ According to Roux, this task required 
the Court to ‘reflect on the nature of South African democracy, and in particular the balance to 
be struck between its representative and participatory elements.’127 The however did not do 
this by discussing the theories of democracy but ‘settled for something less ambitious; a 
statement of the way in which the representative and participatory elements of the system could 
be reconciled in relation to the particular question presented for decision.’128 
This has resulted in the South African Constitutional Court giving expansive judgements that 
do not focus on substantive legal reasoning but on justifying why a particular interpretation is 
justifiable within the current constitutional design. As submitted earlier, a new court’s primary 
task is to ensure its survival, and this is ensured by the nature of judgments that it passes. 
According to Roux, the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), has previously 
criticized the Court, but the institution as a whole remains secure.129 This security can be 
attributed to, among other things, how it has crafted its judgments. 
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The legitimacy of a court depends on how it decides cases before it. To maintain legitimacy, it 
is important for a court to ‘decide cases according to forms of reasoning acceptable to the legal 
community of which it is a part.’130 Even in cases where the decision is against political 
branches, if the forms of reasoning are acceptable, the court is unlikely to face political 
reprisals. This aspect is very important in the case of Zimbabwe where certain decisions of the 
court have been met with hostility from the political arms.  
In explaining how the South African Constitutional Court has managed to survive so long, 
Roux has argued that the record of the Court reflects a mixture of principle and pragmatism.131 
The Constitutional Court’s successful adjudication in the cases involving the death penalty, 
sexual minority rights, and the realisation of socio-economic rights such as access to health 
care housing is primarily a result of this.  
‘the CCSA was able to hand down legally credible decisions in circumstances that were not 
obviously favourable to principled decision making. From the political science perspective, 
such decisions should not have been possible, since the CCSA had not, by the time of these 
decisions, built the institutional legitimacy required to assert its policy preferences in this 
way.’132 
 An otherwise interpretation of the law would have resulted in the loss of legitimacy and would 
have invited political wrath upon the court.  
4.2.7 Conclusion 
 
It can be seen that the South African Constitutional Court has been at the forefront of bringing 
about real change as envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution. South African courts have 
used a broad reading of the Constitution to give meaning to various human rights provisions 
contained therein. The Courts have managed to pass the hurdle of separation of powers despite 
accusations of judicial activism by purposively reading the powers of the courts as 
contemplated by the Constitution. The Courts have also used some degree of craftsmanship in 
the wording of their judgments in such a way that they are not seen to be encroaching on the 
powers of either the Legislature or the Executive. However, transformative constitutionalism 
as envisaged in South Africa has not been free of weaknesses. It has been noted that it has 
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failed to deliver a truly egalitarian society in as far as distribution of resources, as manifested 
by poverty, is concerned. Having said that, it is now necessary to discuss how Kenyan courts 
have executed their role of transforming the state of human rights in their jurisdictions.  
 
Part B 
4.3 Transformative constitutionalism and adjudication in Kenya 
 
This section explores how the transformation agenda has been carried out by the judges in 
Kenya. Since adopting a new Constitution133 in 2010, Kenyan Courts received numerous 
human rights petitions. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the development of the Kenyan 
post- 2010 human rights jurisprudence, to map its trajectory and draw some lessons for 
Zimbabwe. Kenyan constitutionalism and respect for human rights is still work in progress, 
and the courts have played a significant part in shaping that country’s transformative path as 
contemplated by the Constitution of 2010. The courts have used various interpretative methods 
to give life to the provisions of the Constitution. In some cases, the courts have also faced 
criticism from the State and in some instances, the judges are accused of judicial activism.  
When courts engage in transformative adjudication, they are often viewed by critics and other 
arms of the state as trammelling of their judicial powers and acting as political arbiters. This 
creates a rift between the courts and political arms which needs careful management.  Similarly, 
in Zimbabwe, the courts have made some progressive decisions that transform the civil and 
political rights, however, it remains to be seen whether the courts are in future willing to take 
up this challenge and set the country on a transformative path, establishing democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for fundamental human rights despite the potential threats from the political 
arms.  In highlighting this, this section takes a cursory look at Kenyan constitutional history, 
the road to the 2010 Constitution, and then analyse some of the transformative landmark 
decisions of the Kenyan Courts to draw some lessons for Zimbabwean Courts. 
4.3.1 Background 
 
In contemporary African constitutional law and politics, one cannot discuss constitutional 
transformation and the role played by the courts in that process without referring to Kenya. 
 




When Kenya adopted a new Constitution, it raised the prospects for transformation and 
constitutionalism in the country. The adoption of the new Constitution followed a period of 
human rights abuses, deep authoritarianism and a disputed election outcome. What is very clear 
about the Kenyan situation is its deep-seated troubles that need the intervention of the courts 
to constructively help the country engage in a more democratic progression. The adoption of a 
new Constitution in Kenya in 2010 presented it with an opportunity to sever its attachment with 
a culture of undemocratic politics.134 The 2010 Constitution is  ‘lauded as one of the most 
progressive constitutions in the world.’135 The Constitution of Kenya ‘mandates a shift in legal 
culture away from the narrow literalism formerly prevalent to a more purposive and principled 
mode of argumentation.’136 Essentially, there was or still is, a need for the Kenyan courts to 
adopt interpretative methods that give life to the values of its transformative Constitution.  
Kenya was faced with various challenges including a deep-rooted authoritarian form of 
government characterised by election rigging, as well as unprecedented levels of corruption. 
This was made even worse by the existence of a judiciary system that lacked a moral compass 
and the integrity so necessary to keep the Executive branch in check. It should be noted that 
the 2010 Constitution was not the first Kenyan constitution, it, however, was the first one that 
had transformational provisions.137  
The first post-Independence Kenyan Constitution was adopted in 1963 at Lancaster House in 
Britain.138 According to scholars, this Constitution contained some significant liberal elements 
‘and offered a break in principle with the authoritarian and predatory practices of the colonial 
regime.’139 Even though this Constitution may have brought a significant change, it did not get 
the institutional support that would have been necessary to bring about real transformation. 
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Successive post-colonial governments focussed on concentrating power in the Executive 
leading to the authoritarian rule that characterised Kenya for the past few decades.  
During the period from the year 2007 to 2018 Kenyan courts have followed a path that has 
been met with mixed feelings.140 Seen as a near-perfect example of a new wave of 
constitutionalism in Kenya in the period preceding 2010, and demonised in some parts in the 
period after 2013.141 This is particularly because constitutions are often viewed, normatively, 
as representing a break or repudiation with or from the past and charting of the desired future.  
Article 1 provides that ‘sovereign power lies with the people of Kenya.’142 In addition the 
exercise of power by arms of the state, that is the Legislature, Judiciary and the Executive is 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.143 In addition to this, the courts were accorded the 
power to review Legislative and Executive action for unconstitutionality and declare them 
invalid if so determined. This raises several key questions and calls for a proper examination 
of the record of the Court in its transformational efforts if any.  
Those who advocated for a new constitution argued that to deal with the authoritarian nature 
of the regime, the starting point had to be rewriting the constitution to curtail the power of the 
state through a system of checks and balances anchored in judicial review. According to 
Harrington and Manji ‘there was considerable popular support for this position, as identified 
by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) during its nationwide consultations 
in 2002.’144  In addition to this, the Waki and Kriegler Commissions in 2007 and 2008, also 
found that there was a perceived ‘subordination of the judiciary and the electoral machinery to 
the Executive [which] had made a significant contribution to the crisis.’145 There was therefore 
a real need to safeguard the constitution through the separation of powers. It has been observed 
by scholars that, in light of this, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution ‘does more than simply map the 
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distribution of power within the existing political-legal system or embody timeless precepts 
about the arrangement of good government.’146 
Essentially the 2010 Constitution of Kenya sought to represent a break from the past and pave 
a new way for the desired future based on the rule of law and respect for the wishes of the 
people. According to Githuru, the Constitution is a transformative document because it ‘lays 
the legal foundation for the transformation of the Kenyan society as a whole and introduces a 
radically different constitutional order from all the previous orders.’147 The judiciary of Kenya 
has played a crucial adjudicative role in the realisation of these transformative aspirations. 
Githuru has allayed fears over the judiciary’s failure ‘to embrace the transformative potential 
of the Constitution.’148 The importance of the Kenyan Constitution in its transformative efforts 
has been captured by the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kenya, Willy Mutunga;  
‘Some have spoken of the new Constitution as representing a second independence. This is 
when our institutions, and the people, are to come into their own, when the legislature will truly 
act as the representatives of the people, and the supervisors of the executive, when the executive 
will put the interests of the nation first, above the interests of tribe, individual and class and 
when the curse of impunity will be ended and the rule of law prevails. This will only happen if 
we all, including the judiciary, play our part, for the forces of resistance are strong.’149 
To achieve this transformation, there is a need for a court that reads the Constitution in a 
historically conscious manner and adopts a progressive approach to interpretation. The sole 
objective would be to achieve the aspirations of the people of Kenya. Githuru, however, 
laments the prevailing legal culture and the partisan nature of the judiciary as being the real 
challenges to the aspirations for transformation. 
4.3.2 Kenyan constitutional history  
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Kenya’s post-colonial constitutional history can be divided into two. The first being the period 
between 1963 and 1991 and the second between 1992 and 2010.150 These two periods were 
significant in shaping the current Kenyan constitutional dispensation. These periods present 
two distinct phases of constitutionalism in Kenya.  
4.3.2.1 The period 1963 to 1991  
 
Kenya gained its independence from British colonial rule in 1963. The period after 1963 was 
dominated by a one-party state in Kenya led by Jomo Kenyatta’s KANU. Kenyatta’s rule was 
characterised by the entrenchment of autocracy and personal rule after orchestrating significant 
changes to the post-colonial Kenyan Constitution. Some of the significant changes made to the 
Constitution included the abolition of the office of the prime minister thereby concentrating 
executive authority in the President.151 This was effectively a change from a parliamentary to 
a presidential system of government.  
The Independence of Kenya from Britain had raised the people’s expectations for their social 
economic and political aspirations. The Kenyatta regime failed to deliver on those 
expectations.152 The Mau Mau guerrillas had hoped that after independence, the country would 
see the equal redistribution of national resources, the realisation of full democratic rights for 
the people and preservation of the cultural heritage and the Kenyan people’s history. To sum 
up the Kenyans’ feelings after Independence, Kinyatti says: 
‘The popular understanding was that the independent Kenyan government would nationalize 
all the land occupied by foreign capitalists and divide it amongst the Kenyan poor and landless; 
that it would ensure full democratic rights of assembly, association and expression… the rich 
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indigenous cultural heritage rooted in our own history, tradition and national experience would 
be protected from harmful foreign influences and that he majority of African population, having 
borne the brunt of oppression and been disposed by colonialism, would receive preferential, 
remedial or compensatory considerations in all spheres of Kenya’s political and social life.’153 
The essence of this statement is that it captures the post-colonial aspirations of the Kenyans, 
what would, if given the chance, have formed the basis of their constitutional principles and 
values. There was a history of oppression, a struggle for a better future, and a government that 
was considered as having betrayed the people of Kenya. The Kenyan government after 
independence maintained the status quo.154 According to Githuru, ‘[t]his move suited the 
Europeans, Asians and few Africans who had acquired wealth and investments and who were 
therefore not interested in changing the status quo.’155 Kenyan society became polarized 
because of the political antics that were adopted by Kenyatta. To entrench his power, he started 
rewarding political patronage, which led to corruption, ethnicity and lack of accountability. 
The Kenyan society became polarized.  All this, according to scholars, was enabled by the 
independence Constitution and the changes that were made to it.156 
Sections 58 and 59 of the Constitution of Kenya gave the President the power to dissolve the 
Parliament when he deemed necessary. This concentration of power in the President led to an 
entrenchment of a repressive system of governance since the presidency and the Executive 
became more powerful than the other arms of the state. This had a direct impact on the 
separation of powers and an envisaged system of checks and balances. The mechanism for 
accountability was weakened. This, as Githuru notes, was blatant defacing of the constitution. 
It should be noted that despite these clear challenges to democracy, these moves were not 
contested. The lack of litigation on these issues is according to Githuru, owed to the fact that 
western democracy was new in Kenya and the people had not gained much understanding of 
their rights. Kenyatta was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi who led Kenya for 24 years.  
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Under Moi’s rule, the human rights situation deteriorated. According to Adar, ‘[t]here were 
widespread detentions, torture and persecution of political opponents.’157 There was extensive 
control of the information disseminated from institutions of higher learning. Elections were 
also neither fair nor democratic. In addition to the human rights violations, a constitutional 
Amendment was made in 1982 effectively turning Kenya into a one-party state.158 The 
constitutionality of this Amendment was challenged, but the case was dismissed.159 During the 
period 1964 to 1990, a total of 29 amendments were made to the Constitution which had the 
effect of contracting civil and political rights and strengthening the powers of the Presidency. 
The police force was used as an agent of human rights violations: Ethnic cleansing and tribal 
disputes were instigated by the State to weaken the opposition. The judiciary was compromised 
and became a rubber stamp of Government decisions.160 
4.3.2.2 The period 1992 to 2010 
 
In the 1990s there were growing calls for a multi-party democracy. There was a lobby for the 
abolition of a one-party state with the hope of a return to constitutionalism, democracy and 
respect for human rights.161 Eventually, after both internal and external pressure, section 2A of 
the Kenyan Constitution was repealed and the country returned to multi-party politics.162 
Regardless of these Constitutional changes, the people kept advocating for a new constitution; 
‘they needed a Constitution that would completely overhaul the independence Constitution and 
transform the society.’163 To this end, the people of Kenya formed a constitution lobby group 
called Citizens for Constitutional Change.164 
The increasing pressure for a new constitution resulted in many NGOs, secular groups and 
political parties joining the Citizens for Constitutional Change movement. In 1993, the Law 
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Society of Kenya, the International Commission of Jurists and the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission organised a Constitutional Convention. The Convention drafted a Constitution 
which was eventually launched in Nairobi at Ufungamano House.  The draft was used as a 
basis for extensive consultations with all the stakeholders. The government bowed to the 
pressure for a new constitution by announcing plans to invite foreign experts to draft a 
constitution for the country. Civil society organisations opposed this move as they wanted a 
people-driven process. Opposition parties in Parliament formed the Inter-Parties Parliamentary 
Group. They aimed to deliberate on several constitutional reforms before the 1997 elections. 
Following this, the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (1997) was passed to substantially 
review the Constitution. However, after all these efforts, the government did not implement the 
reforms.  
The 1997 elections were followed by further calls for constitutional reforms and 
implementation thereof. In 2000, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission was 
established.165 Professor Yash Pal Ghal was appointed as the Commissioner.166 The 
Commission engaged in a consultative programme gathering views from all sectors of the 
society and drafted a Draft Constitution that was published in September 2002. A 
Constitutional Conference was scheduled to follow the draft; however, this could not happen 
because President Moi dissolved Parliament just before it was due to be held.167 This effectively 
disrupted the constitution-making process.  In 2002, Mwai Kibaki became President, and a 
National Constitutional Conference took place in 2003. The conference was well attended but 
the Draft Constitution was not submitted for adoption. In 2005 another Draft Constitution was 
prepared and subjected to a referendum but was rejected by the majority.168  
The issue of the constitution was revisited after the 2007 election. The election process was 
marred by violence unprecedented in Kenyan history. The violence ‘left about 1 300 people 
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dead and 600 000 others displaced.’169 This was the turning point in Kenya’s history. Even 
stronger calls for a new constitution were made. Kenya had become a highly polarized society. 
If it was to see lasting peace, there was a need for real transformation and this could only be 
done through adoption a new constitution creating a new order, presenting a break from the 
past. Given the violence and the political impasse in the country, mediation efforts led to the 
enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 2008.170 This Act established a 
Committee of Experts to complete the work of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission.171 The dialogue that followed the violence also resulted in the enactment of the 
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 2008 aimed at formalising the political agreements 
that had been reached between the main political parties.  
The Committee of Experts began writing the new constitution in earnest using all the previous 
drafts as well as views gathered from the public. In 2010, the final Constitution was finally 
adopted following a referendum. The referendum voted overwhelmingly for the adoption of 
the new Constitution.172 Kivuva aptly captures the reason for the overwhelming support for the 
new Constitution:  
‘Those clamouring for a new constitution did not just want to restructure the government and 
redefine their relationship to it, they also wanted to solve a number of governance problems 
associated with the country’s previous governments. These included: rethinking the logic of 
state power vis-a-vis the citizenry; reasserting the correct relationships between the three 
branches of government; reforming state institutions; redefining the relationship between the 
central government, regional governance structures; and instituting a new culture of leadership 
oriented towards redressing social exclusion.’173 
From the above, it is evident that the Constitution was adopted as a means of ushering in a new 
dispensation in which the aspirations of the people could be realised.  It is now therefore 
necessary to turn to a discussion of how the constitution of Kenya captures these aspirations as 
a means of transformation in the country.  
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4.3.3 The 2010 Constitution and transformation in Kenya 
 
The adoption of the new Constitution in Kenya was widely described as a dawn of a new era. 
There was a renewed hope for Kenyans, the Constitution presented a break from the past and 
an ushering in of a new dispensation. This hope lay in the transformative elements of the 2010 
Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution as well as its values encouraged the 
development of a new democratic and prosperous country. The same holds for Zimbabwe 
under its 2013 Constitution. The Kenyan 2010 Constitution was drafted in the light of Kenyan 
history, and the need for a truly transformed political space.  Several provisions of the 
Constitution have been identified as transformative. 
The Preamble of the Kenyan Constitution sets out the ‘values, principles and objects of the 
Constitution thereby bringing about assurances for better times.’174 The aspiration to bring the 
people together, commitment to human rights and a pledge for the exercise of good governance, 
are the notable features of the Preamble. The Constitution also honours those who fought for 
the country’s liberation from colonial rule, thereby bringing it closer to the people and inspiring 
patriotism among all Kenyans.  According to Githuru ‘[i]t reflects on Kenya’s historical events 
as a sure acknowledgement of the need for self-reflection from a historical perspective, and the 
need to confront the past in readiness for transformation into the future.’175 
Apart from the Preamble, one provision that captures the importance of the Constitution is 
Article 1 (2) which entrenches the supremacy of the Constitution. It says that the Constitution 
is supreme and is binding on all people and organs of state alike.176 The Constitution is also the 
only source of authority for the State.177 The validity or legality of the Constitution cannot be 
challenged before any court or organ of the State.178 Any law inconsistent with the Constitution 
is void to the extent of the inconsistency.179 In addition to this, the Constitution gives power to 
the people. It refers to the people’s right to exercise their sovereignty. The Constitution is 
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binding on both the Kenyan people and the arms of the state, no one is above the law and all 
have a duty to defend the Constitution.  
The Kenyan Constitution also guards against possible undermining by the politicians or a single 
political party enjoying a majority in Parliament by way of amendments. The Constitution, 
according to Githuru, ‘include[s] the reservation of powers of constitutional amendments by 
way of referendum which mechanism is used as a direct exercise of authority.’180 Article 255 
says ‘a proposed amendment to this Constitution shall be enacted in accordance with Article 
256 or 257 and approved in accordance with clause (2) by a referendum.’181 The Constitution 
then lists several provisions that can be amended by referendum and these include provisions 
related to the supremacy of the Constitution, sovereignty of the people, terms of office of the 
President and the independence of the judiciary, commissions and other independent offices 
among others. This is meant to guard against the arbitrary exercise of power by Parliament. 
The provision allows people to exercise their sovereignty in the Constitution. Perhaps the most 
progressive provision in the Constitution is Article 104 which gives the people the right to 
recall Members of Parliament for non-performance. The right to recall Members of Parliament 
was complemented by the right to access to parliamentary proceedings in terms of Article 118 
of the Constitution. 
The right to public participation contemplated in the Constitution was given meaning by the 
High Court in the case of Moses Munyendo and 908 others v Attorney General and Minister 
for Agriculture.182 The Court in this case acknowledged the right of public participation in 
legislative processes and interpreted the meaning contemplated therein. On the facts, the Court 
held that public participation did not mean that every affected individual would have to 
participate. It was sufficient that the several consultations with some concerned people were 
made. According to Githuru, ‘the Court however emphasized in this decision the need for 
Parliament to use means to facilitate public participation by seeking views from stake holders 
and public before enacting laws, as recognition of the sovereignty of the Kenyan people which 
is enshrined in the Constitution.’183 Justice Majanja referred to the people’s sovereignty as the 
golden thread running through the Constitution. The sovereignty of the people makes the public 
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participation a national value. Articles 4 and 10 together with Chapter 7 of the Constitution 
provides for public participation to enhance good governance, integrity, accountability and 
transparency. The inclusion of these provisions was a progressive departure from the previous 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The 2010 Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights which has also been described 
by scholars as “transformative.”184 According to Sikuku, the effectiveness of constitutions is 
judged by how they secure the fundamental human rights and freedoms.185 The Bill of Rights 
in the 2010 Constitution is in stark contrast to the previous Bill of Rights which was 
“retrogressive and obsolete.”186 The previous bill of rights was criticized for providing for 
traditional civil and political rights replete with claw-back clauses which made it difficult for 
the full enjoyment of these rights.187 These criticisms of the old Bill of Rights was one of the 
main reasons for the calls for a new constitution. In addition to expansive civil and political 
rights, like the South African Constitution, the Kenyan Constitution provides for socio-
economic rights. This Bill of Rights is therefore an integral part of the democratization process 
as it provides a framework for social, cultural, political and economic policies in Kenya.188 
According to Githuru ‘this is crucial in a country like Kenya where the majority of population 
still cannot access proper housing, health, sanitation and education facilities.’189 The discourse 
being advanced here is that the Constitution of Kenya was crafted in a way that not only 
advances socio-economic rights but has the potential to preserve the dignity of the people, 
promotes civil and political rights as well as lead to the full realisation of the potential of all 
Kenyans regardless of race, tribe or political affiliation. The Kenyan courts have taken the 
initiative in interpreting the Constitution is a manner that guarantees the realisation of its full 
potential. It would be imperative to see how Zimbabwean Courts have also interpreted its 2013 
Constitution and gauge whether there are any real prospects for transformation that would see 
a move towards more a more democratic society.  
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The Supreme Court of Kenya, in the Advisory Opinion of Speaker of the Senate and another 
v Attorney-General and Another and 3 Others190 held that; 
‘Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 is a transformative charter. Unlike the conventional “liberal” 
Constitutions of the earlier decades which essentially sought the control and legitimization of 
public power, the avowed goal of today’s Constitution is to institute social change and reform, 
through values such as social justice and equality, devolution, human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy.’191 
Some of the transformative elements contained in the 2010 Constitution include its wide locus 
standi provision which has basically augmented the right to access to justice even in public 
interest litigation matters.  
4.3.4 The record of Kenyan courts and transformation of human rights 
 
The judiciary must give full effect to the provisions of the Constitution, not only in terms of 
the letter but also the spirit. According to Kibet and Fombad, courts are the “midwives” of 
transformation.192 The duty to transform is derived from the legal mandate of the courts to 
interpret and apply the law, and in so doing, the courts should give effect to the aspirations of 
the people. According to Thornhill, ‘…the responsibility for implementing democracy is 
ultimately attributed to the judicial branch, and high-ranking judges promote constructive 
jurisprudence as a primary force in the realization of transformative democratic values.’193  
This, however, cannot be achieved if the courts are not more assertive than they ordinarily are.  
The Constitution of Kenya does not specify whether it should be interpreted broadly or 
narrowly and this allows the judges of both the High Court and the Supreme Court to give 
meaning to its provisions in a manner that does not betray the intentions of the drafters of the 
Constitution. What is certain, however, is that the Supreme Court has previously noted, in the 
Advisory Opinion case of Re Interim Independent Election Commission,194 that constitutional 
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interpretation does not favour formalistic or positivist approaches as set out in Article 20(4) 
and Article 259(1) of the 2010 Constitution.195 In this respect,  Mutunga has argued that, 
‘The [C]onstitution has incorporated non-legal considerations, which we must take into 
account, in exercising our jurisdiction. The Constitution has the most modern Bill of Rights, 
that envisions a human rights based social-justice oriented State and society. The values and 
principles articulated in the Preamble, in Article 10, in Chapter 6, and in various provisions, 
reflect historical, economic, social, cultural and political realities and aspirations that are critical 
in building a robust, patriotic and indigenous jurisprudence for Kenya.’196 
The Kenyan courts’ jurisprudence is still developing, however, several cases can be used to 
explain the interpretative or adjudication techniques they have adopted.197 The many objections 
in the petitions that characterise every Kenyan presidential election provide a point of reference 
for the precarious position that the courts often find themselves in. The decision of the Supreme 
Court in  Raila Odinga and 5 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 
3 others198 involving a petition challenging Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission’s Presidential Election results highlights the Court’s interpretative approach. In 
paragraph 203 of the judgement, the Court said: 
‘[W]e express the opinion that, in the special circumstances of this case, an insightful judicial 
approach is essential. There may be an unlimited number of ways in which such an approach 
guides the Court. But the fundamental one, in one our opinion, is fidelity to the terms of the 
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constitution, and of such other law as objectively reflects the intent and purpose of the 
Constitution.’199 
In considering this, the Court adopted a narrow approach and exercised judicial restraint as the 
matter before it was more political than constitutional or legal. As a result, the Court was 
convinced that the standard of proof in Presidential election petitions should be higher than 
usual to avoid the risk of judicial intervention in cases of a political nature. According to 
Sikuku, this decision was in keeping with South African Judge Albie Sachs’ decision in the 
case of Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others200 where he said, ‘undue judicial 
adventurism can be as damaging as excessive judicial timidity.’201 However, it seems the 
judiciary has over the years been somehow inconsistent in its interpretative methods. In the 
case involving the enforcement of a warrant of arrest against a visiting foreign President AL 
Bashir, the High Court accepted that ‘the International Crimes Act 2008, like the Rome Statute, 
does not recognize immunity on the basis of official capacity.’202 The Judge, in this case, said 
‘the High Court in Kenya clearly has jurisdiction not only to issue warrant of arrest against any 
person, irrespective of his status, if he has committed a crime under the Rome Statute, under 
the principle of universal jurisdiction,’203 as the South African Court did when a similar 
application was made. The decision of the Court was consistent with Article 2 of the 2010 
Constitution which provides that international laws form part of Kenyan laws. This decision 
was met with political wrath from arms of government.204  Kenya threatened to withdraw from 
the ICC and to repeal its Rome Statute implementation legislation, the International Crimes 
Act.  
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In the case Famy Care Ltd v Public Procurement Administrative Board and 2 Others205 the 
Court was asked to outline the content of the right to information as contemplated in Article 
35 of the Constitution.206 In this case, the Court held that the right in question is a right that is 
reserved for the citizens, and may not be exercised by other entities such as corporations or 
foreigners.207 In Nairobi Law Monthly Company Limited v Kenya Electricity Generating 
Company and 2 Others208 the Court confirmed that the right to information can only be held 
by a natural person.  
The Kenyan transformative jurisprudence is still developing. However, some commendable 
strides have been made. According to Kiebet and Fombat, constitutionalism, promotion, and 
respect for human rights are ‘better than in any other time in the country’s history.’209 Notable 
cases in this regard include Eric Gitari v Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination 
Board and 4 Others,210 Kituo Cha Sheria v Independent Electoral Board, Coalition for Reform 
and Democracy (CORD),211 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Samuel 
Njuguna Ng’ang’a v Republic of Kenya and Another212 and Trusted Society of Human Rights 
Alliance v Attorney General and Others.213 These cases indicate the lean towards a value-based 
approach to interpretation and enforcement of human rights. These cases can be used to 
illustrate the Courts’ commitment to upholding the rule of law, democracy and 
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constitutionalism in Kenya.214 It remains to be seen however if the courts will be able to sustain 
this approach in the long term in the face of political backlash. Transformative 
constitutionalism, therefore, largely depends on the interpretative methods adopted by the 
courts. It would be interesting to see the interpretative methods adopted by the Zimbabwean 
courts and assess whether there are any real prospects for transformation. 
In Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General and Others,215 the Court, 
‘described itself as a “co-ordinate” and “co-equal” arm of government with the mandate to 
interfere with the decisions of the political arms which offend or exceeds limits of the 
constitution and the law generally.’216  This essentially means that the courts are no longer 
subordinate or constrained by self-imposed limitations under the previous era. There is now an 
equilibrium in terms of governmental power. The courts had previously restrained themselves 
in terms of legal culture, ‘particularly how judges and lawyers appreciate the spirit of the 
Constitution and its purposes.’217  
Had the judges failed to free themselves from these restraints, the aspirations for a truly 
transformed society would have remained a pipe dream. In this case, the Court was also able 
to dispense the fears of interference by the Judiciary in Executive or Legislative powers thereby 
violating the doctrine of separation of powers. ‘[T]he Court emphasized that a review of the 
decisions of the political arms of government that do not meet constitutional standards does 
not violate the principle of separation of powers since the courts are the guardians of the 
meaning of the law.’218 Kibet and Fombad elaborated this point; [r]elatedly, courts must reject 
undue attention to technicalities and a cursory approach to adjudication since […] substantive 
justice and real enjoyment of rights are the ultimate objectives of transformative 
constitutionalism.’219  
 
214 The courts in Kenya, though still developing their jurisprudence, have primarily adopted a value-based 
approach to interpretation of the Constitution to afford human right, respect for the rule of law and democracy.  
215 Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General and 2 others [2012] eKLR; Petition 229 of 2012. 
216 Kibet & Fombad (n 7 above) at 357. 
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The judiciary in Kenya has, therefore, managed to depart from the common law jurisdiction 
position that judges do not make law and has come to understand and appreciate that the 
constitutional design calls for them to develop the law;  
‘To put it differently, the judge is not merely a midwife; she is also a surgeon with the power 
to clip the existing law to bring it in conformity with the aspirations of the Constitution. 
Discourses on transformative constitutionalism suggest that the change in the judicial attitude 
and approach advocated by the concept is beyond the traditional role of the judges in Kenya 
and most other Commonwealth common law jurisdictions. However, the contours of this 
enhanced judicial power and how it relates to the powers of other arms of government may be 
hard to define. Nonetheless, this power is constitutionally mandated, and a failure to exercise it 
(sic) the adjudication of human rights and constitutional issues generally is tantamount to an 
abdication of judicial duty contrary to an oath of office.’220 
Transformative constitutions require the use of some sort of judicial activism. The role of 
judicial activism in transformative constitutions was aptly summed up by Mutunga where he 
distinguished between the role of an active judge and that of an activist judge:  
‘An active judge regards herself, as it were, as trustee of state regime power and authority. 
Accordingly, she usually defers to the executive and legislature; shuns appearance of policy-
making; supports patriarchy and other forms of violent exclusion; and overall promotes 
‘stability’ over ‘change.’ In contrast, an activist judge regards herself as holding judicial power 
in fiduciary capacity for civil and democratic rights of all peoples, especially the disadvantaged, 
dispossessed, and the deprived. She does not regard adjudicatory power as a repository of the 
reason of state; she constantly re-works the distinction between legal and political sovereign, 
in ways that legitimate judicial action as an articulator of the popular sovereign.’221 
Therefore, to give credence to activist postures adopted in transformative adjudication, judges 
make use of the constitution as a symbol of the popular sovereign by representing the 
aspirations of the people. In interpreting it, judges give due regard to the country’s history to 
paint a clear picture of what people’s aspirations are. As South African Courts have done, in S 
v Zuma where Kentridge J noted that transformative adjudication requires paying regard to 
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‘legal history, traditions and usages of the country concerned.’222 This means, when 
interpreting the constitution in a transformative manner, there is a need to look into the past 
injustices and make a decision that carves a new path for the country. The Kenyan Supreme 
Court has weighed in on the significance of the country’s history in the interpretation of the 
Constitution. In Speaker of the Senate and Another v Attorney-General and 4 Others, the Court 
said, the Supreme Court Act, ‘allows the Court to explore interpretive space in the country’s 
history and memory… even beyond the minds of the framers…’223 This means that the Courts 
are free to look into the history when seeking guidance on the meaning of the letter and spirit 
of the Constitution. In this case, the Court also said: 
 ‘Each matter that comes before the Court must be seized upon as an opportunity to provide 
high-yielding interpretative guidance on the Constitution; and this must be done in a manner 
that advances its purposes, gives effect to its intents, and illuminates its contents. As a result, 
“constitution making does not end with its promulgation; it continues with its interpretation.’224  
In the Communications Commission of Kenya and 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited 
and 5 others,225 the Supreme Court held that the values in Article 10 of the Constitution, among 
others include ‘sustainable development’ and ‘the use of sustainable development as a vision 
and a concept in the Constitution requires that we at least link it to the vision of the Constitution 
which is transformative and mitigating.’226 The Court has therefore used this vision to interpret 
the Constitution cognisant of the aspirations of the people that can only be given effect through 
transformative adjudication. In interpreting this core value, the Court said:  
‘It is clear that sustainable development under the constitution has the following collective 
pillars: the sovereignty of the Kenyan people; gender equality and equality; nationhood; unity 
in diversity; equitable distribution of political power and resources; the whole gamut of rights; 
social justice; political leadership and civil society that has integrity; strong institutions rather 
than individuals, an independent judiciary, and fundamental changes in land. Public 
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participation the cornerstone of sustainable development and it is so provided in the 
Constitution.’227 
In the Eric Gitari v Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Board and 4 Others228 
case, the High Court of Kenya determined a case in which the Applicant sought to register a 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) with the Non-Governmental Organisations Co-
ordination Board. The NGO’s objective was to protect and seek redress for violence and human 
rights abuses suffered by the Gays and Lesbians Community in Kenya. The Applicant sought 
to be registered under the names “Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Council; Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Observancy or Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Organization.” The Respondent 
rejected the proposed names. A second attempt was made to register under a different name, 
that is, “Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Council, or Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Collective” and the Respondent Board rejected 
these names. The Board rejected the registration based on sections 162, 163, and 165 of the 
Penal code which criminalizes same-sex conduct.229 In addition, the Respondent also relied on 
regulations 8(3) (b) of NGO Regulation of 1992 which regulates which states that the Board 
has power to reject any name if ‘such name is in the opinion of the director repugnant to or 
inconsistent with any law or is otherwise undesirable.’230 The Applicants sought relief because 
constitutional rights to freedom of association as contemplated under Article 36  and freedom 
from discrimination under Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution had been violated. The Court 
held that the Constitution gives every person the right to form an association of any kind. The 
Court also held that rights cannot be limited based on moral beliefs no matter how strong. For 
a country with a history of denying the right to freedom of sexual orientation, the judges were 
bold in making this decision in the face of possible social repercussions.231 As shown earlier, 
the South African Courts have faced similar challenges in the past especially in cases that evoke 
public opinion such as that of Makwanyane.232  
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In the case of Kituo Cha Sheria v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission,233 the 
Kenyan High Court was faced with a question of whether prisoners have the right to vote under 
the Constitution and whether this right had been violated by the Respondents’ failure to 
facilitate prisoners’ voter registration. The Applicants averred that prisoners have a right to 
register to vote in terms of Article 38(3)(a) and (b) which reads that every citizen has the right, 
without unreasonable restrictions to be registered as a voter and to vote by secret ballot in any 
election or referendum. The Court held that the right to vote is an incident of the Kenyan 
people’s sovereignty as contemplated in the 2010 Constitution; ‘This sovereignty is exercised 
through voting for representatives in the National and County governments who exercise the 
delegated authority of the people in accordance with Article 2…, the Constitution, with its 
emphasis on the people’s vote guaranteed under Article 38 and the qualification of voters 
provided under Article 83 does not exclude prisoners from being registered to vote and 
consequently voting in an election.’234 The Court further held that the right for prisoners to vote 
should not be construed in the same manner as the diaspora right to vote is construed. Whereas 
the diaspora right to vote is subject to progressive realisation, the prisoners right to vote is 
immediately realisable.235 The significance of this case is that it demonstrated that the Courts 
are willing to protect and promote the civil and political rights of all persons in Kenya.  
In the case of another civil and political right, the High Court of Kenya delivered a judgment 
in the case of Coalition for Reform and Democracy and Samuel Ng’ang’a and Another v 
Republic of Kenya and Others236 in which the Applicants challenged the constitutionality of 
the Security Laws (Amendment) Act No 19 of 2014 that was enacted in the wake of terrorist 
attacks in the country. The application challenged both the content and processes leading to the 
enactment of the Act. With regard to the contents and scope of the Act, the Applicants 
contended that several provisions violate the right to freedom of expression and of the media.237 
The Court held that ‘the importance of the right to freedom of expression and of the media 
cannot be disputed. It is a right that is essential to the enjoyment of other rights, for implicit in 
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it is the right to receive information based on which one can make decisions and choices.’238 
The Court found that provisions of Sections 12  and  64 of the Security Act and section 66A of 
the Penal Code and section 30A and 30F of the Prevention of Terrorism Act are 
unconstitutional ‘for being too vague and imprecise.’239  
The Supreme Court also illustrated its boldness when it handed down a decision regarding the 
2017 Presidential Election Petition in Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission.240 In this case, the Court was called upon to determine: 
‘i)        Whether the 2017 Presidential Election was conducted in accordance with the principles 
laid down in the Constitution and the law relating to elections. 
(ii)       Whether there were irregularities and illegalities committed in the conduct of the 2017 
Presidential Election. 
(iii)     If there were irregularities and illegalities, what was their impact, if any, on the integrity 
of the election? 
(iv)      What consequential orders, declarations, and reliefs should this court grant, if any?’241 
The Court held that, in respect of the first issue, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission failed to conduct elections under Articles 10, 38, 81 and 86 of the Constitution as 
well as Sections 39(1C), 44, 44A and 83 of the Elections Act. As such, the Court was satisfied 
that the irregularities, illegality and conduct of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission substantially affected the integrity of the Presidential Election. The Court, 
therefore, nullified the election results and invalidated the declaration of Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
declaration of the presidency. A fresh election was ordered. This perhaps is one of the greatest 
decisions of the Supreme Court, in which the Court demonstrated an unprecedented boldness 
by declaring the election of the incumbent invalid.  
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4.4 Chapter Summary  
 
This Chapter has highlighted the interpretative means through which the courts in both Kenya 
and South Africa have given life to the provisions of their respective constitutions according 
to the aspirations of the people. It is clear from this Chapter new constitutions are normally 
preceded by unjust or periods characterised by authoritarianism and blatant disregard for 
human rights. It has been shown that in South Africa and Kenya, the courts have been at the 
fore of breaking with the past and developing a new path based on human rights, the rule of 
law and democracy.   The work of the courts in the transformative agenda is commendable as 
evidenced by the jurisprudence that has been discussed in this Chapter. Having said that, it is 
necessary to now turn to a detailed investigate the trajectory that the Zimbabwean 
Constitutional Court has taken and analyse whether there is hope for any real transformation 








PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
TRANSFORMATIVE ADJUDICATION IN ZIMBABWE 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The introduction of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe1 in 2013 provided a glimmer of hope 
for human rights protection and promotion in the country. The adoption of the Constitution 
was anticipated to usher in a new era based on democracy, human rights and constitutionalism.2 
However, so far, the prospects for the realisation of these aspirations of the people have been 
met with mixed feelings. On the one hand, the Legislative arm has not done much to align 
several laws with the new Constitution and on the other, the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretative method is not easy to ascertain.  
As shown in Chapter 2, the road to a new constitution in Zimbabwe was characterised with a 
lack of political will, deadlocks and clandestine drafts. In as much as the people, as authors of 
the Constitution, may have completed their job through the adoption of the Constitution in 
2013, transformative constitutionalism is still far from reality. Constitutionalism in 
constitutional democracies goes beyond just having a constitution as the supreme law, but 
includes the actual practice of the values and principles of the Constitution.3 In Zimbabwe, the 
complexity of the constitutional and the legislative framework requires the significant drive to 
align various legislation with the Constitution and to shift the attitudes of the judges of the 
courts towards a form of adjudication based on constitutionalism and transformation. This 
means the legislative branch must enact, repeal, and amend the laws, and the courts must 
transform the same through their adjudication on a case by case basis. If left entirely to the 
legislative branch to carry out this task, real transformation will remain a dream in Zimbabwe.  
 
1 Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment Act No. 20.), 2013 (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013). 
2 C Ncube and U Okeke-Uzodike “Constituting Power and Democracy: Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution Making 
and Prospects for Democracy.” (2015) 12 (3&4) Africa Renaissance 129-157. 
3 Q Zhang “A Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Development in China” (2010). 




During the past few years, there has been an obvious lack of political will to repeal 
unconstitutional laws especially those related to civil and political rights.4  
The argument made here is that the Zimbabwean courts have the power to see through the 
transformation of civil and political rights by drawing lessons from the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa and the Supreme Court of Kenya’s rights jurisprudence. It is argued that through 
the interpretation of the Constitution in a transformative manner, adopting a new legal culture, 
judicial activism or other forms of adjudication, the Court can play a significant role in the 
realisation of constitutional values in Zimbabwe. The 2013 Constitution itself substantially 
presents the courts with a perfect tool through which this objective can be realised. According 
to Tsabora, ‘… the new Constitution sets an interesting platform for the transformation of 
society through judicial activism, adjudication and constitutional interpretation.’5  
To make a case for this, this Chapter discusses the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe’s civil 
and political rights jurisprudence to ascertain how the South African and Kenyan designs can 
be incorporated into the Zimbabwean system to bring about change. Tsabora has argued that 
‘a useful measure in determining the potential of the new constitutional framework is to 
consider the judiciary’s treatment of cases of constitutional import that come before superior 
court[s].’6 In Zimbabwe, this would be an ideal measure because the adoption of the 
Constitution was coupled with the establishment of a Constitutional Court. Regardless, several 
rights continue to be undermined despite the adoption of a new constitution that extensively 
protects them.  
It is submitted that the courts’ duty to transform the legal and political landscape cannot be 
abdicated and the courts ‘cannot wait for the other social forces to lead the transformation 
agenda.’7 The political arms have already shown reluctance to lead the transformation process.8 
 
4 G Dzinesa “Zimbabwe's Constitutional Reform Process: Challenges and Prospects.” (2012). 
5 J Tsabora “The challenge of constitutional transformation of society through judicial adjudication: Mildred 
Mapingure v Minister of Home Affairs and Ors SC 22/14.” (2004) 1 Midlands State University Law Review. 54 
6 Ibid, at 57. 
7 Ibid.  
8 In 2013 the Legislature adopted the General Laws Amendment Act and it is said about 128 pieces of legislation 
were aligned, however, Makamure observes that ‘these amendments, on overall analysis, were simply textual 
corrections not very material to the spirit and letter of alignment.’ Alignment of laws can’t be delayed any longer. 
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It is acknowledged that the Constitution of 2013 creates a trias politica, however, the courts 
can use constitutional powers to make pronouncements on the constitutionality of government 
action or inaction. In addition to this, developing the law is a constitutionally guaranteed power 
of the courts and there is no doubt that if adequately exercised, the complexities and 
irregularities within the socio-legal and political set up can be addressed. According to Tsabora 
‘…transformation through constitutional interpretation ensure that society and the law move in 
tandem and that the values and principles defining the constitutional framework are put to 
action.’9  
Looking at the record of the Constitutional Court, it remains questionable whether there is a 
transformative trajectory or not. The Court has previously made decisions that one may contest 
as progressive in part. Little research has been conducted on the record of the Constitutional 
Court of Zimbabwe, however, a careful reading of some of the decisions shows that it has 
continued with the old tradition, primarily premised on a textual interpretation of the 
constitution. This textual approach, ‘places premium on political considerations and uses the 
law as a proxy to mask what are latently political decisions.’10 This was indeed the case in 
Mawarire v Robert Mugabe and others.11 With respect, the Court gave a somewhat bizarre 
interpretation of the Constitution as will be shown below. Progressive decisions have also been 
made, and these include the cases of Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment 
and Others v The Police Commissioner and Others,12 Madanhire and Another v Attorney 
General13 and Mwonzora v The State14 among others. 
5.2 Towards the judicialization of politics in Zimbabwe 
 
To discuss the attitudes of the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in civil and political rights 
cases, it is necessary to discuss how the courts have previously approached politically charged 
cases. Zimbabweans have since independence turned to courts to intervene or address core 
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moral predicaments, or public policy, when human rights are violated. The courts have largely 
been reluctant to make pronouncements on key political issues. However, the decision of 
Mawarire v Robert Mugabe 15 signalled a new trajectory.  
The courts in Zimbabwe have previously refused to take cases with political implications. In a 
speech delivered at the opening of the 2006 legal year in the Masvingo High Court, Justice 
Bhunu stated that: 
‘It must be appreciated that as members of the judiciary, it is our unpleasant duty to resolve 
bitter conflicts. We deal with angry, furious people almost all the time. It is not surprising that 
in most cases wherever there is conflict or contest, there is bound to be a loser and most losers 
will always have a complaint. We in the judiciary are not unduly perturbed or disturbed because 
of the knowledge that they will be only letting out steam for they will have had a fair trial. It is, 
therefore, necessary to remind everyone concerned at this juncture that the courts are neutral 
arbiters. They are neither for nor against anyone. The courts will not help spring anyone into 
power nor help anyone to remain in power. Those who desire political office must go to the 
people and not the courts. The courts have neither the power nor desire to usurp the function of 
the people. It is the people who are kingmakers, not the courts.’16 
The above quote shows that the courts are not interested in politically charged cases and require 
that political matters be resolved politically. This made it difficult for any form of civil and 
political rights transformation to take place through the courts since the judges would not even 
accept such cases. The status of political cases in courts before the Mawarire judgement was 
aptly summed up by Gomwe as follows: 
‘Our courts since then under Chidyausiku CJ led Supreme Court have deliberately taken a 
“hands off” approach with regards to highly politically charged cases, coupled with 
demonstrating a tendency in high profile and electoral cases to lend its process to the service of 
the State.’17  
 
15 Mawarire v Robert Mugabe N.O. & Others CCZ 1/13 (2013).  
16 Justice Chinembiri Earnest Bhunu “Judiciary on interprets the law” Speech Delivered at the opening of the 2006 
legal year in the High Court’s Masvingo Circuit. (February 15, 2006). Available at 
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[Accessed 15 March 2017]. 
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 However, since the advent of the new Constitution, the courts have accepted several politically 
charged cases. This has opened avenues for litigation in political and civil rights cases 
something which was nearly impossible before 2013 due to the “hands-off” approach taken by 
the courts. In the year 2013, in the first-ever case in the Constitutional Court, the Court heard 
the case of Mawarire v Robert Mugabe wherein an application was made to the Constitutional 
Court by one Jealous Mawarire seeking an order compelling the President to proclaim election 
dates. Mawarire argued that the President was constitutionally obliged to announce the election 
dates. This is despite the fact that there was an existing agreement by the Principals within the 
Government of National Unity on what would be an appropriate time to announce the dates. 
One would have expected the Court to either reject the application altogether or to distinguish 
between legal and political questions and only to address legal questions as was the previous 
tradition. The Court’s departure from this norm can be said to have signalled the turn towards 
a new trajectory whereby the Court rose above the constraints of judicialization of politics or 
the issue of separation of powers. According to Gomwe, the Court made, ‘an about turn from 
previous Court policy alluded to above with regard to highly sensitive political matters, 
abrogating to itself the [task] of resolving this crucial political question of election dates.’18 
It is not within the scope of this work to discuss the merits in Mawarire case, however, how it 
was handled and the decision that was made gave rise to several legal questions, including the 
amount of confidence that can be placed in the Court processes, especially in political cases. 
One critic of the judgement submits that ‘Chidyausiku CJ, who penned the majority judgement, 
embarked on a wholesale use [of] legal sophistry to arrive at what was, with respect, an 
incorrect judgment.’19 It can be argued that the Chief Justice adopted this approach to make a 
decision that would not be opposed by the President whose political party was not opposed to 
the Mawarire Application. The significance of this decision, however, is that it paved the way 
for judges to entertain political decisions20 regardless of the political implications they may 
 
18 Ibid, at 9.   
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give rise to.21 Had the Mawarire decision been any different, the Court would have faced 
reprisals from the Zanu PF party which had very significant influence in the Government of 
National Unity. It can be argued that the fact that the court arrived at an incorrect decision to 
avoid political backlash is not something that can be celebrated. The judges could have made 
a correct judgment without upsetting the political arms through the use of various techniques 
drawn from the South African Constitutional Court rights jurisprudence. Politically sensitive 
cases can be resolved legally without upsetting the political arms.  
5.3 Rights adjudication in landmark cases in Zimbabwe  
 
Since the Mawarire decision, the Constitutional Court has received several cases. The decision 
opened avenues for the adjudication of cases including those of a political nature which the 
courts had previously refused to hear. Given Zimbabwe’s history of state-led civil and political 
rights violations, it is necessary to discuss how the courts have handled cases involving human 
rights.  
5.3.1 Freedom of expression jurisprudence 
 
The right to freedom of expression in Zimbabwe has been severely constrained despite being 
a constitutionally guaranteed right. This makes it necessary to discuss how the courts have 
handled cases involving freedom of expression violations in light of the new constitutional 
dispensation. It is apparent, from the discussion above that this right has been constrained by 
the existence of draconian laws such as the Criminal Code22 and the AIPPA.23 
The Criminal Code was put to test for the first time under the old Constitution24 in the 
Constitutional Court in the case of Madanhire and Another v Attorney-General.25 The facts of 
the case were that two applicants were charged with criminal defamation.  The two were the 
Editor and the Reporter of The Standard Newspaper, a prominent independent weekly 
 
21 The decision led to further political polarisation: The MDC argued that it was too early to proclaim election 
dates before all and electoral and political reforms were made, and Zanu Pf argued that the adoption of the 
Constitution created a perfect opportunity for fresh elections.  
22 Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. 
23 [Chapter 10: 27]. 
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newspaper in Zimbabwe. It is on record that sometime in November 2011 the two published a 
story in which they accused a prominent politician and businessman who served as a 
chairperson of a medical insurance company, Green Card Medical Aid Society, of financial 
mismanagement.  In the context, it was alleged that the medical insurance was on the brink of 
collapse and that it was struggling to pay its staff and to cover its clients.26 The two were 
arrested and charged with criminal defamation on the basis that they had published the story 
with intention of causing alarm and to harm the reputation of the politician and the medical 
insurance company. The matter was first heard in the Trial Court and referred to the 
Constitutional Court for the determination of the constitutionality of the provisions of the 
Criminal Code, section 96.27  
The Applicants sought to have the offence of criminal defamation as defined under section 96 
of the Criminal Law Code to be declared unconstitutional. The charges, if found 
 
26 Ibid.  
27 Section 96. 
‘(1)  Any person who, intending to harm the reputation of another person, publishes a statement which⎯ 
 (a) when he or she published it, he or she knew was false in a material particular or realised that 
there was a real risk or possibility that it might be false in a material particular; and 
 (b) causes serious harm to the reputation of that other person or creates a real risk or possibility of 
causing serious harm to that other person’s reputation; 
shall be guilty of criminal defamation and liable to a fine up to or exceeding level fourteen or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding two years or both. 
(2)  In deciding whether the publication of a statement has caused harm to a person’s reputation that is sufficiently 
serious to constitute the crime of criminal defamation, a court shall take into account the following factors in 
addition to any others that are relevant to the particular case⎯ 
 (a) the extent to which the accused has persisted with the allegations made in the statement; 
 (b) the extravagance of any allegations made in the statement; 
 (c) the nature and extent of publication of the statement; 
 (d) whether and to what extent the interests of the State or any community have been detrimentally 
affected by the publication. 
(3)  Subject to subsection (4), a person accused of criminal defamation arising out of the publication of a statement 
shall be entitled to avail himself or herself of any defence that would be available to him or her in civil proceedings 
for defamation arising out of the same publication of the same statement. 
(4)  If it is proved in a prosecution for criminal defamation that the defamatory statement was made known to any 




unconstitutional, to be struck down as null and void.28 The offence was committed under the 
1980 Constitution and the case was decided in terms of section 20(1) of the old Constitution 
which provided that: 
 ‘[E]xcept with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered 
in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference 
with his correspondence.’29  
In light of this, the Court held that ‘it certainly cannot be gainsaid that the offence of criminal 
defamation operated to encumber and restrict the freedom of expression enshrined in s 20(1) 
of the former Constitution.’30 In addition to this, the Court determined whether the limitation 
to freedom of expression in section 96 of the Criminal Code is justifiable in a democratic 
society. In making this decision, the Court, enquired into two aspects; ‘firstly, what are the 
consequences of criminalising defamation and, secondly, is there an appropriate and 
satisfactory alternative remedy to deal with the mischief of defamation?’31   
In addressing the first question, the Court held that the offence of criminal defamation has a 
“stifling and chilling effect” on the right to speak and right to know, especially given the 
important role that newspapers play in unearthing corruption and fraudulent activities in our 
society. In addressing the second question the Court held that there is an alternative in the form 
of a civil remedy under the actio injurium.  
The significance of this judgement is the emphasis that was placed on the individual rights vis 
a vis interests of the State. According to Kika ‘the Court emphasized that freedom of 
expression, coupled with the corollary right to receive and impart information, is a core value 
of any democratic society deserving of the utmost legal protection.’32 The Court, in this case, 
 
28 Madanhire and Another v Attorney-General; ‘The application before this Court, as originally posited, was for 
the offence of criminal defamation as defined in s 96 of the Criminal Law Code to be declared unconstitutional 
and struck down as being null and void. The same relief was initially propounded by Adv. Morris at the hearing 
of the matter. However, after it was observed by the Court that the application in its original form did not address 
the relevant provisions of the new Constitution, the application was confined to the consistency of the offence 
with the former Constitution.’ p 2.  
29 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980. 
30 Madanhire and Another v Attorney General ZWCC 78/12 (2015). 
31 Ibid. 




referred to the legal duty that Zimbabwe has in terms of international law in the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of expression. This was a positive step in the protection of 
human rights through litigation in Zimbabwe. 
The Madanhire decision even though decided under the previous Constitution, was progressive 
in that it showed that the newly established Constitutional Court was willing to interpret the 
Constitution in such a manner that transforms the civil and political rights of the individuals. 
This case was widely commended by civil rights organisations and scholars.33 The Court was 
of the view that it was not necessary to discuss the constitutionality of the provision in respect 
of the new Constitution and said this would be left for determination in a future case as and 
when such an application is made. The Court explained that the reason for this is that freedom 
of expression in section 61 of the 2013 Constitution is framed differently. The Court, however, 
said section 61(5)(c) of the 2013 Constitution ‘expressly excludes malicious injury to a 
person’s reputation or dignity from the ambit of the freedom of expression and freedom of the 
media.’34 The Court also observed that section 61 must be interpreted more narrowly and that 
the offence of criminal defamation may be justifiable under the limitations enshrined in section 
86 of the 2013 Constitution. It is submitted that this interpretation is erroneous and 
retrogressive. The courts should always interpret the Constitution in a manner that affords more 
rights under the new constitutional dispensation.  If the courts are to adopt such a narrow 
interpretation, they risk losing interpretative credibility, and the realisation of the ideals of 
constitutional democracy will remain a pipe dream in Zimbabwe. Transformative 
constitutionalism requires judges to favour the interpretation that affords more rights than the 
one that restricts them. The courts in South Africa have been bold enough to make such 
interpretations even in the face of potential opposition from the political arms. It suffices to 
note here that criminal defamation had been used to silence political opposition therefore the 
declaration of its invalidity was not well received within the political circles.   
The decision left a great deal of confusion and uncertainty regarding whether criminal 
defamation as outlawed under the old Constitution would consequently also be invalid under 
 
33 Media Institute of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe said “MISA Zimbabwe welcomes the ConCourt judgment that 
vindicates its incessant calls for the scraping of this law from the statute books. It has always been the position of 
MISA Zimbabwe that such laws have no place in a democratic society given that there are alternative civil 
remedies available to aggrieved parties outside criminal defamation.” Available at 
https://www.ifex.org/zimbabwe/2016/02/04/criminal_defamation/  




the new Constitution. The Media Institute of Southern Africa made application to the 
Constitutional Court in MISA Zimbabwe and others v Minister of Justice and Another35 to seek 
confirmation of the status of criminal defamation under the new Constitution. This came after 
the Minister of Justice had made remarks on record that criminal defamation was still valid and 
would be used in appropriate circumstances.36  The Minister’s statement consequently revived 
fears of prosecution under criminal defamation and continuous violations of the right to 
freedom of expression. Regardless of the Minister’s statement, which could be deemed as a 
threat to the independence of the judiciary, the Court ruled that criminal defamation is void and 
no longer a part of the law.37 In light of this decision, in a statement aimed at the Zimbabwe 
Government, the African Commission on Human Rights Chairperson Advocate Pansy Tlakula 
said;  
‘I call on your government to support the decision of the Constitutional Court in light of the 
potential of this ruling to promote and protect the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and as elaborated in the 
Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa.’38 
The decision of the Court was bold in that it uncharacteristically defied political sentiments on 
freedom of expression and the validity of criminal defamation in the law. Criminal defamation 
and other provisions of the Criminal Code such as section 33(2)(a) have traditionally been used 
as a means of suppressing diverse views and silencing political opponents.  
Another case arising from the Criminal Code and decided under the auspices of section 20(1) 
of the 1980 Constitution which protected the right to freedom of expression, is that of 
Mwonzora v The State.39 In the Trial Court, Mr Douglas Mwonzora, a prominent opposition 
political figure, had been charged under section 33(2) (a) which prohibits statements that 
 
35 MISA Zimbabwe and others v Minister of Justice and others CCZ  7/15. 
36 VP Mnangagwa defends criminal defamation. (2015) The Herald 16 April. 
37 MISA Zimbabwe “Analysis: Facts and implications of Zim ruling on criminal defamation” (05 February 2016)  
available at http://misa.org/issues/analysis-facts-and-implications-of-zim-ruling-on-criminal-defamation/ 
[Accessed 18 March 2018]. 
38 MISA Zimbabwe “AU Hails Scrapping of Criminal Defamation in Zimbabwe.” (06 March 2016) available at 
http://misa.org/issues/free-expression-the-law/au-hails-scrapping-of-criminal-defamation-in-zimbabwe/ 
[Accessed 18 March 2018]. 




undermine the authority of the President or insult the President. Section 33(2)(a) of the 
Criminal Code reads: 
‘33. Undermining the Authority of or insulting President;  
…. 
(2) any person who publicly, unlawfully, and intentionally-  
(a) makes any statement about or concerning the President or any Acting President with the 
knowledge or realising that there is a real risk or possibility that the statement is false and that 
it may –  
(i) engender feelings of hostility towards, or  
(ii) cause hatred, contempt or ridicule of; the President or any Acting President, whether in 
person or in respect of the President’s Office.  
(b) makes any abusive, indecent or obscene statement about or concerning the President or an 
Acting President, whether in respect of the President personally or the President’s Office;  
shall be guilty of undermining the authority of or insulting the President and liable to a fine not 
exceeding level six or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both.’40  
 
Mwonzora was charged with the criminal offence after he referred to former President Mugabe 
as a “goblin”, and also insinuated that the President was corrupt while addressing a political 
rally. An application was made to the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of 
section 33(2)(a).  The Court did not address the crucial question of whether the provision was 
unconstitutional but dwelt on the applicant’s right to the protection of the law. Some scholars, 
however, argue that the Court’s decision not to determine the constitutionality of section 
33(2)(a) was correct as ‘the prosecution of the applicant had been declared unlawful,’ therefore 
there was no need to determine the constitutionality of the crime. 
 
This case had presented the Court with an opportunity to deal with the constitutionality of 
section 33(2)(a) in line with the transformative nature of the Constitution and the role of the 
Court in developing the law. The Court’s decision, however, fell short of the expectations for 
transformative adjudication. A judge with a transformative mind would have dealt extensively 
with the issue because it is important to emphasize constitutionalism, the rule of law and the 
protection and promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms. Transformative 
constitutionalism would have required the court to use some formulaic tests to determine the 
constitutionality of the section in question. The Court could have done this, not because it was 
 




a legal question before it but because of its moral and legal duty to make such pronouncements 
and bring about change in society.  
 
5.3.2 Freedom of assembly jurisprudence 
 
With the declining economic and political situation in Zimbabwe over the past few years, 
citizens have resorted to airing their grievances through mass protests and other forms of 
organised gatherings. However, those who choose to engage in this are met with the wrath of 
the law through the infamous Public Order and Security Act41 and some sections of the 
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act.42 When courts intervene, they are met with 
hostility and often receive severe criticism from the political arm. For example, former 
President Mugabe is on record condemning judges who allow the people to exercise their right 
to freedom of assembly. He has accused the judges of being reckless; ‘[o]ur courts, our justice 
system, our judges should be the ones who understand even better than ordinary citizens. They 
dare [my emphasis] not be negligent in their decisions when requests are made by people who 
want to demonstrate.’43 
The right to freedom of assembly is a constitutionally guaranteed right under section 58 (1) of 
the 2013 Constitution.44 ‘Freedom of assembly is a fundamental human right. It is a vehicle 
that enables citizens to collectively express, promote, pursue, and defend their common 
interests.’45 Corollary to this right is the section 67 right to political participation. In terms of 
this right, everyone has a right to individually or collectively engage in peaceful activities to 
influence, challenge or support policies of the government. This right has traditionally been 
subverted by the provisions of the Criminal Code46 prohibiting any conduct that may be seen 
to be a subversion of the authority of the State, overthrowing or attempting to overthrow the 
 
41 [Chapter 11:17]. 
42 [Chapter 10:27]. 
43Zimbabwe's Mugabe says judges reckless for allowing protests. 2016 Reuters. 04 September, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe/zimbabwes-mugabe-says-judges-reckless-for-allowing-
protests-idUSKCN11A0GL [Accessed 27 March 2018]. 
44 Section 58(1).  
45 Freedom House “Joint Civil Society Statement: Zimbabwe Must Respect Freedom of Assembly and Human 
Rights.” December 28, 2016 available at  https://freedomhouse.org/article/joint-civil-society-statement-
zimbabwe-must-respect-freedom-assembly-and-human-rights [Accessed on 17 September 2017]. 




government by unconstitutional means. In 2016, civil society organisations made a joint 
statement calling upon the Government to drop charges against those arrested whilst exercising 
their right to assembly, to ensure that those in future who choose to exercise this right are not 
arbitrarily arrested, detained or prosecuted and to ensure the protection of people from 
abduction and thoroughly investigate such unlawful acts committed against anyone.47  
 The Court had the opportunity to determine the permissible limitations of the right to assembly 
and the application of the criminal offence of subversion to demonstrations, petitions and other 
forms of gathering in the case of S v Mawarire.48 The accused, Evan Mawarire, a prominent 
clergyman made videos calling on the people of Zimbabwe to engage in peaceful protests 
against the Government, and the introduction of Statutory Instrument 64, as well as the 
adoption of Bond Notes as a form of currency. The people responded to this call by engaging 
in several protests across the country.49 He was charged with two counts of subverting a 
constitutional government in terms of section 22(2) (a) of the Criminal Code.50 In the 
alternative, he was charged with the crime of incitement to commit public violence in terms of 
section 187(1)(a) as read with section 36(1) of the Code.51 In his defence, Mawarire argued 
that the charges violated his right to freedom of assembly in terms of section 58, and his right 
to demonstrate and petition in terms of section 59 of the 2013 Constitution. The Court held that 
it was well within the accused’s rights to call for passive resistance against the State, per 
Chigumba J: 
 ‘[H]e urged prayers for peace. How can prayers for peace be considered unconstitutional 
means of removing a constitutional government?’ His criticism of government policies is 
permissible in terms of the Constitution, and there is no evidence that he urged a violent removal 
of the government.’52  
This judgment was widely celebrated for protecting the right of protestors to freedom of 
assembly and guarding against future abuse of the Criminal Code to violate this constitutionally 
 
47 Freedom House (n 123 above). 
48 S v Mawarire HH 802-17. 
49 Public must be part of 'incredible change' in Zimbabwe, says dissident pastor. 2017 The Telegraph UK 16 
November, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/16/dissident-pastor-calls-zimbabweans-rise-
take-streets/ [Accessed 16 May 2018]. 
50 [Chapter 9:23]. 
51 S v Mawarire HH 802-17, p 2-3.  




guaranteed right. However, a careful reading of the judgement shows that it was devoid of any 
interpretation of the content and the extent of the protection of the right to freedom of assembly. 
A constitutional interpretation of the right to freedom of assembly within the context of the 
2013 Constitution would have gone a long way in developing the rights jurisprudence in 
Zimbabwe. The case was largely decided on the facts, and the Court did not refer to any 
progressive precedents on the extent of the protection of the right to freedom of expression nor 
any legal texts on those rights.  
As noted earlier, freedom of assembly under the 2013 Constitution has continued to be 
subverted through the continuous application of the POSA.53 Provisions of the POSA allow the 
police to issue statutory instruments banning public gatherings. For example, following a series 
of demonstrations, in Harare in 2016, the police published a statutory instrument in terms of 
POSA banning demonstrations for 14 days. In response to this, a conglomerate of political 
parties under the banner Democratic Assembly for the Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) 
made an urgent chamber application to the High Court challenging the validity of the statutory 
instrument.54 Chigumba J heard the application and granted a provisional order invalidating 
the statutory instrument.55 The order was granted on the basis that the police had not followed 
the correct procedure in issuing the ban in terms of section 27 of POSA.56  
The Applicants then made another application in the High Court in Democratic Assembly for 
Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) v The Commissioner of Police Others; Zimbabwe 
Divine Destiny v Saunyama and Others57 seeking a final order setting aside the police ban. The 
first question before the High Court was ‘whether section 27 of the Public Order and Security 
 
53 [Chapter 11: 17]. 
54 Statutory Instrument 101A of 2016. 
55 “Interim Relief 1. That, forthwith, the operation of Statutory Instrument 101A of 2016 be and is hereby 
suspended. 2. That the 2nd respondent shall process and deal with all notifications for public gatherings and 
processions or meetings in the manner lawfully prescribed in section 12 of the Public Order Security Act [Chapter 
11:17] 3. That the 2nd and 3rd respondents be and are hereby interdicted from unlawfully interfering with the 
rights of citizens to exercise their right defined by s 59 of the Constitution read together with s 12 of the Public 
Order Security Act.” 
56 Democratic Assembly for the Restoration & Empowerment (DARE) & Ors v The Commissioner of Police & 
Ors HH-554-16. 
57 Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) & Ors v The Commissioner of Police & Ors; 




Act violated sections 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 and 67 (2) of the Constitution.’58 The second question 
was ‘whether the derogations from the right to protest fell within the permissible limitations 
provided for in section 86 of the Constitution.’59 In respect of the first question, the Court held 
that ‘there can be no doubt that the provisions of section 27 constitute a derogation from the 
rights accorded citizens in terms of section 59 of the Constitution. Having said that, the Court 
then turned to the second issue and determined whether section 27 would pass the limitation of 
rights test set out in section 86(2) of the Constitution. The Court adopted a two-stage test; 1. Is 
POSA a law of general application? This point could not be contested, POSA was held to be a 
law of general application. 2. ‘Are the provisions of section 27 (1) of POSA a fair, reasonable, 
necessary and justifiable derogation or limitation in a democratic society?’60  
Concerning the second part, the respondents contended that the 2013 Constitution does not 
fundamentally change how this section should be construed in respect of its constitutional 
validity.  The Court also held that because there is no fundamental difference in the content of 
the right in the new Constitution and the old Constitution, the interpretative methods adopted 
in the previous constitutional dispensation should be adopted [my emphasis]. It also held that 
‘…. cases decided by our courts under the old Constitution remain relevant in the interpretation 
of the present Constitution, including section 59.’61 In construing the provisions of section 59 
of the Constitution, the Court adopted ‘a purposive and general interpretation, one that 
endeavours to give citizens the full measure of that fundamental right and freedom.’62 And on 
the other hand, the Court interpreted the provisions that sought to limit the rights narrowly and 
restrictively to allow the barest minimum limitation.  
The Court, in interpreting the Constitution, took a teleological/purposive approach and held 
that the liberation struggle was fought to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe enjoy these civil 
 
58 G Feltoe, G Linington and F Mahere “Worlds Apart: Conflicting narratives on the right to protest; Case Notes 
on 1. Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) & Ors v The Commissioner of Police & 
Ors HH-554-2016 2. Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) & Ors v The 
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Zimbabwe Electronic Law Journal. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) & Ors v The Commissioner of Police & Ors; 
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rights. It held further that these rights form the core of democracy and that they are sacrosanct. 
Having made such an interpretation, the Court made a ruling that some scholars find 
perplexing.  Chiweshe JP went on to say, ‘it is pertinent to observe that no democracy can 
function or thrive in an environment of public disorder and anarchy. The security and well-
being of any community is of paramount importance.’63 The Court reasoned that section 27(1) 
seeks to ensure public order and security, therefore, it does not unreasonably, and unjustifiably 
limit the constitutional rights in section 59, therefore such a limitation is permissible in terms 
of section 86. Somehow, the Court failed to attach any weight to the purpose, rationale or utility 
of the provision guaranteeing freedom of assembly.  
According to Feltoe et al, ‘the blanket ban on all demonstrations upheld by Chiweshe JP clearly 
constitutes  a negation of a right rather than a mere limitation.’64 What is surprising in this 
judgment is that the Court acknowledged that section 27 (1) has ‘the effect of imposing greater 
restrictions than necessary to achieve its purpose;’65 and went on to ignore the weight of this 
point. It is respectfully submitted that had the Court purposively interpreted the provision as it 
claimed it did, it would have arrived at a different conclusion. Feltoe et al observe that if a 
restriction goes beyond what is necessary for the circumstances, it should be considered 
unconstitutional.66  
The Applicants in DARE appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal seeking a reversal of the 
High Court decision. The Supreme Court of Appeal acting in terms of section 175(4) of the 
Constitution referred the case to the Constitutional Court for a determination of the 
constitutionality of the contested provision. Makarau JCC, in the unanimous decision, 
considered the importance of the wording in section 59 and noted; ‘every person has the right 
to demonstrate and to present petitions, but these rights must be exercised peacefully.’67 In the 
analysis of this provision, the Court said it is worth noting that the Constitution makes the 
admonition that the rights in section 59 be exercised peacefully. Correctly, it is submitted, in 
 
63 Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) & Ors v The Commissioner of Police & Ors; 
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respect of this provision, the Court held that ‘the rights and the admonition must be placed on 
an equal footing and must be read together as giving complete content of the rights.’68  
In addition to this, the Court explained the rationale for the rights in section 59, in particular 
the right to demonstrate. As per Makarau JCC: 
‘I may add on a general note that protests and mass demonstrations remain one of the most 
vivid ways of the public coming together to express an opinion in support of or in opposition 
to a position. Whilst protests and public demonstrations are largely regarded as a means of 
political engagement, not all protests and mass demonstrations are for political purposes. One 
can take judicial notice of, in the recent past, a number of public demonstrations that were not 
political but were on such cross-cutting issues as the environment, and/or the rights of women 
and children. Long after the demonstrations, and long after the faces of the demonstrators are 
forgotten, the messages and the purposes of the demonstrations remain as a reminder of public 
outrage at, or condemnation or support of an issue or policy.’69 
Hence in construing the limitation placed by section 27 of the right to freedom of assembly, 
the Court held that the section 27 ban has a ‘dragnet effect.’ As such, it bans demonstrations 
indiscriminately, both the ‘innocent and the guilty.’ On the facts, the Court considered that the 
ban that was imposed was a blanket ban and during its operation, all peaceful demonstrations 
are nullified: 
 ‘This includes demonstrations already planned at the time the ban is imposed and those that 
are yet to be planned. [T]o the extent that the ban does not discriminate between known and yet 
to be planned demonstrations, the limitation in s 27 has the effect of denying rights in advance 
and condemning all demonstrations and petitions before their purpose or nature is known. [T]he 
limitation in s27 of POSA stereotypes all demonstrations during the period of the ban and 
condemns them as being unworthy of protection. Stereotyping is a manifestation of bias without 
any reasonable basis for that bias.’70  
Based on this reasoning, the Court could therefore not find any reason upon which the 
limitation in section 27 of POSA could be justified. It held that the limitation is not fair, 
reasonable or necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 86 of the Constitution. The Court 
also pointed out that it found it disturbing that POSA has no limitation as to the number of 
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times that section 27 can be invoked. ‘[T]hus, despotic regulatory authority, could lawfully 
invoke these powers without end.’71 Based on that, section 27 of POSA was found to be 
unconstitutional. However, the Court suspended the invalidity of section 27 for six months to 
allow for the Legislature to correct the defect in terms of section 175 of the 2013 Constitution.  
The reasoning in this judgment is significant. The Court afforded the applicants the right to 
freedom of assembly as contemplated in the Constitution. The Court broadly interpreted 
Section 59 to afford the rights, and narrowly construed the limitations provisions in section 86. 
The Court adopted an interpretation that restricts the operation of the limiting provision as 
necessarily possible thereby transforming the civil and political rights discourse in Zimbabwe. 
The Court adopted a rights-based approach to interpreting the relevant provisions including 
section 27 of the POSA and by finding it unconstitutional. In addition, the Court was bold 
enough to exercise its constitutional powers to check the constitutionality of legislation as well 
as the conduct of the State. To avoid confrontation with the Legislature, it cautiously deferred 
the constitutional invalidity to allow for the Legislature to exercise its law-making function in 
terms of section 175(6)(b) of the Constitution.72   
5.4 Chapter Summary  
 
In conclusion, it can be said that this Chapter has shown that the Constitution of Zimbabwe is 
a transformative document, whose ideals are informed by the aspirations of people. The people 
aspire to have a society founded on democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect 
for fundamental rights. These fundamental rights include civil and political rights that are 
cardinal to the full development of a democratic society. These are the rights to freedom of 
assembly and expression. History shows that these rights were often violated by the State and 
other State agencies. In addition to this, there were, and still are, many other statutes that are 
inconsistent with the Constitution. For Zimbabwe to achieve a truly transformed society, 
interpretation of the Constitution in a purposive manner should be the starting point. As shown 
above, where political arms feel threatened by the Court’s judgments, they are likely to direct 
reprisals against the judiciary. South African Constitutional Court has managed to navigate 
around this, and the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court is also capable of doing the same.  The 
Courts have had the opportunity to decide on these and a few notable landmark judgments have 
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been made, for example in the Mawere,73 DARE74 and Madanhire75 cases.  It should be noted, 
however, that most of these judgements, though progressive, have not contributed substantially 
to the development of the interpretation and adjudication methods of the Constitutional Court. 
Judiciary-led transformative processes require judges who are bold enough to adjudicate in 
politically sensitive matters regardless of popular political sentiments.   
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The conclusions made in this thesis are based on the discussions in the previous Chapters and 
the aims and objectives of the study. The discussions in Chapters 2 to Chapter 5 complement 
each other and were aimed towards answering the research questions set out in the first chapter 
of the study. The broad aim of this thesis is to examine the role that can be played by the 
judiciary in Zimbabwe in the transformation of human rights, in particular civil and political 
rights.  This is based on the understanding that the constitution of any country stands at the 
centre of constitutionalism, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule 
of law. With the adoption of the 2013 Constitution,1 Zimbabwe was expected to chart a new 
trajectory in this regard. However, unaligned laws have remained an obstacle to this. If the laws 
in Zimbabwe are aligned with the Constitution, there will be a substantive change in the 
application of human rights and the rule of law. Not only will this advance human rights, but 
it will also help instil much-needed investor confidence in the economic sphere.  
The findings made in this study are aligned to the research question, and it is hoped that it will 
make a significant contribution towards the advancement of constitutionalism and a culture of 
human rights in Zimbabwe. Presently, Zimbabwe is operating with a disjointed legal system. 
A Constitution that is founded on the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law on the one hand, and a set of repressive legislation such as Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA)2 and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)3 on the other. 
These laws have been responsible for violations of fundamental human rights such as freedom 
of expression and freedom of assembly. The law has also been used as a tool to persecute 
perceived enemies of the State, whether imaginary or real. The major finding is that the 
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Zimbabwean judiciary has not taken a solid position to indicate whether it appreciates its role 
in the delivery of real transformation of the lives and human rights of the people.    
This work critically analyses the role that the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe should play 
in ensuring constitutional democracy. An analysis of how the Court has so far fared in 
construing the wording of the Constitution is made. The thesis takes into account the risks 
associated with judicial craftsmanship and the possible threat on the independence of the 
judiciary and brief analysis of how the Court can avoid backlashes from the political arms is 
made. Lessons are drawn from the jurisprudence of the South African and Kenyan Courts. In 
this regard, it is suggested that, in as much as such a jurisprudential basis is desirable, the 
Zimbabwe Constitutional Court should not be a clone of the South African Constitutional 
Court. Zimbabwe should develop its unique transformative jurisprudence drawing from the 
South African experience.  
Through its recommendations, the thesis intends to contribute, from a socio-legal perspective, 
the extent of the influence which judicial enforcement of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe 
could make as a complementary strategy to the achievement of the much-needed 
transformation in an otherwise polarized society.  
The first chapter of this thesis is an overview outlining the main research problem, theoretical 
assumptions as well as the research objectives and questions. Chapter 2 is a detailed discussion 
of the constitutional history of Zimbabwe. It sets out the background on the adoption of the 
new Constitution in 2013. This background serves to highlight the rationale behind the 
adoption of the 2013 Constitution and how it carries the hopes and aspirations of the people of 
Zimbabwe. This lays the basis for the argument that the adoption of the new Constitution was 
meant to bring about transformation within the legal and political spheres of Zimbabwe. The 
substance and processes leading to the adoption of the 2013 Constitution bring to the fore the 
idea of transformative constitutionalism. The pre-2013 civil and political rights violations, the 
inclusion of a comprehensive Bill of Rights, the establishment of the Constitutional Court, and 
the involvement of the people of Zimbabwe in the making of the Constitution, justifies the call 
for real transformation. It is upon this basis that the thesis argues for court-led transformation.  
To allow for discussions on how the courts in Zimbabwe have interpreted civil and political 
rights and to make a case for their transformation, Chapter 3 explores the nature and extent of 
the application and limitations for the rights to freedom of association and freedom of 




legislation and conduct of the State and have been at the centre of much controversy. Chapter 
3 shows that civil and political rights are protected at both domestic and international level. 
The main submission here is that states have the primary responsibility to promote and protect 
these rights. By acceding to the various international human rights frameworks, states 
undertake to abide by the provisions contained therein. The argument is that where domestic 
constitutions provide for these rights, the courts, as the guardians of the constitutions, have a 
duty to promote and protect the rights through interpretation and adjudication.  
Chapter 4 examines how the South African Constitutional Court and the Kenyan Supreme 
Court have interpreted human rights in a transformative manner. Both jurisdictions have passed 
landmark decisions, using transformative interpretation methods to give life to the values and 
principles contained in their constitutions in ways that aim to achieve the aspirations of the 
people. It is acknowledged that courts appreciate the role of political actors, and contrary to 
popular belief, adjudicating in such matters or exercising judicial activism as opposed to 
judicial restraint, does not amount to a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.  The 
courts must guard jealously the values and principles of the constitution. Transformative 
adjudication has been used in both jurisdictions to better the lives of the people and to achieve 
the constitutional goals and national aspirations. This thesis is framed on the assumption that 
the Zimbabwean judiciary will draw lessons from the transformative adjudication of the 
Kenyan and South African courts. South African courts have adopted broad purposive 
interpretation and the Kenyan courts have adopted a value-based interpretation of the 
constitution in a manner that has ushered notable human rights transformation. In this regard, 
Makwanyane,4 Soobramoney,5  Treatment Action Campaign,6 and Fourie7 in South Africa and 
Eric Gitari,8 Kituo Cha Sheria,9 and Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance10 in Kenya have 
been particularly instructive.   
Chapter 5 examines the jurisprudence of the Zimbabwe judiciary. This is aimed at exposing 
the opportunities and challenges of transforming civil and political rights as contemplated in 
 
4 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
5 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
6 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC). 
7 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) 
8 Eric Gitari v Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Board and 4 Others [2015], Petition 440 of 2013. 
9 Kituo Cha Sheria v Independent Electoral Board, Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) [2013] eKLR. 




the new Constitution.11 The Chapter begins by discussing the transformative elements of the 
Constitution. It is observed that the Constitution is endowed with provisions that signal a need 
for a departure from the old and usher in a new era founded on democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights.12 This thesis concedes that carrying out the transformation process 
for a relatively new court may result in conflict between the judiciary and other arms of state. 
The backlash that the High Court judge for her decision in the case Democratic Assembly for 
Restoration and Empowerment and Others v The Police Commissioner and Others (DARE)13 
received from President Mugabe demonstrates this. However, there are several lessons to be 
learned from examples of the adjudication techniques used by the South African Constitutional 
Court and the Kenyan Supreme Court.   
6.2 Reflections on the prospects for judiciary-led transformation in 
Zimbabwe  
 
Transformation of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe is a realistic possibility. This, 
however, is likely to be hindered by two main distinct but related factors. These are the 
existence of a) lack of sufficient independence of the judiciary and b) implications for reliance 
on courts as means of addressing political questions.  
 a) It is a universally accepted truth that the independence of the judiciary is one of the 
‘principal building blocks of the rule of law.’14 According to Bridge, independence of the 
judiciary has three main characteristics. These are judges own personal interests in the outcome 
of a case, decisions, once passed, must be respected and judiciary free from interference.15 The 
independence of the judiciary is important to guard against abuse of executive power, to halt 
legislative erosion of fundamental rights and to assure the public that the judges are impartial 
and fair in the discharge of their duties.16 Even though the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides 
 
11 It has been shown in this study that the constitution is endowed with transformative provisions which can be 
interpreted in a manner that advances the rights of the people.  
12 Chapter 5 of this thesis is instructive in this regard.  
13 Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment and Others v The Police Commissioner and Others 
HC 8940/2016. 
14 J Bridge “Constitutional Guarantees of the Independence of the Judiciary” (2007) 11 (3) Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law at 1 
15 Ibid 
16 DT Hofisi and G Feltoe “Playing Politics with the Judiciary and the Constitution.” (2016) Zimbabwe 




for the independence of the judiciary, the changes brought about through Amendment 1 
discussed in Chapter 2 cast doubts on the sufficiency of this provision. Statements of judicial 
independence are not sufficient to ensure that the judiciary is indeed independent. The 
enactment of Amendment 1 brought forth this reality. Zimbabwe has judiciary independence 
in the Constitution but all powers of nomination and appointment vest in the executive. This 
undermines actual independence.17  
Before Constitution Amendment number 1, the procedure of the appointment of judges was 
considered to be international best practice.18 The process was meant to be open and transparent 
as it included the use of public interviews after nominations from all stakeholders. This had the 
effect of diminishing executive influence. However, Amendment 1 now makes the process of 
appointing judges neither open nor transparent and the presidency now has more sweeping 
powers and influence which practically diminishes the independence of the judiciary This is 
one aspect that needs to be cured as a matter of urgency if the transformation envisaged in the 
constitution is to be realised. However, it should be acknowledged that some judges, in cases 
such as DARE have demonstrated boldness through passing judgements detrimental to 
executive and legislative authority. This somewhat gives hope that with the right tools, the 
judges are capable of discharging their duties without fear or favour.  
b) Judicial review mechanisms in various jurisdictions have resulted in public policy and 
political questions being brought before the courts. These include questions relating to 
government conduct violating civil and political rights and election results disputes. While 
these have not caused many problems for the judiciary in Kenya and South Africa, in 
Zimbabwe, the government has made threats against judges who allow demonstrations and 
public processions. In as much as the possibility of threats is real, the courts have not openly 
abdicated on their judicial review function. The decision by Justice Makarau in DARE is an 
indication that there exists some hope in the judiciary that where the opportunity arises, 
decisions of a transformative nature can be made.   
Having outlined the above, it is necessary to now turn to the conclusions and these will be 
followed by the necessary recommendations.  
 
17 Ibid. 




6.3 Summary of main findings and conclusions  
 
Given the need for transformation in Zimbabwe, it remains to be seen whether the Zimbabwe 
Constitutional Court as the apex court will adopt a value-based interpretative approach.  
Zimbabwe’s judiciary has been largely inconsistent in terms of its operation. The jurisprudence 
examined in this thesis has exposed several interpretative inconsistencies and a general lack of 
a transformative agenda. Since its inception in 2013, the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court has 
not taken a meaningful progressive approach to interpret wording and purport of the 
Constitution. In the very few cases in which the Court has protected civil and political rights, 
it has not developed the jurisprudence to ensure the protection and enjoyment of those rights 
in future. The courts in general have adopted an approach that confines their legal interpretation 
to texts of rules of law and avoided any approaches or pronouncement of ethical or moral views 
in civil and political rights cases. The Zimbabwean courts must appreciate that they are duty-
bound to give full effect to the value-laden Constitution in a manner that transforms society. 
One would have expected the courts to make pronouncements that encompass a transformation 
process and creation of spaces in which dialogue and political contestations may be acceptable. 
The 2013 Constitution has been presented throughout this thesis as a progressive document 
that allows the citizens to claim what is owed to them by the State. However, this has not been 
realised due to lack of political will. This study, therefore, finds that for transformation to occur, 
there should be either political or legal processes ready to accomplish it. In the absence of 
political will to do so, the judiciary should be the driving force in the attainment of 
constitutional objectives through a transformative interpretation of the Constitution.  
Drawing from the South African and Kenyan experiences, it is concluded that transformation 
does not come through legislative means only, but also through courts that develop a rich 
jurisprudence in the betterment of the lives of the people. This has been particularly possible 
due to the independence of the judiciary that currently exist in these jurisdictions.  In 
Zimbabwe, such an approach is currently stifled by the political arms that have previously 
questioned and defied the decisions of the Court and has threatened the independence of the 
judiciary.19 Zimbabwean judges can be criticized for failing, in many circumstances, to find 
 
19 Zimbabwe's Mugabe says judges reckless for allowing protests. 2016 Reuters. 04 September, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe/zimbabwes-mugabe-says-judges-reckless-for-allowing-




room for the judicial advancement of human rights in the present political order. Given the 
continued operation of the Public Order and Security Act20 and the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act21, the current legal order is hostile to human rights.  
 Kenyan jurisprudence has also been used to illustrate that the courts can adopt transformative 
adjudication and restore constitutionalism, democracy, the rule of law and respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This has been done by reading the Constitution in a manner 
that consciously adopts a progressive approach to interpreting its letter and spirit. The Kenyan 
courts have avoided adjudicating in a manner that mortifies or betrays the vision of the drafters 
of the Constitution.22 In addition to this, the Kenyan courts have departed from the formalistic 
or positivist approaches to adjudication and have taken non-legal factors into account in 
interpreting the Constitution. This is done through appreciation of the fact that the Constitution 
envisages a social-justice-oriented state. As a result, the Preamble to the Kenyan Constitution 
has been instrumental in giving meaning to the provisions of the whole document.  
This thesis shows that using the judiciary to discharge of duties conventionally belonging to 
other arms of state can be damaging. In Zimbabwe, the Constitutional Court has not appraised 
the other arms of the State of its duty to develop the law. As such, its decisions have consistently 
been met with hostility from the State. The judiciary must develop the existing law and bring 
it in conformity with the aspirations of the Constitution.  
6.4 Recommendations  
  
The South African Constitutional Court and the Kenya Supreme Court have, comparatively, 
made some tremendous progress into the transformation project. It is conceded that the South 
Africa story has had its shortcomings especially in respect of the eradication of poverty. 
However, commendable progress has been made in the realisation of various minority rights 
through its dignity and equality jurisprudence. Kenya has made commendable strides in the 
adjudication of rights-based cases. This has been made possible by both their constitutional 
design as well as legal culture. In addition to this, the judiciary in these jurisdictions enjoys a 
great deal of support from the political arms even where they do not make decisions favourable 
 
20 [Chapter 11: 17]. 
21 [Chapter 10: 27]. 





to the state. South Africa, in particular, places the notion of democracy at the heart of 
government business, therefore there has not any real threat against the judiciary as they share 
a common goal. South African Constitutional Court and Kenyan Supreme Court have placed 
the notion of transformation at the centre of their adjudication and this has been widely received 
by the political arms.  
Given that the current approaches and methodology used in constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication in Zimbabwe are inadequate to achieve the goals of transformation, it is necessary 
to make some recommendations. The following recommendations are made regarding both 
legal and policy interventions.  
6.4.1 Constitutional interpretation  
 
• The need for a paradigm shift from literalism to purposivism in interpreting civil and 
political rights.23  
The purposive theory of interpretation requires the court to shift from a literal to the 
purposive mode of giving meaning to the wording of the statute. According to Singh, ‘[t]he 
determination of the purpose of the legislation requires a purpose-oriented approach, which 
gives due consideration to the contextual framework right from the outset.’24 This means 
that the Zimbabwe courts must consider the purpose of the Constitution as an overarching 
legislative instrument. The purpose of a Constitution is found in the country’s history. The 
judges will have to therefore engage with the historical context and give life to the 2013 
Constitution. This is necessary to optimize the transformation process in Zimbabwe. There 
is need to interpret the Constitution in a manner that is cognisant of the social, economic, 
political and cultural experiences of the country.  
This will need to be developed with a consideration of the transformative framework 
anchored in the interpretation and adjudication of human rights cases. There is need for the 
 
23 Willy Mutunga captures this: ‘Our Constitution cannot be interpreted as a legal-centric letter and text.  It is a 
document whose text and spirit has various elements built within its content, as amplified by the Supreme Court 
Act that is not solely reflective of legal phenomena.  This content reflects historical, economic, social, cultural, 
and political setting of the country and also its traditions.’ W Mutunga “The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and its 
interpretation: Reflections from the Supreme court's decisions” (2015) 1 (6) SPECJU 13.  
24 A Singh “The Impact of the Constitution on Transforming the Process of Statutory Interpretation in South 




Judges to build a consensus around such a framework to develop the country’s legal and 
political space in a direction that is informed by the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy.  
• Using a value-based/teleological approach 
The spirit and the values of the Constitution must be at the centre of all legal interpretation 
in Zimbabwe. The idea of constitutionalism must be manifested through the decisions of 
the Court as the guardian of the Constitution. This involves a change of attitude by the 
judiciary and synchronising their conduct with the hopes and aspirations of the people. 
There is no doubt that the Zimbabwe people aspire for a transformed society, and this value 
should always be at the centre of all the Courts’ decisions. Zimbabwe has a tainted human 
rights record, arising from a history of authoritarianism and a culture of political violence. 
The Constitution25 could not do much to curtail these. Thus, in interpreting the 2013 
Constitution, the Court must examine the events leading up to its adoption and ascertain 
meaning accordingly.  This is achieved by attaching ‘less than the usual weight to linguistic 
and purposive considerations and more than the usual weight to general legal values.’26 The 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of sections 59 and 86 in the case of DARE v Newbert 
Saunyama27 can be used as the basis upon which a new interpretation trajectory can be 
founded. In the DARE case, the Court broadly interpreted Section 59 which affords rights, 
and narrowly interpreted section 86 which limits rights. This has the effect of widening the 
enjoyment of the constitutional rights and restricting the operation of the limiting 
provisions, because of the human rights values found in the Constitution.   
6.4.2 Constitutional adjudication 
 
• Tactical adjudication  
Beyond just interpretation, to achieve transformation, the way a judgement is delivered or 
crafted is just as important as the decision itself. It has been observed throughout this thesis 
that the main challenge inhibiting transformation is the backlash that may arise from the 
 
25 The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980. 
26 Mureinik “Administrative Law in South Africa” (1983) 3 South African Law Journal cited by Singh (n 19 
above) at 54.  





political arms towards the judiciary.  As a consequence of the adoption of a constitution as 
the supreme law, judicial intervention in politics becomes inevitable.28 According to  Roux 
‘by exploiting ambiguities in the normative structure governing their decisions, courts can 
manage their relationship with the political branches to a considerable degree.’29 It is thus 
important that the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court be prepared to manage its relationship 
with the political branches. The most important thing for a Constitutional Court is to stay 
‘in business long enough to give meaningful effect to constitutional rights.’30 In so doing a 
court has to enlist several techniques during its adjudication. Lessons can be drawn from 
the South African where the Courts have been able to freely adjudicate on matters that 
ordinarily would be dealt with by the Executive and Legislature. This is despite the 
existence of “separation of powers” as one of the guiding principles in the country. In terms 
of the Constitution, the power to declare any law or conduct of the State as unconstitutional 
is vested in the Constitutional Court. Transformative adjudication requires that the courts 
embrace transition as was envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution. In South Africa, 
one of the ways that have been used by the courts to avoid confrontation with the State is 
by acknowledging that social transformation is a duty which primarily rests with the State.  
It is recommended that in the discharge of its duties, the Constitutional Court must not lose 
its independent reasoning and judgment. The Constitutional Court should make decisions 
that are conscious of Zimbabwe’s peculiarities and context. In particular, the Zimbabwe 
people longstanding yearn from the respect of human rights, advancement of rule of law 
and struggle for democracy should be at the centre of the court’s reasoning.   
Drawing from Roux’s tactical adjudication, it is recommended that the Zimbabwean courts 
develop their own model of adjudication. Roux’s analysis of South African courts 
adjudication may not fit squarely into the Zimbabwean context but this may be used as a 
foundation of reasoning of a similar nature. Flowing from that, the following is 
recommended;  
 
28 T Roux. “Legitimating transformation: political resource allocation in the South African Constitutional Court.” 
(2003) 10 (4) Democratization. 92-111 at 92. 
29 Ibid at 93. 





a) ‘Doctrinally redundant language to set the tone of its judgements.’31  
This is done by using scene-setting language, the tone or register will justify the decision 
made. According to Roux, the tone or register used in a judgment are as important as legal 
reasoning in the decision itself. As such, the court has to be wary of its word choice and the 
language framing its language.32 The South African Constitutional Court has particularly 
used this in order to maintain its institutional role. Roux notes that ‘in other cases, when 
finding in favour of the state, it (the Court) will resoundingly endorse the policy in question, 
often going quite far beyond what is necessary for purposes of making its decision.’33 This 
indicates that the tone or register used in a decision may help deliver a message in a way 
that is not confrontational thereby avoiding political backlash.  
b) ‘Preference for formulaic tests over substantial moral reasoning.’34  
The decisions of the South African Constitutional Court are particularly instructive in this 
regard. They have often ‘eschewed substantive moral reasoning in favour of casuistry or 
the articulation of formulaic tests.’35 This involves designing tests for the application of 
certain rights guided by moral premises that seek to expand the application of the right in 
question. This is done by means of interpreting legal texts, the constitution in particular, in 
a way that does not invite substantial moral reasoning. Roux acknowledges that this is not 
always applicable in all, there are some rights whose ‘philosophical dimensions cannot be 
sidestepped.’36  
 c) ‘The conversion of conceptual tests into discretionary standards.’37  
This is especially important in helping the Court to avoid being stuck on pre-conceived 
meanings and to use its discretion to determine what should be within the confines of the 
Constitution. As used in South Africa, such adjudicative moves ‘are not unconscious or 
whimsical. They are a part of a deliberate strategy on the part of the CCSA [Constitutional 
 
31 Ibid at 12. 
32 Roux (n30 above). 
33 Ibid  at 13. 
34 Ibid at 16. 
35 Ibid at 17.  
36 Ibid at 18 




Court of South Africa] to make the performance of its adjudicative function more context-
sensitive.’38 4 
d) ‘Interpreting constitutional texts so as to ensure pragmatic outcomes.’39  
This strategy complements the recommended purposive and teleological methods of 
interpretation. It is pragmatic in the sense that the provisions are construed in a way that 
gives effect to the purposes and values that underly the new constitutional dispensation. 
This strategy is aligned with the notion that transformative constitutions should be afforded 
generous or broad purposive interpretation. According to Roux, the purposive approach 
requires that ‘any ambiguity in the constitutional text must be resolved in favour of the 
interpretation that would best give effect to the purposes and values underlying the new 
constitutional order.’40 This however can mean different things for different jurisdictions. 
In more democratic jurisdictions, broad interpretation can be used to afford more rights and 
in authoritarian jurisdictions, broad interpretation can be used to yield adverse results.  
      6.4.3 Restoration of judicial independence  
 
Given the perceived impact of Constitutional Amendment 1 on the independence of the 
judiciary, the Amendment must be repealed or amended and provisions relating to the 
appointment of judges be restored to their original form. Amendment 1 currently impedes 
the judges from executing their role without fear or favour which is fundamentally 
detrimental to transformation project envisaged in the Constitution. Zimbabwe needs to 
draw lessons from the experience of Kenya and South Africa on how strong state 
institutions can be used to build or support an independent judiciary. From a political point 
of view, striking a balance of power between the Executive and Legislature would be a 
starting point for the restoration of judicial independence.  
I hope that this work will spark a more rigorous debate on the role of the Constitutional 
Court of Zimbabwe in the transformative agenda espoused in the Constitution. The 
precarious position that the Court finds itself in should not be underestimated, both legally 
and politically. Despite the odds, a more adventurous court would be more desirable than 
 
38 Ibid at 21.  
39 Ibid at 22.  




a timid one because the stakes are too high. There is a genuine need for transformation in 
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